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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § l%-2-2(3)(]).1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE 1: Did the Tax Court err in concluding that an agreement between the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("BOE") and Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
("ATK") to refund $5 million in one lump sum payment as satisfaction for disputed 
property tax valuation claims for tax years 1995-1999 was enforceable, legal and 
constitutional, where: 
(1) the form of the, agreement expressly failed to address the constitutional and 
statutory mandates that all property be assessed in proportion to its fair 
market value, stating that settlement was neither indicative nor dispositive 
of any valuation or exemption issue, thus ignoring the constitutional 
mandate of uniformity and equality and violating fundamental notions of 
fairness to all other taxpayers; 
]There is no direct statutory language under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 establishing 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over final orders and decrees of the district court review by 
trial de novo of formal adjudicative proceedings of the State Tax Commission. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601(1). However, the Supreme Court does have express 
jurisdiction over final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the State Tax Commission pursuant to Subsection 78-2-
2(3)(f) and over final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with the State Tax Commission pursuant to Subsection 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii). 
1 
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(2) the refund amount of $5 million was indivisible and non-allocatable 
between the various tax years with jurisdiction bifurcated between the Tax 
Court and the Tax Commission and the agreement provided no mechanism 
for implementation consistent with statutory provisions governing property 
taxation processes; 
(3) there was no statutory or common law authority permitting such a 
compromise of property taxes; 
(4) the agreement improperly sought to bind a subsequent government board 
concerning a governmental function; and 
(5) a material condition precedent to the agreement failed when the Tax 
Commission and the Tax Court rejected the agreement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application by the District Court of constitutional 
and statutory standards and determination of the validity of a tax settlement agreement 
present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction standard to issues of 
law and will not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. 
of the Utah Sate Tax Comm 'n, 922 P.2d 758 (Utah 1996); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1990). 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The issues were expressly preserved by the Tax 
Court on pages 13-15 [R. 2881] of its Final Order and Judgment dated June 30, 2003. 
2 
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ISSUE 2: Did the Tax Court err in determining that it had continuing 
jurisdiction over a failed or void agreement between the BOE and ATK to refund $5 
million in one lump sum payment as satisfaction for disputed valuation claims for 
property tax years 1995-1999 and in further concluding it was enforceable, legal and 
constitutional where 
(1) The Tax Commission had rejected the agreement and the parties proceeded 
to a formal hearing contrary to the terms of the agreement and the intent of 
the parties; 
(2) the Tax Commission determined the fair market value of ATK5 s real 
property setting values which were wholly inconsistent with the merits of a 
$5 million property tax refund; and 
(3) ATK had altered the consideration for the agreement which formed, in part, 
the benefit of the bargain by dismissing its personal property appeals 
pending before the Tax Commission. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application by the District Court of constitutional 
and statutory standards and determination of the validity of a tax settlement agreement 
present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction standard to issues of 
law and will not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Id. 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The issues were expressly preserved by the Tax 
Court on pages 13-15 [R. 2881] of its Final Order and Judgment dated June 30, 2003. 
3 
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ISSUE 3: Did the District Court err in holding that the Salt Lake County 
Assessor ("Gardner") was a party to and bound by an agreement to refund $5 million in 
one lump sum payment as satisfaction for disputed valuation claims for property tax 
years 1995-1999 without regard to fair market value and subject to attorney fees where 
(1) he was deliberately banned from participating in discussions leading up to 
the proposed Agreement and did not participate in any of its terms although 
he was a separately named party to one of the pending actions, and in fact, 
opposed the Agreement proposal as illegal and in violation of 
constitutional and statutory mandates; and 
(2) the agreement, on its face, was proposed by and drafted at the request of 
the BOE and not Gardner, and was accepted by ATK who acknowledged 
that the proposal came from the BOE, not Gardner, and who later drafted 
the Joint Motion to Approve the Settlement which expressly excluded 
Gardner as a party; and 
(3) the BOE agreed and told the Tax Court that Gardner was not a party to the 
proposed agreement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application by the District Court of constitutional 
and statutory standards and determination of the authority of a County Assessor and 
award of Attorney fees present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction 
standard to issues of law and will not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Kimball 
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Condos Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 642 
(Utah 1997). 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The issues were expressly preserved by the Tax 
Court on pages 13-15 [R. 2881] of its Final Order and Judgment dated June 30, 2003. 
ISSUE 4: Did the Tax Court err in holding that the BOE had the authority to 
bind Gardner to an agreement he was barred from participating in and which he 
determined was an illegal attempt to refund $5 million to ATK to settle five (5) tax years 
without any regard to fair market value? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Application by the District Court of constitutional 
and statutory standards and determination of the authority of a board of equalization 
present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction standard to issues of 
law and will not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Id. 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The issues were expressly preserved by the Tax 
Court on pages 13-15 [R. 2881] of its Final Order and Judgment dated June 30, 2003. 
5 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Proceedings. 
This is an appeal by the Salt Lake County Assessor Lee Gardner ("Gardner") and 
Granite School District ("Granite") challenging a Tax Court ruling which approved an 
agreement between the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("BOE") and Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK") to refund $5 million of property taxes in one lump sum 
payment, as satisfaction for disputed property tax valuation claims for tax years 1995-
1999 without regard to the fair market value assessment of ATK's real and personal 
property. Under the terms of the agreement, the $5 million lump sum was indivisible and 
non-allocatable between the various tax years and jurisdiction for approving the 
Agreement was bifurcated between the Tax Court and the Tax Commission. The 
agreement was rejected by the Tax Commission and by the Tax Court. However, after a 
formal hearing was held before the Tax Commission wherein the Tax Commission 
primarily sustained Gardner's assessments, the Tax Court reversed its prior ruling at the 
urging of ATK and approved the Agreement. Gardner and Granite challenge the 
legality, validity and enforceability of the agreement. 
II. Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition. 
1. At all times pertinent to the issues raised herein, ATK's real and personal 
property was subject to property tax assessment by Gardner. Pursuant to his 
constitutional and statutory duties, Gardner issued annual real and personal property tax 
assessments to ATK for each tax year from 1995 thru 1999. ATK appealed the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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assessments each year to the BOE. The BOE sustained Gardner's valuation methodology 
and values2 by decision for the 1995 and 1996 tax years. By stipulation, ATK bypassed 
the BOE and filed expedited appeals with the Tax Commission for the 1997 through 
1999 tax years. [R.2440]. 
1995 and 1996 valuation appeals 
2. ATK appealed the BOE's 1995 and 1996 real and personal property tax 
decisions to the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006. These two 
years were consolidated for formal hearing which was held and on 16 November 1999. 
The Tax Commission issued a ruling effectively upholding Gardner's adjusted 1995 and 
original 1996 assessments as sustained by the BOE. Both ATK and the BOE appealed 
the Tax Commission's determination to the Tax Court. These appeals were consolidated 
into one action and were pending before the Tax Court in the Fall of 2000. [R. 2881]. 
1997,1998 and 1999 valuation appeals 
3. ATK similarly appealed its 1997, 1998 and 1999 property tax assessments 
to the Tax Commission. These three tax years were also consolidated to determine the 
core issues of valuation methodology and the fair market value assessments of ATK's 
property for each tax year. All three tax years were pending before the Tax Commission 
in the Fall of 2000. [R.2440]. 
2The BOE heard the 1995 and 1996 valuation appeals and sustained Gardner's 
adjusted 1995 value and original 1996 assessment. Based on the adjustment, Salt Lake 
County refunded $240,363.55 of taxes and interest to ATK. 
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Independent Action 
4. In addition to these judicial and administrative appeals, ATK filed an 
independent action ("Independent Action") with the District Court on 6 February 1998. 
This Independent Action was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1327 which vests 
the District Court (Tax Court) with jurisdiction over actions to recover taxes paid under 
protest. [R. 25]. 
5. The Independent Action centered on ATK's challenge to the County's 
privilege tax assessment on ATK's business use and operation of the Naval Industrial 
Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP") which is owned by the United States Navy but used 
by ATK to conduct its business. ATK's Complaint sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against Salt Lake County and several named county defendants. ATK specifically 
named Gardner as a separate party to its complaint. Id. 
Settlement discussions 
6. In the early Fall of 2000, while the 1995 and 1996 real property tax 
appeals were pending in the Tax Court and the 1997 through 1999 real and personal 
property administrative appeals were pending before the Tax Commission, Gardner was 
informed that the BOE and ATK were discussing settlement of all proceedings. He 
learned that the proposed Agreement was to be a lump sum refund for all five (5) years, 
and submitted two letters to the BOE members expressing concern. He urged them not 
to settle on just a dollar amount, but to consider and resolve the valuation methodologies 
on their merits. Except for his attending a single meeting held on or around 18 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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September 2000, the BOE deliberately prohibited Gardner from attending and barred him 
from participating in any settlement discussions despite his being a named party in the 
Independent Action.. [R. 1741]. 
7. In November of 2000, Granite School District ("Granite") learned of the 
settlement discussions. As an impacted taxing entity, Granite School District was at risk 
to refund nearly half of any refund of property taxes to ATK. On 17 November 2000, 
Granite filed a Motion to Intervene in the administrative proceedings before the Tax 
Commission for tax years 1997 through 1999. [R. 2449]. Shortly thereafter, on 7 
December 2000, Granite filed similar Motions to Intervene in the Tax Court actions, 
including the Independent action. [R 1401, 1474]. 
8. On 30 November of 2000, ATK submitted a proposed Agreement to the 
BOE seeking a lump sum settlement. In that proposal, ATK listed the Assessor or 
"assessors" as party to the agreement. [R. 1707, 1708]. 
9. On 5 December 2000, the BOE countered with an offer to refund a lump 
sum of $5 million as settlement of all outstanding property tax claims for 1995 through 
1999. [R. 1412; Attachment 2]. In its counteroffer, the BOE eliminatedreference to 
Assessor or "assessors," contained in ATK's prior offer. On that same day, ATK 
accepted the BOE's counter offer. [R. 1411; Attachment 3]. 
10. On 6 December 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission publicly 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 
discussed the Agreement.3 [R. 1687]. During the public meeting, Gardner again voiced 
his objections to the Agreement. He explained that the proposed refund was unfair and * 
would, in effect, be asking other taxpayers to pay ATK's taxes. He asked the 
Commission not to approve the refund, but to allow the hearing to go forward before the ^ 
Tax Commission. Over Gardner's objections, the Commissioners approved the 
agreement. [R. 1683]. 
11. On 13 December 2000, Gardner, a named party in the Independent Action 
but not in the other appeals, filed a Motion to Intervene in the administrative proceedings 
before the Tax Commission for tax years 1997 thru 1999. [R. 2449]. Gardner also filed a { 
Motion to Intervene in the 1995 and 1996 Tax Court appeals on 26 December 2000. [R. 
1447]. v
 { 
12. On 15 December 2000, ATK and the BOE filed with the Tax Commission 
and the Tax Court a Stipulation of Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry 
i 
of an Order Approving Settlement.[R.1410, 1417]. Gardner and Granite both filed 
Memoranda opposing the Joint Motion to Approve the Settlement. [R. 1579, 1706]. 
13. On 2 January 2001, the former Salt Lake County Commission and Board of 
Equalization were replaced by a Mayor-Council Optional form of government. The new 
3In November of 1998, Salt Lake County voters approved an optional form of 
government which was to transition in over the ensuing two years. The optional form of 
government formally took effect 2 January 2001. Consequently, December of 2000 was 
the last month of office for Mark Shurtleff, Brent Overson and Mary Callaghan, the three 
Salt Lake Equalization Board members and Commissioners responsible for negotiating 
and approving the Agreement. 
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nine (9) member County Council and Board of Equalization subsequently reviewed the 
actions of the three (3) former Commissioners regarding the $5 million lump sum 
property tax refund and neither accepted nor rejected the agreement. The Tax Court 
would later label their position as one of "benign neutrality." [R.1752, 2881]. 
14. On 7 March 2001 the Tax Commission granted Gardner and Granite 
intervention in the administrative proceedings as a matter of right and rejected ATK and 
the BOE's Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement. [R. 2449]. 
15. Having rejected the Agreement, the Tax Commission and the parties 
moved forward with the administrative hearing. The Formal Hearing, held April 23-27, 
2001, was to determine the appropriate valuation methodology for assessing ATK's 
property and to determine the fair market value of its taxable property for tax years 1997 
thru 1999. [R. 2440]. 
16. On 19 September 2001 the Tax Commission issued its Final Decision and 
determined the fair market value assessment for ATK's real property to be $215,210,000, 
$212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for tax years 1997 through 1999 respectively.4 Id. 
17. The following day, on 20 September 2001, the Tax Court issued a 
memorandum decision wherein it also disapproved the Agreement stating 
[The Court] is of the opinion that the refund amount of $5 million is 
indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years. Therefore, 
even though this Court disagrees with the legal theory relied upon by the 
4The property taxes due on the values determined by the Tax Commission for tax 
years 1995 through 1999 do not support the $5 million property tax refund. 
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I 
Utah State Tax Commission, the Court has no option but to reluctantly 
disapprove of the Settlement Agreement As mentioned earlier, these 
disparate decisions are on a collision course which can best be resolved by ' 
Utah's appellate courts. 
The Tax Court, however, found Gardner to be a "nominal party" to the Agreement as an 
"officer" of Salt Lake County and ordered him to pay attorney fees for actively 
challenging the constitutionality and validity of the agreement. [R. 1987]. 
18. On 21 September 2001, ATK appealed the Tax Commission's Final < 
Decision in its 1997 thru 1999 administrative proceedings for ATK's real property to the 
Tax Court. Through a series of Court transfers by disqualification and assignment, and 
notwithstanding objection by the Defendants, the 1997 through 1999 Tax Court appeals 
were later transferred to Judge Lynn Davis. [R. 2324, 2318, 2315]. 
19. Shortly thereafter, on 27 September 2001, ATK filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal and Voluntary Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals 
with the Tax Commission, dismissing all of its pending personal property tax appeals < 
with the Tax Commission from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.5 [R. 2876]. 
20. On 14 November 2001, ATK filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Tax 
Court's Decision of 20 September 2001 asking the Tax Court to reconsider its rejection 
of the Agreement for lack of jurisdiction now that all pending ATK appeals (exclusive of 
personal property appeals which had been dismissed outright) were before Judge Davis. 
5ATK's obvious design for this dismissal was to completely divest the Tax 
Commission of any jurisdiction over any of ATK's personal and real property. 
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[R.2406]. 
21. On 30 June 2003, over the objections of Gardner, Granite and all other 
Defendants, the Tax Court granted ATK's Motion to Alter or Amend the Tax Court's 
Decision of 20 September 2001, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Order and Judgment approving the agreement. [R.2881]. 
22. Gardner and Granite thereafter filed their appeals herein on 25 July 2003 
and 29 July 2003, respectively. [R. 2945, 2953]. 
(3) Statement of Facts 
1. ATK is a manufacturer of solid rocket propulsion systems and composite 
structures. ATK owns and uses real and personal property in Salt Lake County which is 
subject to local property tax and privilege tax assessment. [R. 24, 2440]. 
2. For each tax year from 1995 thru 1999, Gardner duly issued real and personal 
property tax assessments to ATK as mandated by law. Each year, ATK appealed its real 
and personal property tax assessments to the Tax Commission. [R. 2878]. Appeals 
therefrom were later filed in the Tax Court for 1995 and 1996. [R. 2877]. 
3. ATK also filed an Independent Action with the District Court on 6 
February 1998, naming Gardner as a County defendant. [R. 25]. 
4. In early Fall of 2000, while all real and personal property administrative 
and judicial appeals were pending for these five (5) tax years, Gardner was informed that 
the BOE and ATK were discussing the possibility of settling all proceedings. [R. 1743]. 
5. Upon learning that the proposed Agreement was to be a single lump sum 
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property tax refund for five (5) separate tax years, Gardner submitted two letters to the 
BOE members expressing concern. He urged them not to settle on a dollar amount, but 
to consider and resolve the valuation methodologies on their merits. [R. 1737, 1734]. 
6. Except for a single meeting held on or around 18 September 2000, ATK 
and the BOE deliberately prohibited Gardner from attending any settlement discussions. 
[R. 1743]. 
7. By letter dated 30 November of 2000, ATK submitted a proposed 
Agreement to the BOE seeking a lump sum settlement. [R.1707]. ATK listed the 
Assessor or "assessors" to be party to the agreement. [R. 1708]. 
8. On 5 December 2000, the BOE countered offering to ATK a lump sum 
refund of $5 million to settle all outstanding property tax claims against Salt Lake 
County for 1995 through 1999. [R. 1412]. In its counteroffer, the BOE eliminated my 
reference to Assessor or "assessors," as contained in ATK's prior offer. [R. 1708]. The 
BOE told the Tax Court that Gardner was not a party to the Agreement. [R.2125]. 
9. On that same day, ATK accepted BOE's offer. [R. 1411, Attachment 3]. 
10. One day later, on 6 December 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission 
publicly discussed the Agreement. [R.1687]. During the public meeting, Gardner again 
voiced his objections to the form of the Agreement. He asked the Commissioners not to 
approve the refund explaining that the proposed refund was unfair and would, in effect, 
be asking other taxpayers to pay ATK's taxes. Id. The Commission rejected Gardner's 
request and approved the Agreement. [R. 1683]. 
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11. As of 6 December 2000, there had never been a hearing or finding that 
Gardner's original assessments, as adjusted by the BOE, were either illegal or erroneous. 
[R. 2440, 2881]. Except for the Tax Commission's earlier ruling on the 1995 and 1996 
appeals, no findings of fact or conclusions of law were ever made determining any issue 
raised by ATK on appeal, including valuation assessments, exemptions and the taxation 
of NIROP. This is consistent with ATK and the BOE's intent that the Agreement not be 
dispositive of any issue. [R. 1412, 2440, 2881]. 
5 December 2000 Agreement 
12. ATK and the BOE agreed to settle all claims in all outstanding actions for 
tax years 1995 through 1999 for a lump sum property tax refund of $5 Million. [R. 1412, 
Attachment 2]. The $5 million lump sum refund was indivisible and non-allocatable 
between the five (5) various tax years. Id. The Agreement states: 
In proposing a settlement amount of $5 Million dollars, the Board 
specifically makes this a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for 
the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No obsolescence percentage or amount will 
be applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a 
reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with 
respect to any issue raised in ATK's appeals. (Emphasis added). Id. 
13. The Agreement contains no reference to fair market value nor does it 
contain any statement fixing the assessed value of ATK's taxable property for any of the 
five (5) tax years. Id. 
14. The Agreement does not address the divisibility/severability of the $5 
million dollar settlement amount to separate years. The Agreement spans multiple tax 
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years and multiple jurisdictions. Id. 
15. The BOE and ATK further agreed that "[t]his settlement proposal is subject * 
to execution of a settlement agreement and stipulation incorporating the terms hereof, 
[and] final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the District Court. ..." Id. | 
16. Finally, the Agreement states 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in 
concert with ATK shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third i 
District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the 
settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner. In the 
event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-
breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in enforcing 
the settlement agreement. Id. 
17. ATK and the BOE deliberately barred Gardner from attending or 
participating in settlement discussions. He did not participate in negotiations nor did he
 { 
agree to its terms. He was not a party to the Agreement. [R 1743]. Nevertheless, based 
upon the Tax Court's ruling that Gardner was a "nominal party," and in light of the Tax 
Commission's rejection of the Agreement, Gardner repudiated the agreement on 22 
December 2001. [R2573]. 
18. The Tax Commission rejected the Agreement on 7 March of 2001. [R. 
2449]. In April of 2001, the parties moved forward to a Formal Hearing in the 1997 thru 
1999 tax years. [R. 2440]. 
19. The Tax Commission issued its Final Decision on 19 September 2001 
sustaining Gardner's valuation methodology and determining the fair market value for 
ATK's real property to be $215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for tax years 
17 
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1997 through 1999 respectively. Id. 
20. The values determined by the Tax Commission for tax years 1995 and 
1996 and 1997 through 1999 do not support and are wholly inconsistent with a $5 
million property tax refund contemplated by the Agreement. [R. 2440]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On 5 December 2000, the BOE and ATK entered into an Agreement to refund a 
lump sum of $5 million as a litigation settlement of all outstanding ad valorem tax claims 
for tax appeals 1995 through 1999. The Agreement was indivisible and non-allocatable 
between the various tax years. The Court should rule that the Agreement is void as 
against public policy, unlawful, invalid and unenforceable because it violates 
constitutional mandates and the Legislature's statutory scheme that all property be 
uniformly and equally assessed at fair market value. The $5Million five (5) year lump 
sum tax refund Agreement cannot be implemented because there is no statutory 
mechanism for refund of ad valorem taxes not based on fair market value assessments. 
The Agreement is also unlawful because it requires the approval of the Tax Court and the 
Tax Commission over a single refund that was indivisible and non-allocatable between 
the various tax years and neither the Tax Court nor the Tax Commission retained 
jurisdiction to approve the Agreement 
The BOE acted ultra vires by agreeing to a five year lump sum tax refund absent 
statutory authority and contrary to its constitutional and statutory duties. Taxing officers 
of state, county or municipality cannot compromise or release claims for taxes legally 
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assessed unless empowered to do so by statute. The attempt by the BOE to bind a 
subsequent legislative body was also void. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006 provides no 
authority to compromise taxes legally assessed. The BOE also has no authority to alter 
the fixed assessment of the Tax Commission. Further, the BOE had no authority to bind 
future legislative body. 
The five year tax refund Agreement is further unenforceable because, as an 
executory contract requiring approval by two separate tribunals, it fails since both the 
Tax Court and the Tax Commission rejected the Agreement. By proceeding to a formal 
hearing before the Tax Commission, ATK and the BOE acquiesced to the judgment of 
the Tax Commission and effectively repudiated the Agreement ATK's extreme second 
attempt to enforce the Agreement was an attempt, unilaterally, to rewrite the Agreement 
and thus it also fails for lack of mutual assent and consideration. ATK dismissed its 
personal property claims before the Tax Commission thereby altering the terms and 
consideration for the Agreement rending it invalid and unenforceable. 
Finally, the Tax Court's award of Attorney Fees is unsupported by the record and 
legally flawed. The Agreement was between ATK and the BOE and not the Assessor. 
Gardner was deliberately barred from settlement discussions. The written offer of 
settlement proposed by the ROE and accepted by ATK specifically excluded the 
Assessor as a party as did the subsequent Joint Stipulation for Approval of Settlement. 
The BOE has acknowledged that Gardner was not a party to the Agreement. If the BOE 
had intended to include Gardner in the proposed Agreement, it's actions would have 
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exceeded the scope of its authority and would have been arbitrary and capricious. 
Gardner, as the elected Assessor, has a legal right and duty independent of the BOE to 
ensure that all property in the county is assessed at fair market value. 
For all these reasons, the Court should rule that the Agreement is void, 
unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable, and deny an award of Attorney fees. The 
Court should further remand the matter back to the Tax Court for further proceedings to 
establish fair market value assessments consistent with Utah law. The Court should also 
remand to a different venue and substitute a different Judge based on the lack of 
resources and difficult caseload of Judge Davis. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The form of the Agreement between ATK and the BOE is contrary to public 
policy and unlawful. The Agreement is unconstitutional, invalid and 
unenforceable. 
It is an accepted rule that parties may not enter into stipulations which are 
"unreasonable" or "against good morals" or against "sound public policy." Brooklyn 
Bank v. O'Neil (324 U.S. 697, 704) quoted in In the Matter of Snowpine Villag 
Condominium Board of Mangers, v. Town of Great Valley, 144 Misc. 2d 1049; 545 
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. 1989). Contracts that are contrary to express statutes or to the 
policy of express statutes are illegal contracts and any such illegality voids the entire 
contract. Tanner Elec. Co-op, v. Puget South Power & Light Co,, 911 P.2d 1301 (Wash. 
1996); 17A C.J.S. §208. Agreements violating constitutional provisions are likewise 
illegal to the same extent as agreements violating enactments's of the legislature. U.S. v. 
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Biloxi Municipal School Distr., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963) Judgment afFd, 326 
F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964). 17A C.J.S. §213- Parties cannot abrogate statutory requirements 
by private contract. Baker v. Maclay Properties Co., 648 So.2d 888 (La. 1995). 17A 
C.J.S. §208. .-, i 
A. The form of the Agreement as a five year lump sum tax refund without 
reference to assessed values violates constitutional mandates and the 
Legislature's statutory scheme that all property be uniformly and 
equally assessed at fair market value. ^ 
On 5 December 2000, the BOE agreed with ATK to refund a lump sum of $5 
million as a litigation settlement of all outstanding ad valorem tax claims for 1995 . 
through 1999. [R. 1412, Attachment 2]. The Agreement between ATK and the BOE is 
wholly contained in the December 5th letter prepared by the BOE and appended hereto as 
Attachment 1. It states: 
The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999, 
inclusive and is in the amount of $5 Million dollars. 
In proposing a settlement amount of $5 Million dollars, the Board 
specifically makes this a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for 
the years 1995 - 1999 inclusive. No obsolescence percentage or amount 
will be applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a 
reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with 
respect to any issue raised in ATK's appeals. 
(Emphasis added). As agreed, settlement was to be based on a single lump sum refund < 
for all five (5) years. There was no reference to fair market value assessment nor any 
statement fixing the assessed value of ATK's taxable property for any of the five (5) tax 
years. The parties agreed that settlement was not to be ildispositive with respect to any 
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issue raised by ATK's appeals." In other words, the Agreement was not to be based on 
fair market value or "equalized" assessments for any of the five assessment years as 
required by Utah's constitutional and statutory scheme for ad valorem taxation. This 
failure to address fair market value assessment was not inadvertent, but deliberate. 
In an Affidavit filed by ATK, Brent Overson, a County Commissioner and 
member of the BOE, reflects on his participation in the negotiations for settlement of the 
ad valorem taxes for ATK for 1995 through 1999 stating: 
* 
(8) I made no review of the appraisals as is defined in the Uniform 
Standards of Appraisal Practice. At no time did I state or recommend a 
valuation for the Alliant Techsystems property that was apart of the 
aforementioned discussions. 
(Emphasis added). [R. 1770, Attachment 4]. Later, in one of its Responsive pleadings to 
the Tax Court, ATK acknowledges that the Agreement " . . . does not achieve anyone's 
concept of fair market value for the years 1995 -1999 inclusive. Neither does the 
Settlement Agreement prospectively establish property values." (Emphasis added). 
[R.2591, Attachment 3]. 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §§ 2(1) and 3(1) (1999) plainly mandate that "[a]U tangible 
property in the state not exempt... shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in 
proportion to its value" to ensure (<that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property.... (Emphasis added). To 
fairly allocate the burden of property taxation and achieve uniformity and equality, every 
assessment must be fixed in proportion to its value. ATK and the BOE failed to even 
mention fair market value in "their Agreement let alone settle on a fixed fair market value 
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assessment. Rather, they compromised solely on tax dollars in direct violation of 
constitutional and statutory mandates. 
The property tax is ad valorem - that is, it is based solely upon value.6 Under Utah 
law, assessments made by cojonty assessors and equalized by boards of equalization are 4 
the only basis of property taxation for political subdivisions of the State. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-302. Integrity in ad valorem tax administration requires strict adherence to 
fundamental constitutionally based principles of fairness, uniformity and equality which 
find expression only through the proper assessment and equalization of property values. 
i 
The nearly universally accepted^a/r market value standard is the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the \ 
relevant facts. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11). Fair market value assessments are 
paramount and at the very core of ad valorem taxation. Their critical role is simply 
demonstrated in the following illustration from the International Association of 
Assessing Officer's (IAAO) training text: 
Public budgets are divided by an aggregation offair market value assessments to derive a 
6
 (Emphasis added). Property Assessment Valuation, IAAO, p. 5 (1977) 
9.1 
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certified tax rate. The certified tax rate in turn is multiplied by fair market value 
assessments of individual properties to determine property taxes. 
Utah's Property Tax Act 
A brief review of Utah's Property Tax Act (Chapter 2 of Title 59) highlights the 
importance and attention given by the law to establishing and ensuring accurate fair 
market value assessments. Multiple statutory safeguards have been enacted to ensure 
integrity in the process and uniformity and equality in the application. 
First off, every assessor is to be fully acquainted with all property in the county. 
§303. As one of several elected administrative officers directly accountable to the people 
within his county, he and his deputies are to be trained and certified in performing their 
duties. §701, He must assess all property at fair market value, §103, Property values are 
to be updated each year based on a systematic review of current market data. §303.1. 
After preparing his assessment book containing the assessments of all real and personal 
property in the county, the assessor must swear an oath that all property is equally and 
uniformly assessed at fair market value, §311. The assessor may be liable on his bond 
for property assessed at less than fair market value through his willful failure or neglect 
of duty. §315, And the Tax Commission may take corrective action if the assessor fails to 
follow current mass appraisal standards. §303.1, 
To further assure proportionality and accuracy in value assessments, Utah law 
creates two tiers for administrative review of the assessor's work - the county board of 
equalization and the State Tax Commission. Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 11 (1999), The 
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county board adjusts and equalizes the assessor's fair market value assessment of all real 
and personal property within the county, subject to regulation and oversight by the Tax 
Commission. Id. Upon review, the board may increase or decrease any assessment 
contained in the assessment book so as to equalize the assessment of all classes of i 
property. §1003. A decision of the board on appeal must contain a fair market value 
determination and a conclusion that the value is properly equalized with comparable 
properties. §1004. Interested parties, including the assessor, may appeal the board's 
decision to the Tax Commission. §1006; Kimball Condos, 943 P.2d 642. 
i 
The Tax Commission supervises and administers the tax laws of the State. Utah 
Const. Art. XIII} §11 (1999). It maintains original assessment jurisdiction over specified 
properties and is charged with equalizing valuation assessments within and among the 4 
several counties. Id. The Tax Commission adopts standards, with the advice of the Utah 
Assessor's Association, to determine acceptable levels and valuation deviations within 
each county. §704.5. Each year the Tax Commission conducts assessment studies to 
determine the relationship between the market value shown on the assessment roll and 
i 
the market value of real property in each county. §704. Where significant value deviation 
occurs, the Tax Commission must order factoring or corrective action. Id. The Tax 
Commission is to adjust and equalize values with other comparable property if { 
equalization is raised and the Tax Commission determines that the fair market value 
deviates plus or minus 5% from comparable properties. §1006. The Tax Commission 
must annually investigate whether property is being assessed at fair market value. §1008. 
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If property is not assessed at fair market value, the Tax Commission must decrease or 
increase value to enforce the assessment at its fair market value and shall direct the 
assessor, board of equalization and auditor to correct the value. Id. Importantly, the 
assessor, board of equalization and auditor must make all increases or decreases as 
required by the Tax Commission to make the assessment of all property conform to its 
fair market value. Id. 
These numerous statutory safeguards exist to ensure that all property is uniformly 
and equally assessed at fair market value. In their haste to compromise, ATK and the 
soon departing BOE7 chose to ignore assessed values and focus only on tax dollars. 
Admittedly, ATK acknowledged a total disregard and abandonment of the legal standard 
of fair market value stating emphatically to the Tax Court below "the Settlement 
Agreement, like all such agreements, is a compromise, and for that reason, does not 
achieve anyone's concept of fair market value for the years 1995 -1999 inclusive." [R. 
2591]. In so doing, ATK an4 the BOE violated sound public policy embodied in 
fundamental constitutional and statutory mandates of proportional fair market value 
assessments. Gardner recognized the fundamental flaw in the actions of ATK and the 
BOE. As mandated by the strictures of his office, he attempted to dissuade their unlawful 
conduct, but was deliberately prohibited or "kicked out" from participating in 
discussions. [R. 1743, Attachment 5]. Because the Agreement violates constitutional and 
7The Agreement was approved by an outgoing three member BOE less than one 
month before Salt Lake County's new Mayor-Council optional form of government 
commenced. 
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statutory mandates, this Court must rule that the Agreement was illegal and therefore 
void ab initio. 
B. The $5Million five (5) year lump sum tax refund Agreement cannot be 
implemented. 
4 
In ad valorem taxation, the sole mechanism for reducing taxes is through reducing 
assessed values. See, Utah Code Ann, §§59-2-1001 (the clerk shall notify taxpayer of any 
adjustment in taxes resulting from a change in the taxable value); 59-2-321 (the property 
taxes of each taxing district shall be extended on the assessment book by the county 
auditor at the rate certified by the governing body); 59-2-1002 (the board of equalization j 
may direct assessor to enter new assessment when incomplete or incorrect); 59-2-1003 
(county boards of equalization may increase or decrease assessments); 59-2-1004 (the 
i 
decision of the board on real property appeal shall contain a determination of the 
valuation of property); 59-2-1005 (the basis of value of personal property may be 
appealed to commission); 59-2-1006 (on appeal, the commission may make any 
correction or change in the assessment); 59-2-1007 (at a hearing, the commission may 
increase, lower, or sustain the assessment); 59-2-1008 (the county assessors, county •, 
boards of equalization, and county auditors shall make all increases or decreases as may 
be required by the commission to make the assessment of all property within the county 
conform to its fair market value). 
Tax refunds in ad valorem taxation are value driven, that is, they flow as a product 
from a reduction in assessed values multiplied by a certified tax rate. The 5 December 
2000 Agreement contains no valuation assessments nor any reference to fair market 
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value. The Salt Lake County Auditor has no basis from which to apply a certified tax rate 
for a reduction in taxes. Consequently, there is no basis in law for an adjustment of taxes 
and the Agreement cannot be implemented. While the expectation of the parties may 
have been to allocate a reduction in value sometime in the future after approval by the 
Tax Commission and Tax Court, such allocated reduction was solely for refund 
calculation percentages and not to be dispositive with respect to any issue raised by 
ATK's appeals. [R. 1412, Attachment 2]. Gardner is not aware of any principle of law 
which would permit parties to an ad valorem tax dispute to ignore the law for settlement 
purposes. Because the Agreement cannot be implemented, the Court must rule the form 
of the Agreement is unlawful, invalid and unenforceable. 
C. Requiring the approval of the Tax Court and the Tax Commission 
over a single refund that was indivisible and non-allocatable between 
the various tax years rendered the Agreement invalid and 
unenforceable. Neither the Tax Court nor the Tax Commission 
retained jurisdiction to approve the Agreement 
The Agreement was expressly conditioned on final approval by the Tax 
Commission and the Tax Court. ATK and the BOE agreed "[t]his settlement proposal is 
subject to ... final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the District Court... " 
(Emphasis added). [R. 1412, Attachment 2]. The Agreement reflected a single lump sum 
tax refund for, "all claims in all outstanding actions for [tax years 1995 through 1999] 
involving real and personal property, [and] NIROP . . . . " The $5 Million refund was 
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indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years.8 These five years included 
I 
actions pending before the Tax Court and the Tax Commission. 
When the Agreement was reached, however, the Tax Court had jurisdiction over 
the 1995 and 1996 appeals, but not over the 1997 through 1999 appeals pending at the i 
Tax Commission. Conversely, the Tax Commission had jurisdiction only over the 1997 
through 1999 appeals, but not over the 1995 and 1996 appeals pending in the Tax Court. 
Neither tribunal had jurisdiction over all proceedings. Thus, had the Tax Court 
originally approved the Agreement, it would have ruled on the validity of a tax refund for 
( 
tax years over which it had no jurisdiction. Similarly, had the Tax Commission approved 
the Agreement, it would have ruled on the validity of a tax refund for tax years over 
which it had no jurisdiction and moreover, over two years in which it had already ruled < 
on the merits of valuation.9 It is axiomatic that a tribunal cannot rule on matters over 
which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See, Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287 
(Utah 2003); Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001). The conditional 
approval required by the Agreement which sought approvals by the Tax Court and the 
Tax Commission on matters over which neither tribunal had jurisdiction violates Utah 
law and renders the Agreement unlawful, invalid and unenforceable. 
8Tax Court ruling 20 September 2001. This conclusion led the Tax Court to reject 
the Agreement where jurisdiction was bifurcated between the Court and the Commission. 
9The Tax Commission fixed its valuation assessment for the 1995 and 1996 
appeals which had appealed de novo to the Tax Court. 
on 
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II. The BOE acted ultra vires by agreeing to a five year lump sum tax refund 
absent statutory authority and contrary to its constitutional and statutory 
duties. Taxing officers of state, county or municipality cannot compromise or 
release claims for taxes legally assessed unless empowered to do so by statute. 
Its attempt to bind a subsequent legislative body was also void. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006 provides no authority to compromise 
taxes legally assessed. 
In Logan City v. Allen, 44 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1935) this Court acknowledged the 
general rule of law that taxing officers cannot compromise claims for taxes legally 
assessed absent statutory authority to do so. This principle is controlling and dispositive. 
In Logan, Logan City sought personal judgments against the Cache County Board 
of Commissioners and the Tax Commission based upon their agreement to compromise 
taxes levied on hospital property for 1929, 1930 and 1931. In reaching its determination, 
this Court stated as a general rule, <(the taxing officers of state, county or a municipal 
corporation may not compromise or release claims for taxes legally assessed unless 
empowered to do so by statute. " (Emphasis added). Logan, 44 P.2d 1085. The 
important question to the Supreme Court was whether the Board and the Commission 
had authority to effect a settlement or compromise with the hospital and accept less than 
the total amount of tax interest and penalty. Supra. The Court stated that "//the officer 
acted within authority, it was because of the provisions of section 6054, Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, as amended. . .." (Emphasis added). Section 6054 expressly provided: 
In case property is sold to the county as purchaser pursuant to the 
provisions of law, and is subsequently assessed, no person shall be 
permitted to redeem from such sale except upon payment also of the 
amount of such subsequent assessment, interest, penalty and costs, unless 
in cases involving $250.00 or less, in the judgment of the county Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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commissioners and in all other cases in the joint judgment of the county 
commissioners and of the State tax commission, the interest of the state and 
the county will be subserved by accepting a less sum than the amount due 
for taxes, interest, penalty, and costs." 
(Emphasis added). Thus finding a statutory basis for the settlement, the Court sustained 
i 
the compromise. 
Unlike Logan, there was no statutory authority permitting the BOE to compromise 
and refund five (5) years of property taxes without reference to fair market value " 
assessments. ATK filed its appeals to the Tax Commission pursuant to the authority of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006. The plain language of Section 59-2-1006 permits a . 
taxpayer to appeal from a board of equalization decision to the Tax Commission for 
challenges concerning the assessment and equalization of property, or the determination 
i 
of any exemption in which the taxpayer has an interest. It authorizes the Tax Commission 
to "make any correction or change in the assessment or order of the county board of 
equalization" or to "adjust property valuations to reflect a value equalized with the * 
assessed value of other comparable properties," but it does not authorize the BOE or Tax 
Commission to compromise by refunding property taxes in the manner agreed to by ATK | 
and the BOE.10 Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006. 
10The legislature has provided a mechanism to the poor and indigent of abating or 
deferring property taxes. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1347 permits the county legislative body 
to adjust or defer taxes where "the best human interests and the interests of the state and 
the county are served."However, Utah courts have viewed abatement actions by taxing 
bodies generally as unconstitutionally granted tax exemptions. In State v. Salt Lake 
County, the Supreme Court said that "whether by exemption or abatement [the ultimate 
result] is the same . . .[T]he property is relieved from its burden of taxation contrary to 
the prohibition of our state constitution . . . . When the tax is abated or remitted after it Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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There has also been no showing that ATK's property taxes were illegally or 
erroneously assessed. In the administrative hearings for the 1995 and 1996 appeals, the 
Tax Commission sustained Gardner's 1995 adjusted and 1996 original assessment as 
sustained by the BOE. [See, Attachment 13]. On de novo appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-601, the Tax Court had yet to take any action that might have altered the Tax 
Commission's determination. No trial had been held and no evidence had been presented 
upon which a finding of illegality could be sustained. Because there was no evidence to 
the contrary, the Tax Commission's fixed assessments were lawful and correct. 
For the 1997 through 1999 appeals, no formal hearing had been held before the 
Tax Commission and no evidence had been presented when the Agreement was reached 
on 5 December 2000. Consequently, Utah law presumes the 1997 through 1999 
assessments were also correct. See, Beaver County v. WilTellnc, 995 P.2d 602 (Utah 
2000) quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm% 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 
1979) (unless a taxpayer shows substantial error or impropriety in an assessment, and 
provides a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Commission could adopt a lower 
valuation, the original assessment is presumed correct).11 Because there had been no 
has been levied . . . the mandates of the constitution that such burdens shall be 'equal and 
uniform' on all property within the state, except such as is exempt by the fundamental 
law . . . may be violated. 85 P.2d 851, 854 (citation omitted) but citing Utah Const. Art. 
XIII, § 2. 
1
'After the Tax Commission rejected the Agreement, the parties proceeded to 
formal hearing. The Tax Commission issued its Final Decision on 19 September 2001 
and sustained Gardner's valuation methodology. The Tax Commission determined the 
fair market value for ATK's real property to be $215,210,000, $212,559,000 and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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rulings to the contrary on the date the refund Agreement was reached, the valuation 
assessments for all five years had been legally assessed as a matter of law and could not 
be compromised. 
B. The BOE has uo authority to alter the fixed assessment of the Tax i 
Commission, 
The powers and duties of county boards of equalization are not plenary. They are 
constitutionally and statutorily limited. County boards adjust and equalize the valuation * 
and assessment of all real and personal property within the county, subject to regulation 
and oversight by the Tax Commission. (Emphasis added). Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 11; A 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1001. County boards may, with proper notice, "increase or 
decrease any assessment contained in any assessment book, so as to equalize the 
4 
assessment of all classes of property under Section 59-2-103 [at fair market value]," but 
they must make all increases or decreases as required by the commission to make the 
assessment of all property within the county conform to its fair market value.12 Utah * 
Code Ann. §59-2-1008. A decision of the board on appeal must contain a determination 
of the valuation of the property based on fair market value and a conclusion that the fair | 
market value is properly equalized with the assessed value of comparable properties. 
§59-2-1004. Any person dissatisfied with its decision, may appeal to the Tax 
I 
Commission. §59-2-1006. However, once an appeal is perfected, the county board loses 
$232,650,000 for tax years 1997 through 1999 respectively. [R. 2440]. < 
12
 For centrally assessed properties, a county board of equalization may not change 
any assessment fixed by the commission. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-802(3). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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jurisdiction over the assessment to the Tax Commission who then performs its 
constitutional duties. 
For 1995 and 1996, the Tax Commission ruled on valuation methodologies and 
fixed the fair market value of ATK's property. ATK appealed, but no evidentiary hearing 
had been held to alter the Tax Commission's fixed assessments. Because these 
assessments had been fixed by the Tax Commission and unaltered by the Tax Court, the 
BOE had no authority to alter them. 
After the Tax Commission rejected the Agreement, the Tax Commission held 
another evidentiary hearing and likewise fixed the fair market value for the 1997 through 
1999 tax years. Again, because these assessments had been fixed by the Tax Commission 
and unaltered by the Tax Court, the BOE had no authority to alter them. Thus, by 
entering a proposed Agreement to refund $5 million to ATK, the BOE acted beyond the 
scope of its authority and the Court must rule that proposed Agreement is unlawful, 
invalid and unenforceable. 
C. The BOE had no authority to bind a future legislative body. 
Utah law adheres to the general rule that governmental bodies, "in the exercise of 
governmental or legislative power cannot make a contract which is binding on the 
municipality after the end of such governing body's term of office." Bair v. Layton City 
Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902 (Utah 1957). See also, 10A E. McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations § 29.101 at 44 (stating that "the hands of successors cannot be tied by 
contracts relating to governmental matters.") Settlement agreements are governed by the 
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same rules which apply to contracts generally. See, Sackler v. Savin, 987 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (Utah 1995). 
Although Utah courts have not addressed this precise issue, other courts have. 
For example, in City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219 i 
(Ky. 1981), the city of Louisville entered into a settlement agreement whereby the City 
agreed to place certain property in a special taxing and service district with a reduced tax 
rate for a certain number of years. See Id. at 221. With regard to this issue the court said 
that "[t]he law is clear that a legislative body may not limit its power to act one way or 
I 
another in the future governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions." Id. at 224. 
The court, stating that "[it is beyond cavil that the power to tax and to set tax rates is a 
governmental function" held that the settlement agreement was void as against public ^ 
policy. Id. 
The BOE had no authority to bind the legislative body of the new Salt Lake . 
County Mayor - Council optional form of government which began January of 2001 into 
refunding $5 million property tax dollars. The collection, review and refund of ad 
i 
valorem taxes are the classic exercise of governmental functions. Because the Agreement 
between ATK and BOE sought to bind a subsequent legislative body in their exercise of 
a fundamental governmental function, i.e., the refund of ad valorem taxes, the Agreement I 
is void as against public policy and unenforceable. 
III. The five year tax refund Agreement is unenforceable because it was rejected . 
by both the Tax Court and the Tax Commission. ATK's extreme second 
attempt to enforce the Agreement attempts unilaterally to rewrite the 
Agreement and fails for lack of mutual assent and consideration. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The Agreement fails as an executory contract requiring approval by 
two separate tribunals because both the Tax Court and the Tax 
Commission rejected the Agreement. 
In the 5 December 2000 Agreement, ATK and the BOE entered into an executory 
contract wherein the BOE agreed with ATK to refund $5 million subject to "final 
approval by the Utah State tax Commission and the District Court...." [R. 1412, 
Attachment 2]. Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general 
contract actions. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995) citing Butcher v. Gilroy, 
744 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under well-established principles of contract 
interpretation, where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence 
or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require performance by the 
obligor, because the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right to demand 
performance, does not arise until that condition occurs or exists. Harper v. Great Salt 
Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1999) citing 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 628, at 16 (1960). Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the 
obligor of any duty to perform. Id. 
Approval by the Tax Commission and Tax Court are material conditions 
precedent to the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. However, both the Tax 
Commission and the Tax Court rejected the Agreement. On March 7, 2001, the Tax 
Commission issued its Order denying the Joint Motion for approval of Settlement and 
rejecting the Agreement. [R. 2449, Attachment 12]. On 20 September 2001, the Tax 
Court disapproved the Agreement ruling: 
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« 
While this Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction, it is of the opinion 
that the refund amount of $5 million is indivisible and non-allocatable I 
between the various tax years. Therefore, even though this Court disagrees 
with the legal theory rplied upon by the Utah State Tax Commission, the 
Court has no option but to reluctantly disapprove of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
I 
[R. 1987]. Because a material condition precedent failed to occur, the Agreement failed 
and was invalid and unenforceable. 
A similar ruling was reached by the Indiana Supreme Court in Indiana State 
Highway Com yn v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Indiana 1998). Seey Attachment 11. In 
Curtis, the Indiana Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a settlement agreement d 
that explicitly required the approval of a component of a party was binding on the party 
without that approval. In reaching its decision, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: 
I 
As a general rule, an express condition must be fulfilled or no liability can 
arise on the promise that the condition qualifies. 5 Williston, Contracts 675 
(3rd ed. 1961) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts 225. If a condition 
does not occur, performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become 
due and if the condition can no longer occur, the duty is discharged. 
(Citations omitted). 
The Indiana Supreme Court ruled as a matter of contract law, that "because INDOT 
i 
approval was required by the settlement agreement, and that approval was not obtained, 
the agreement, as to the easement provisions, is not enforceable." Similarly, this Court 
should rule that because Tax Commission and Tax Court approval was required by the i 
Agreement, and because that approval was not obtained, the Agreement is invalid and 
unenforceable.
 g 
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B. By proceeding to a formal hearing before the Tax Commission, ATK 
and the BOE acquiesced to the judgment of the Tax Commission and 
repudiated the Agreement rendering it invalid and unenforceable. 
On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission issued its Order denying the Joint Motion 
for approval of Settlement. [R. 2449]. However, rather than challenge the Tax 
Commission's denial, the parties proceeded to formal hearing on the merits of ATK's 
1997 through 1999 administrative appeal claims during the week of April 23 through 
April 27, 2001. On 19 September 2001, the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision and substantially upheld the values determined 
by Gardner's appraiser for 1997 through 1999. [R. 2440]. By proceeding to formal 
hearing, all parties to the Settlement acquiesced in the Tax Commission's denial of the 
Settlement and effectively repudiated the Agreement rendering it invalid and 
unenforceable. 
It is well settled in Utah that in case a party to an action accepts the benefits of a 
judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a judgment against him he thereby waives his right 
to have said judgment reviewed on appeal. See, Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co. 
790 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1990); Tree v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); 
Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117(1920) (citing 2 
Cyc. 644; 3 C. J. p. 665, section 536); see generally Annotation, Appeal-Payment of 
Judgment-Effect, 39 A.L.R.2d 153 (1955) 
In Cingolani, 790 P.2d 1219 the Utah Court of Appeal explained that the Utah 
Supreme Court had applied this general doctrine using diverse legal theories in its 
'18 
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rationale, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. The Court noted 
I 
For example, in Ottenheimer, 188 P. at 1118, the court held that the 
appellant company, in surrendering premises to the respondent/owners in 
accordance with the judgment appealed from, had "abandoned" its appeal 
and "waived" its right to have the appellate court decide the question of 
whether appellant had a valid lease of the property. In Trees,738 P.2d at 4 
613, the court examined the appellant's compliance with a trial court's 
judgment of specific performance in light of established estoppel factors, 
including respondent's reliance on appellant's surrender of the property and 
acceptance of the respondent/buyer's money. In Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 
656 P.2d 409(Utah 1932), the court held that a real estate purchaser's ' 
appeal from a judgment of forfeiture was moot because of the purchaser's 
post-judgment payment of the entire balance of the real estate contract in 
compliance with the judgment. See also Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 
655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982) (defendant's appeal dismissed as moot where it j 
had accepted payment under the judgment appealed from and executed a 
written satisfaction of judgment). 
790 P.2d 1219. The legal theories and principles supporting this doctrine are applicable 
4 
to the facts at hand. Rather than appeal the Tax Commission's denial of the Settlement 
Agreement, the BOE and ATK acquiesced in the denial and proceeded to formal hearing. 
At significant expense, the parties submitted their respective appraisals and cross 
examined witnesses to determine the value of ATK's real property for 1997 through 
1999. In doing so, ATK (and the BOE) effectively repudiated the Agreement and 4 
waived its right to further challenge the Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement. In 
failing to receive approval by the Tax Commission, the Agreement necessarily fails and 
ATK has waived its right to pursue the matter further. The Court should now rule that the 
Agreement is invalid and unenforceable. 
i 
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C. By dismissing its personal property claims before the tax commission, 
and proceeding without Tax Commission approval, ATK unilaterally 
attempted to rewrite the Agreement, altering the terms and 
consideration for the Agreement thereby rending it invalid and 
unenforceable. 
On September 27, 2001, approximately six days after filing its Petition for Judicial 
Review to the Tax Court, ATK filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary Dismissal of 
the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing all its 
pending appeals with the Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax 
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive. [R.2881]. The obvious purpose of this 
action was an extreme attempt by ATK to cure the jurisdictional defect in the form of the 
Agreement by placing the matter solely before the Tax Court for approval. In its Motion 
to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision, ATK states 
[T]his Court rendered a Tax Court Decision on September 20, 2001 that 
upheld as "legal, enforceable and constitutionally sanctioned" the 
Settlement Agreement to resolve and settle all property tax disputes 
between ATK and the County from 1995 to and including 1999. The court 
declined to approve the settlement because, at the time, the Court did not 
have jurisdiction over the case involving 1997, 1998 and 1999. Following 
a decision of the Tax Commission involving the years 1997, 1998, and 
1999, ATK appealed by trial de novo those years to this Court. Now this 
Court has all of the five years covered by the Settlement Agreement before 
it, and ATK urges the^court to approve the Settlement Agreement in its 
entirety and to issue an Order to enforce it. 
[R. 2406]. However, by dismissing the personal property claims and ignoring the Tax 
Commission's prior rejection, ATK has unilaterally attempted to rewrite the Agreement 
by altering the terms of its conditions and consideration. Its actions further repudiate the 
Agreement rendering it invalid and unenforceable for failure of consideration. 
Af\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The proposed refund of $5 million was to include "all claims in all outstanding 
actions for those tax years involving real and personal property, NRIOP, 
(Emphasis added). [R. 1412, Attachment 2]. Thus, consideration for the BOE's $5 
million refund offer specifically included ATK claims over its personal property. When 4 
ATK withdrew and voluntarily dismissed its personal property claims before the Tax 
Commission, it altered the fundamental consideration for the proposed Agreement 
resulting in a failure of consideration. 
"Failure of consideration [as opposed to lack of consideration] exists wherever 
one who has either given or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to 
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that performance." Aquagen 
Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust 972 P.2d 411 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). If a failure of i 
consideration occurs, the contract ceases to exist and is unenforceable. Id. (citation 
omitted). ATK's extreme action in withdrawing its personal property claims, thereby 
altering its consideration, further evidences the illegality of the Agreement and the error 
of the Tax Court in approving it. The Court should rule that by such action, the 
1 
Agreement ceased to exist and thus remained unenforceable. 
D. The Tax Court erred in validating an executory Agreement which had 
been rejected by the Tax Commission and subsequently unilaterally 
rewritten altering the consideration of the parties without affirmative i 
mutual assent 
The lower Tax Court erred in validating an executory Agreement which had been 
rejected by the Tax Commission. Once the condition precedent failed, the Agreement 
became invalid and unenforceable. The Agreement failed. There was no reason or 
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authority which allowed the Tax Court to revisit the failed Agreement and validate it, 
especially after ATK attempted to unilaterally rewrite the Agreement by altering the 
consideration and to move forward without affirmative mutual assent by the BOE. The 
Tax Court advanced little or no legal justification for its ruling but did express some 
frustration with the case.13 It is further evident that ATK was successful before the Court 
below in a second attempt to validate the Agreement based on timing and court 
assignments, neither of which should form a legal basis for approving the failed 
Agreement. This Court should reverse the Tax Court's final decision and rule the 
Agreement is unlawful, invalid and unenforceable. 
IV The Tax Court's award of Attorney Fees is unsupported by the record and 
legally flawed. 
In its 30 June 2003 final ruling, the Tax Court awarded Attorney fees to ATK 
against Gardner in the amount of $30,000. The Tax Court ruled that Gardner was a 
"nominal party to the Settlement Agreement," and had "breached the Settlement 
Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather than seeking to secure it 
approval. [R. 2881]. The claims by ATK below that Gardner was a party to the proposed 
Agreement and was therefore bound by its terms and obligated to advance its approval 
13The Tax Court began its June 2002 decision stating "[arguments were 
entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. Counsel were advised that the 
written decision would be delayed because the issues are complex and unique, the 
briefing is extensive, and the Court does not have the benefit of a law clerk. In addition, 
the Court is handling over a hundred cases in the Municipal Division assignment on 
many days and occasionally two hundred to three hundred cases per day. Attempting to 
find contemplative time to consider the profound arguments of counsel in a case of this 
importance and magnitude is mind-boggling." 
A~> 
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are erroneous, wholly without merit, and disingenuous. Gardner was deliberately 
"kicked out" of settlement discussions and never participated in its terms. When he 
learned of the proposal, he actively opposed it. The Court's ruling on attorney fees is 
unsupported by the record and legally flawed. | 
A. The Agreement was between ATK and the BOE and not the Assessor. 
Gardner was deliberately barred from settlement discussions. 
ATK argued below to the Tax Court that "[o]n December 5, 2000, Alliant and ' 
'Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys' entered into a Settlement Agreement..." 
(Emphasis added). [R. 1666]. This statement was inaccurate and misleading. The actual | 
settlement letter of 5 December 2000 from Mr. Hendrickson begins "ftjhe Board has 
requested me to communicate a final settlement offer to you ... ." (Emphasis added). 
ATK's letter of acceptance also dated 5 December 2000 states "[ATK] hereby accepts 
the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's counter-offer in settlement as stated in 
your letter to me dated December 5, 2000." (Emphasis added). [R. 1412]. The settlement * 
counteroffer was issued by the BOE, and not by "Salt Lake County, its officers and 
attorneys." 14 The counteroffer was accepted and agreed to only by ATK. j 
Gardner was also not involved as a party in any way in the settlement discussions. 
He was, rather, deliberately barred from attending discussions. [R. 1743, Attachment 5]. 
i 
His deliberate exclusion from the discussions was based in part, on his vocal opposition 
14Reference to "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys" in the Settlement 
Agreement was to a condition of conduct and was not to identify the parties who entered 
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to the efforts and conduct of ATK and the BOE. In September of 2000, the Assessor 
sent two letters to each BOE member formally objecting to settlement discussions. [R. 
1737, 1734, Attachment 5]. During a meeting he attended on 18 September 2000, 
Gardner further expressed his objections to the settlement and the inequities it would 
create with other taxpayers within the county. Id. He indicated that such a settlement 
would violate fair market value and asked the BOE to reverse it's decision to offer a 
settlement to allow the appeals process to take its natural course. Id. At no other time 
following the September 18th meeting was Gardner invited to attend any further meetings 
between ATK, the BOE and Jhe Attorney's Office, including any meetings that may have 
led up to the issuance of the December 5, 2000 settlement letter from Karl Hendrickson 
to Maxwell Miller. 
During the public meeting on 6 December 2000, Gardner publicly voiced his 
objections to the Agreement. He explained that the proposed refund was unfair and 
would be like asking other taxpayers to pay ATK's taxes. He asked the BOE not to 
approve the refund, but allow the hearing to go forward before the Tax Commission. 
Notwithstanding Gardner's objections, the Agreement was ratified. 
B. The written offer of settlement proposed by the BOE and accepted by 
ATK specifically excluded the Assessor as a party as did the 
subsequent Joint Stipulation for Approval of Settlement. 
Under Utah law, a stipulation is to be construed like other contracts or written 
instruments. Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 
UT 11, f^ 39. The plain language of a stipulation will control its interpretation unless 
44 
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the language is ambiguous or uncertain. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991). * 
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered . . . . A judge should therefore consider any 
credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention . . . . If after | 
considering such evidence the court determines that the interpretations 
contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract, 
then extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms . . . . " 
Yeargin, 2001 UT 11, *| 39, quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass yn, 907 P.2d 264 ' 
(Utah 1995). 
Attachment 8 is a true and correct copy of a letter dated 30 November 2001 from . 
Maxwell Miller (ATK) to Karl Hendrickson (BOE) setting forth a counter offer proposal 
to the BOE. [R. 1708]. Paragraph 4 states 
4 
Salt Lake County, its officers, attorneys and assessors, shall, in good faith 
and acting in concert with ATK, secure an appropriate Order from the 
Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the 
Settlement Agreement and Stipulation in an expeditious manner. 
4 
(Emphasis added). By its own terms, ATK considered "assessors" in a category separate 
and apart from "officers" and "attorneys." ATK's counter offer was rejected by the BOE 
i 
on 5 December 2000, when the BOE responded with a counter offer that included the 
following: 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in < 
concert with ATK, shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third 
District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the 
settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner. 
(Emphasis added). In the BOE's counter offer, reference to "assessors" was deleted. ' 
The exclusion is intentional when one compares the precision by which the BOE 
AZ 
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included every other term contained in the earlier condition proposed by in its November 
30th letter. 
Gardner, in the good faith discharge of his statutory duties, petitioned the Tax 
Court below to reconsider its decision to include him as a nominal party to the 
Agreement based on pleadings prepared by ATK, signed by the BOE and filed with the 
Tax Court and Tax Commission. On December 14, 2000, parties to the December 5th 
Settlement Agreement filed with the Court a Stipulation For Settlement And Joint 
Motion For Approval And Entry Of An Order Approving Settlement. [R. 2064]. The 
Stipulation was prepared by ATK. In the Stipulation, ATK defines as parties itself and 
Defendants Salt Lake County; Larry Richardson, in his official capacity as 
Salt Lake County Treasure; Mary Callaghan, Mark Shurtleff and Brent 
Overson, in their official capacities as the Salt Lake County Commission, 
and the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization {"County Board'). 
(Emphasis Added). Gardner has been excluded from the list of party defendants.15 
Later in the Stipulation, Paragraph 3 states "[o]n December 5, 2000, Alliant and 
the County Board agreed to a Settlement of all the foregoing matters." (Emphasis 
added). By defining the County Board to exclude the Assessor, ATK, the County 
Commissioners and the BOE recognized and agreed that Gardner was not a party to the 
Agreement.16 These Joint Stipulations demonstrate plain and unmistakable 
15ATK identified the party defendants to the Stipulation in precisely the same 
manner as it did in the caption to the lawsuit, with the exception that Lee Gardner, in his 
official capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is excluded. 
16The Stipulation directly contradicts ATK's claim below that Gardner was in fact 
a party. 
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acknowledgments by ATK and the BOE that Gardner was not a party to the Agreement. 
The BOE has further acknowledged to the Tax Court that Gardner was not a party 
to the Agreement. In its Objection to ATK's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement filed on 24 October 2001, the | 
BOE states "[ATK] specifically excluded Mr. Gardner as one of the parties to the 
agreement. It excluded him for the simple reason that everyone understood that he was 
i 
neither a party to the Agreement, nor consented to be bound by its terms." [R. 2126, p. 3, 
Attachment 10]. More directly, in its Memorandum opposing Alliant's Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Tax Court Decision filed on 24 December 2001, "the Board does not 
believe that the Assessor was a party to the Settlement Agreement...." [R. 2497, p. 3, 
Attachment 10]. ( 
The record below does not support an award of attorney fees against Gardner. The 
Court should reverse the Tax Court's ruling on the award of attorney fees. 
4 
C. If the BOE had intended to include Gardner in the proposed 
Agreement, it's actions would have exceeded the scope of its authority 
and would have been arbitrary and capricious. Gardner, as the elected 
Assessor, has a legal right and duty independent of the BOE to ensure j 
that all property in the county is assessed at fair market value. 
If the BOE had intended to include Gardner in the Agreement without his 
approval, its actions would have exceeded the scope of its authority would have been f 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Gardner is an independently elected County Official. His rights and duties are 
defined by statute. He is directed to assess all property located within the county, not 
An 
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otherwise assessed by the Tax Commission, at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its 
fair market value. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-301 and 59-2-102. When a taxpayer 
challenges a valuation of real property before the board of equalization, "the assessor or 
any deputy whose testimony is needed shall be present, and may make any statement or 
introduce and examine witnesses on questions before the board." (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(5). Under such a challenge, the duties and authority of a 
County Board of Equalization are constitutionally and statutorily limited. It is required to 
adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within 
the county, subject to regulation and control by the commission as prescribed by law.17 
If the Assessor is dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of 
equalization, he has an independent statutory right to appeal that decision to the Tax 
Commission. "Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of 
equalization concerning the assessment and equalization of any property, or the 
determination of any exemption in which the person has an interest, may appeal that 
decision to the commission " Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006(1). The right to appeal 
continues into the district court and/or to the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
59-1-601; 63-46b-16; 59-1-610 and 78-2-2. See, Kimball Condos Owners Ass'n v. 
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 642 (Utah 1997). See also, 
Howell v. County Bd. of Cache County Ex Rel. IHC Hosps., Inc. 881 P.2d 880 (Utah 
1994); and Yorgason v. County Bd of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653 (Utah 1986). 
See Section II (D) below. 
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In Kimball Condos Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, 943 P.2d 642 (Utah 1997), the Salt Lake County Assessor took an appeal from ' 
the Board of Equalization's decision with respect to the 1990 valuation of the Kimball 
condominiums. The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization had rejected the Assessor's 4 
valuation method for the year 1990. 
In its challenge before the Utah Supreme Court, the taxpayer, Kimball Condo 
i 
Owner's Association, asserted that county assessors do not have the statutory authority to 
appeal the decisions of boards of equalization and, therefore, the Assessor's appeal of the 
1990 assessment was void. The Tax Commission had analyzed the issue in some detail 
and had ruled that the Assessor did have standing to appeal. The Utah Supreme Court 
agreed and held that the Tax Commission properly allowed the Salt Lake County I 
Assessor to file an appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006. From a public policy 
perspective, the Court noted: 
i 
"if the assessor had no right of appeal from board of equalization decisions, 
many decisions would be insulated from review altogether. Certainly, 
taxpayers who successfully contest an assessment would have no reason to 
appeal, if a board of equalization erred in construing constitutional or
 g 
statutory provisions in the a taxpayer's favor. In that case, the decision 
would stand because there would be no one who both would and could 
appeal. Consequently, the constitutional requirements that assessments be 
both uniform and represent fair-market value would be undermined." 
i 
Kimball Condos Owners Ass'n, 943 P.2d 642. The Assessor has a duty to ensure that 
assessments be both uniform and represent fair market value. 
The Agreement represents a significant tax dollar refund to ATK. It implicitly ^ 
invalidates the assessed values placed on the real and personal property of ATK and the 
49 
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methodologies employed by Gardner to value the property. Its application will result in 
disparate tax treatment for taxpayers within the County in violation of constitutional and 
statutory mandates. As a matter of public policy, if this Agreement is allowed to stand, 
whenever the BOE disagrees with the Assessor or the Assessor's right to challenge a 
BOE decision, all the BOE needs to do is take off their BOE "hat" and put on their 
settlement "hat" and we will have lost an important check and balance on the system. 
Gardner not only had the legal right, but the duty to ensure that ATK's property within 
the county was assessed at fair market value. If the BOE had acted to bind Gardner 
without his approval, the BOE's actions would have been arbitrary and capricious. 
Gardner maintains the legal right to challenge the Agreement. 
The Tax Court's final ruling awarding Attorney Fees to ATK is in error and must 
be reversed. There is no factual or legal basis for the award. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein, the Court should rule that the Agreement is void, 
unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable, and deny the award of Attorney fees. The 
Court should further remand the matter back to the Tax Court for further proceedings to 
establish fair market value assessments consistent with Utah law. Upon remand, Gardner 
urges the Court to change venue and substitute a different Judge based on the lack of 
resources and difficult caseload expressed by Judge Davis. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of April, 2004. ^\w] VV, Vy/vA 
Kelly W. Wri feht 
Attorney for n)efendent-Int< 
Appellant Salt Lake Co ow 
venor 
\nty Assessor 
sn 
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ADDENDIX 
A copy of the following documents are appended hereto and incorporated herein: 
(1) Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
(2) Agreement letter and Acceptance between BOE (Henderickson) and ATK 
(Miller) consisting of two letters dated 5 December 2000. [R. 1412, 1411]. 
(3) Excerpt from ATK's Responsive pleading dated 15 January 2002 stressing 
that the refund Agreement does not achieve anyone's concept of fair 
market value. [R. 2591] 
(4) Affidavit of Brent Overson (BOE) dated 20 February 2001. [R. 1771]. 
(5) Affidavit of Lee Gardner with Attachments. [R. 1743]. 
(6) Salt Lake County Commission Minutes of 6 December 2000 [R. 1687]. 
(7) County Clerk letter dated 6 December 2000 reflecting Commission 
approval of Agreement [R. 1683]. 
(8) ATK letter offer to BOE dated 30 November 2000. [R. 1708]. 
(9) Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an 
Order Approving Settlement. [R. 2065]. 
(10) Excerpts from BOE objection pleadings dated 22 October 2001 and 21 
December acknowledging that Gardner was not a party to the refund 
Agreement. [R* 2126, 2495]. 
(11) Indiana State Highway Com 'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Indiana 1998). 
(12) Tax Commission Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement [R. 
2449.] 
(13) Tax Commission ruling for 1995 and 1996 assesments. 
(14) Tax Commission ruling for 1997 through 1999 assessments. [R. 2440]. 
(15) Tax Court final ruling of 30 June 2003. [R. 2881]. 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. Art XIII, § 2(1) (1999) 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or 
under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
Utah Const. Art XIII, §§ 3(1) (1999) 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall prescribe by law such 
provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its 
tangible property, provided that the Legislature may determine the manner and extent of 
taxing livestock. 
Utah Constitution Article XIIL Section 11 (1999) 
The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the tax laws of the State. It 
shall assess mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of property among the several counties. Under such regulations in such cases 
and within such limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, it shall.. . equalize the 
assessment and valuation of property with the counties. The duties imposed upon the 
State Board of Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of this State shall be 
performed by the State Tax Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall be a County Board of Equalization consisting of 
the Board of County Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of Equalization 
shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property 
within their respective counties, subject to such regulation and control by the State Tax 
Commission as may be prescribed by law. The State Tax Commission and the County 
Boards of Equalization shall each have such other powers as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
< 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-210. General powers and duties (1999) 
The powers and duties of the commission are as follows: 
(3) to adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and laws of the state, to 
govern county boards and officers in the performance of any duty relating to assessment, * 
equalization, and collection of taxes; 
#** 
(5) to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state; 
(7) to exercise general supervision over assessors and county boards of equalization 
including the authority to enforce Section 59-2-303.1, and over other county officers in 
the performance of their duties relating to the assessment of property and collection of 
taxes, so that all assessments of property are just and equal, according to fair market 
value, and that the tax burden is distributed without favor or discrimination; < 
(8) to reconvene any county board of equalization which, when reconvened, may only 
address business approved by the commission and extend the time for which any county 
board of equalization may sit for the equalization of assessments; 
(9) to confer with, advise, and direct county treasurers, assessors, and other county 
officers in matters relating to the assessment and equalization of property for taxation ( 
and the collection of taxes; 
(10) to provide for and hold annually at such time and place as may be convenient a 
district or state convention of county assessors, auditors, and other county officers to 
consider and discuss matters relative to taxation, uniformity of valuation, and changes in
 ( 
the law relative to taxation and methods of assessment, to which county assessors and 
other officers called to attend shall attend at county expense; 
* * * , 
(12) to cause complaints to be made in the proper court seeking removal from office of 
assessors, auditors, members of county boards, and other assessing, taxing, or disbursing ( 
officers, who are guilty of official misconduct or neglect of duty; 
*** 
(15) to examine all records relating to the valuation of property of any person; 
*** 
(19) to visit periodically each county of the state, to investigate and direct the work and 
methods of local assessors and other officials in the assessment, equalization, and 
taxation of property, and to ascertain whether the law requiring the assessment of all 
property not exempt from taxation, and the collection of taxes, have been properly 
administered and enforced; 
(20) to carefully examine all cases where evasion or violation of the laws for assessment 
and taxation of property is alleged, to ascertain whether existing laws are defective or 
improperly administered; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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*## 
(23) to correct any error in any assessment made by it at any time before the tax is due 
and report the correction to the county auditor, who shall enter the corrected assessment 
upon the assessment roll; 
(25) to perform any further duties imposed by law, and exercise all powers necessary in 
the performance of its duties; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601(1) (1999) 
(I) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-46b-15, beginning July 1, 1994, 
the district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by 
the commission after that date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
UTAH'S PROPERTY TAX ACT (1999) (TITLE 59, CHAPTER 2) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-102(11) Definitions 
(II) "Fair market value11 means the amount at which property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy 
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of 
taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable 
to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable probability of a 
change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the 
change would have an appreciable influence upon the value. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-103(1) Rate of assessment of property 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301. Assessment by county assessor. 
The county assessor shall assess all property located within the county which is not 
required by law to be assessed by the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-302. Basis of property taxation for political subdivision. 
The assessments made by: 
(1) the county assessor, as equalized by the county board of equalization and the 
commission; and 
(2) the commission, as apportioned to each county, city, town, school, road, or other 
district in their respective counties, 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-303. General duties of county assessor. 
(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the names of the ( 
owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county, and shall assess the 
property to the owner, claimant of record, or occupant in possession or control at 12 
o'clock midnight of January 1 in the tax year, unless a subsequent conveyance of 
ownership of the real property was recorded in the office of the county recorder more 
than 14 calendar days before the date of mailing of the tax notice. In that case, any tax * 
notice may be mailed, and the tax assessed, to the new owner. No mistake in the name or 
address of the owner or supposed owner of property renders the assessment invalid. 
(2) A county assessor shall become fully acquainted with all property in his county, as 
provided in Section 59-2-301. < 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-303.1. Mandatory cyclical appraisals. 
(1) Beginning January 1, 1994, each county assessor shall annually update property 
values of property as provided in Section 59-2-301 based on a systematic review of { 
current market data. In addition, the county assessor shall complete a detailed review of 
property characteristics for each property at least once every five years. 
(a) The commission shall take corrective action if the commission determines that: 
(i) a county assessor has not satisfactorily followed the current mass appraisal standards, { 
as provided by law; 
(ii) the sales-assessment ratio, coefficients of dispersion, or other statistical measures of 
appraisal performance related to the studies required by Section 59-2-704 are not within 
the standards provided by law; or . 
(iii) the county assessor has failed to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1). 
(b) For purposes of this section, "corrective action" includes: 
(i) factoring pursuant to Section 59-2-704; 
(ii) notifying the state auditor that the county failed to comply with the requirements of 
this section; or 
(iii) filing a petition for a court order requiring a county to take action. 
(2) (a) By July 1, 1993, each county assessor shall prepare a five-year plan to comply 
with the requirements of Subsection (1). 
(b) The plan shall be available in the county assessor's office for review by the public 
upon request. 
(c) The plan shall be annually reviewed and revised as necessary. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-311- Completion and delivery of assessment book - Signed 
statement required - Contents of signed statement. 
Prior to May 22 each year, the assessor shall complete and deliver the assessment book 
to the county auditor. The assessor shall subscribe and sign a statement in the assessment 
book substantially as follows: 
I, , the assessor of County, do swear that before 
May 22, (year), I made diligent inquiry and examination, and either personally 
or by deputy, established the value of all of the property within the county subject to 
assessment by me; that the property has been assessed on the assessment book equally 
and uniformly according to the best of my judgment, information, and belief at its fair 
market value; that I have faithfully complied with all the duties imposed on the assessor 
under the revenue laws including the requirements of Section 59-2-303.1; and that I have 
not imposed any unjust or double assessments through malice or ill will or otherwise, or 
allowed anyone to escape a just and equal assessment through favor or reward, or 
otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-315. Liability for willful failure or neglect of duty - Action 
on official bond - Judgment. 
(1) The assessor and sureties are liable on the official bond for all taxes on property 
within the county which, through willful failure or neglect, is not assessed or which has 
been willfully assessed at less than its fair market value. 
(2) The county attorney shall, upon showing of proper evidence and upon written 
demand by the commission or the county legislative body, commence and prosecute to 
judgment an action upon the assessor's bond for all taxes lost from willful failure or 
neglect in assessing property. 
(3) If, during the trial of the action against the assessor, the value of the unassessed or 
underassessed property is determined, the assessor is liable for the difference between the 
amount of taxes collected and the amount of taxes which should have been collected 
pursuant to law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-321. Extension of taxes on assessment book. 
(1) The property taxes of each city, town, school, and special taxing district shall be 
extended on the assessment book by the county auditor at the rate certified by the 
governing body of the city, town, school, and special taxing district at the time the state 
and county taxes are extended. 
(2) The whole tax shall be carried into a column of aggregates, and shall be collected by 
the county treasurer at the time and in the manner provided by law for collecting state 
and county taxes. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-701. Appraisal by certified or licensed appraisers only -
Certification of elected county assessors. 
(1) Any person performing an appraisal for purposes of establishing fair market value of 
real estate or real property for the assessment roll shall be the holder of an appraiser's 
certificate or license issued by the Division of Real Estate under Title 61, Chapter 2b, 
except uncertified or unlicensed appraiser trainees may, for up to 36 months after the 
date of hire or appointment as an appraiser trainee, appraise property under the direction 
of a holder of an appraiser's certificate or license issued by the division. 
(2) The limitations on appraisal authority under Subsections 61-2b-10(1) and (2) and 
Section 61-2b-13 do not apply to a person performing an appraisal for purposes of 
establishing fair market value for the assessment roll. 
(3) The commission may prescribe additional requirements for any person performing an 
appraisal for purposes of establishing fair market value for the assessment roll. 
(4) The commission may, by rule, establish qualifications for personal property 
appraisers exempt from licensure under Title 61, Chapter 2b, Real Estate Appraiser 
Licensing and Certification Act. 
(5) It is the duty of a county assessor, as established in Section 17-17-1, to ensure that 
the assessor's office is in compliance with this section and any additional rules or 
requirements for property appraisers established by the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-704. Assessment studies - Sharing of data - Factoring 
assessment rates - Corrective action. 
(1) Each year, to assist in the evaluation of appraisal performance of taxable real 
property, the commission shall conduct and publish studies to determine the relationship 
between the market value shown on the assessment roll and the market value of real 
property in each county. The studies shall include measurements of uniformity within 
counties and use statistical methods established by the commission. County assessors 
may provide sales information to the commission for purposes of the studies. The 
commission shall make the sales and appraisal information related to the studies available 
to the assessors upon request. 
(2) The commission shall, each year, order each county to adjust or factor its assessment 
rates using the most current studies so that the assessment rate in each county is in 
accordance with that prescribed in Section 59-2-103. The adjustment or factoring may 
include an entire county, geographical areas within a county, and separate classes of 
properties. Where significant value deviations occur, the commission shall also order 
corrective action. 
(3) If the commission determines that sales data in any county is insufficient to perform 
the studies required under Subsection (1), the commission may conduct appraisals of 
property within that county. 
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(4) If a county fails to implement factoring or corrective action ordered under Subsection 
(2), the commission shall: 
(a) implement the factoring or corrective action; and 
(b) charge 100% of the reasonable implementation costs to that county. 
(5) If a county disputes the factoring or corrective action ordered under Subsection (2), 
the matter may be mediated by the Multicounty Appraisal Trust. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-704.5. Commission to adopt rules - Legislative review. 
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and 
after receiving the advice of the Utah Assessors Association, the commission shall by 
rule adopt standards for determining acceptable assessment levels and valuation 
deviations within each county. The standards shall be used for determining whether 
factoring or corrective action is required under Subsection 59-2-704(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-801. Apportionment of property assessed by commission. 
(1) Before May 25 of each year, the commission shall apportion to each tax area the total 
assessment of all of the property the commission assesses as provided in Subsections 
(l)(a) through (f). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-802. Statement of commission transmitted to county 
auditors - Contents of statement - Duties of auditors - Change of assessment 
prohibited. 
(1) The commission shall, before June 8, annually transmit to the county auditor of each 
county to which an apportionment has been made a statement showing: 
(a) the property assessed; 
(b) the value of the property, as fixed and apportioned to the tax areas; and 
(c) the aggregate amount of taxable value placed in dispute by property owners within 
the county pursuant to Section 59-2-1007. 
(2) The county auditor shall enter the: 
(a) statement on the county assessment roll or book; and 
(b) amount of the assessment apportioned to the county in the column of the assessment 
book or roll which shows for the county the total taxable value of all property. 
(3) A county board of equalization may not change any assessment fixed by the 
commission. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001. County board of equalization - Public hearings -
Hearing officers - Notice of decision - Rulemaking. 
(1) The county legislative body is the county board of equalization and the county 
auditor is the clerk of the county board of equalization. 
(2) The county board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of the real and personal property within the county, subject to regulation and 
control by the commission as prescribed by law. The county board of equalization shall 
meet and hold public hearings each year to examine the assessment roll and equalize the 
assessment of property in the county, including the assessment for general taxes of all 
taxing entities located in the county. 
(3) For the purpose of this chapter, the county board of equalization may appoint hearing 
officers for the purpose of examining applicants and witnesses. The hearing officers shall 
transmit their findings to the board, where a quorum shall be required for final action 
upon any application for exemption, deferral, reduction, or abatement. 
(4) The clerk of the board of equalization shall notify the taxpayer, in writing, of any 
decision of the board. The decision shall include any adjustment in the amount of taxes 
due on the property resulting from a change in the taxable value and shall be considered 
the corrected tax notice. 
(5) During the session of the board, the assessor or any deputy whose testimony is 
needed shall be present, and may make any statement or introduce and examine witnesses 
on questions before the board. 
(6) The county board of equalization may make and enforce any rule which is consistent 
with statute or commission rule, and necessary for the government of the board, the 
preservation of order, and the transaction of business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1002. Change in assessment - Force and effect - Additional 
assessments - Notice to interested persons. 
(1) The county board of equalization shall use all information it may gain from the 
records of the county or elsewhere in equalizing the assessment of the property in the 
county or in determining any exemptions. The board may require the assessor to enter 
upon the assessment roll any taxable property which has not been assessed and any 
assessment made has the same force and effect as if made by the assessor before the 
delivery of the assessment roll to the county treasurer. 
(2) During its sessions, the county board of equalization may direct the assessor to: 
(a) assess any taxable property which has escaped assessment; 
(b) add to the amount, number, or quantity of property when a false or incomplete list has 
been rendered; and 
(c) make and enter new assessments, at the same time canceling previous entries, when 
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any assessment made by the assessor is considered by the board to be incomplete or 
incorrect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-10G3. Power of county board to increase or decrease 
assessment. 
The county board of equalization may, after giving notice as prescribed by rule, increase 
or decrease any assessment contained in any assessment book, so as to equalize the 
assessment of all classes of property under Section 59-2-103. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004. Appeal to county board of equalization - Real 
property - Time period for appeal - Decision of board - Extensions approved by 
commission - Appeal to commission. 
(1) (a) A taxpayer dissatisfied with the valuation or the equalization of the taxpayer's real 
property may make an application to appeal by: 
*** 
(4) (a) The county board of equalization shall meet and hold public hearings as 
prescribed in Section 59-2-1001. 
(b) The county board of equalization shall make a decision on each appeal filed in 
accordance with this section within a 60-day period after the day on which the 
application is made. 
(c) The commission may approve the extension of a time period provided for in 
Subsection (4)(b) for a county board of equalization to make a decision on an appeal. 
(d) The decision of the board shall contain a determination of the valuation of the 
property based on fair market value, and a conclusion that the fair market value is 
properly equalized with the assessed value of comparable properties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1005. Procedures for appeal of personal property valuation 
- Time for appeal - Hearing - Decision - Appeal to commission. 
(1) The county legislative body shall include a notice of procedures for appeal of any 
personal property valuation with each tax notice. If personal property is subject to a fee 
in lieu of tax or the uniform tax under Article XIII, Sec. 14, Utah Constitution, and the 
fee or tax is based upon the value of the property, the basis of the value may be appealed 
to the commission. 
(2) Any taxpayer dissatisfied with the taxable value of the taxpayer's personal property 
may appeal by filing an application no later than 30 days after the mailing of the tax 
notice. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 59-2-1006. Appeal to commission - Duties of auditor - Decision 
by commission. . 
(1) Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization 
concerning the assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any 
exemption in which the person has an interest, may appeal that decision to the 
commission by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the appeal with the 
county auditor within 30 days after the final action of the county board. * 
(2) The auditor shall: 
(a) file one notice with the commission; 
(b) certify and transmit to the commission: < 
(i) the minutes of the proceedings of the county board of equalization for the matter 
appealed; 
(ii) all documentary evidence received in that proceeding; and 
(iii) a transcript of any testimony taken at that proceeding that was preserved; and < 
(c) if the appeal is from a hearing where an exemption was granted or denied, certify and 
transmit to the commission the written decision of the board of equalization as required 
by Section 59-2-1102. 
(3) In reviewing the county board's decision, the commission may: i 
(a) admit additional evidence; 
(b) issue orders that it considers to be just and proper; and 
(c) make any correction or change in the assessment or order of the county board of 
equalization. 
(4) In reviewing the county board's decision, the commission shall adjust property 
valuations to reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable 
properties if: 
(a) the issue of equalization of property values is raised; and 
(b) the commission determines that the property that is the subject of the appeal deviates 
in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed value of comparable properties. 
(5) The commission shall decide all appeals taken pursuant to this section not later than 
March 1 of the following year for real property and within 90 days for personal property, 
and shall report its decision, order, or assessment to the county auditor, who shall make 
all changes necessary to comply with the decision, order, or assessment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007. Objection to assessment by commission - Application -
Contents of application - Amending an application - Hearings - Appeals. 
(1) (a) If the owner of any property assessed by the commission, or any county upon a 
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showing of reasonable cause, objects to the assessment, the owner or the county may, on 
or before June 1, apply to the commission for a hearing. 
(b) The commission shall allow the following to be a party at a hearing under this 
section: 
(i) the owner; and 
(ii) the county upon a showing of reasonable cause. 
(2) The owner or county shall include in the application under Subsection (l)(a): 
(a) a written statement setting forth the known facts and legal basis supporting a different 
fair market value than the value assessed by the commission; and 
(b) the owner's or county's estimate of the fair market value of the property 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1008. Investigations by commission - Assessment of escaped 
property - Increase or decrease of assessed valuation. 
(1) Each year the commission shall conduct an investigation throughout each county of 
the state to determine whether all property subject to taxation is on the assessment rolls, 
and whether the property is being assessed at fair market value. When, after any 
investigation, it is found that any property which is subject to taxation is not assessed, 
then the commission shall direct the county assessor, the county board of equalization, or 
the county auditor, as it may determine, to enter the assessment of the escaped property. 
(2) If it is found that any property in any county is not being assessed at its fair market 
value, the commission shall, for the purpose of equalizing the value of property in the 
state, increase or decrease the valuation of the property in order to enforce the assessment 
of all property subject to taxation upon the basis of its fair market value, and shall direct 
the county assessor, the county board of equalization, or the county auditor, as it may 
determine, to correct the value of the property in a manner prescribed by the commission. 
(3) The county assessors, county boards of equalization, and county auditors shall make 
all increases or decreases as may be required by the commission to make the assessment 
of all property within the county conform to its fair market value. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1009. Equalization based on reports of county auditors. 
Before July 7 the commission shall examine and compare the reports of the county 
auditors and shall equalize the assessment of the taxable property of the several counties 
of the state for the purpose of taxation. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1011. Record of changes - Form and contents of signed 
statement. 
The county auditor shall make a record of all changes, corrections, and orders and 
before October 15 shall affix a signed statement to the record, subscribed by the auditor, 
in a form substantially as follows: 
< 
I, , do swear that, as county auditor of county, I have kept correct 
minutes of all acts of the county board of equalization regarding alterations to the 
assessment rolls, that all alterations agreed to or directed to be made have been made and 
entered on the rolls, and that no changes or alterations have been made except those 
authorized by the board or the commission. * 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321. Erroneous or illegal assessments - Deductions and 
refunds. 
The county legislative body, upon sufficient evidence being produced that property has 
been either erroneously or illegally assessed, may order the county treasurer to allow the 
taxes on that part of the property erroneously or illegally assessed to be deducted before 
payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest, and costs paid more than once, or erroneously or 
illegally collected, may, by order of the county legislative body, be refunded by the i 
county treasurer, and the portion of taxes, interest, and costs paid to the state or any 
taxing entity shall be refunded to the county, and the appropriate officer shall draw a 
warrant for that amount in fe^or of the county. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1347. Redemption - Adjustment or deferral of taxes. 
(1) (a) If any interested person applies to the county legislative body for an adjustment or 
deferral of taxes levied against property assessed by the county assessor, a sum less than 
the full amount due may be accepted, or the full amount may be deferred, where, in the
 { 
judgment of the county legislative body, the best human interests and the interests of the 
state and the county are served. Nothing in this section prohibits the county legislative 
body from granting retroactive adjustments or deferrals if the criteria established in this 
subsection are met. 
(b) If any interested person applies to the commission for an adjustment of taxes levied 
against property assessed by the commission, a sum less than the full amount due may be 
accepted, where, in the judgment of the commission, the best human interests and the 
interests of the state and the county are served. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16 Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize 
the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making 
body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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ATTACHMENT 2 
Agreement letter and Acceptance between BOE 
(Henderickson) and ATK (Miller) consisting of two 
letters dated 5 December 2000. [R. 1412, 1411]. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAVID E.YOCOM Mil UM Hint 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CIVIL DIVISION JERRY G. CAMPBELL KENT S.LEWIS 
CHIEF DEPUTY Assistant Director 
WILLIAM R HYDE 
Division Director 
December 5. 2000 
Maxwell A. Miller 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2218 
RE: Settlement of Outstanding Alliant Tech Litigation 
Dear Max: 
The Board has requested me to communicate a final settlement counteroffer to you to be 
presented to your client. The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999, 
inclusive, and is in the amount of $5 Million dollars. That settlement number includes all claims 
in all outstanding actions for those tax years involving real and personal property, NIROP, and is 
inclusive of all interest, both that accruing prior to the issuance of the judgments or orders and 
that accruing after the issuance of the judgments or orders through the date of final payment. 
In proposing a settlement amount of $5 Million dollars, the Board specifically makes this 
a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No 
obsolescence percentage or amount will be applied to any particular year under appeal and any 
allocation of a reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with respect to any issue raised in 
Alliant's appeals. Specifically included within that category are claims as to excessive or 
extraordinary functional obsolescence, economic or external obsolescence, environmental 
contamination and remediation, and any stigma associated therewith. With respect to the 
personal property inclusion within the settlement amount, acceptance of the settlement shall 
include all issues which have been asserted with respect to personal property, including but not 
limited to existence or non-existence of items of property, extraordinary functional obsolescence 
economic or external obsolescence associated with production equipment and unresolved issues 
related to previously filed personal property affidavits by Alliant and audits performed by Salt 
Lake County. This settlement proposal is subject to execution of a settlement agreement and 
stipulation incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and 
the District Court and entry of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to authorize Salt Lake 
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET, S3600 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84190-1200 TELEPHONE (801) 468-3420 FAX (801) 468-2646 
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Maxwell A. Miller 
December 5, 2000 
Page 2 
County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all refunds paid 
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy. Payment of the refund, at the taxing 
entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of 
the judgment levy. 
This settlement shall be deemed by the parties to be a litigation settlement of disputed 
claims. To that end, in the event the settlement is not accepted, none of the communications nor 
correspondence relating to the settlement shall be introduced or produced by any party nor shall 
they be deemed admissible including by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the parties in 
any proceeding relating to the matters in dispute or any subsequent proceeding involving Alliant 
or Alliant's successors in interest. In the event the settlement is accepted, the prohibition against 
production, introduction, or admissibility in any proceeding shall extend to any and all 
correspondence, communications relating to the settlement proposal, the settlement adoption and 
the actual settlement documents themselves, including therein pleadings, orders and judgments 
except as may be required to enforce the terms of the settlement 
Unless prohibited by an order entered in the intervention proceedings, the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation shall be signed and filed with the Third District Court and the Utah 
State Tax Commission, as the case may be, no later than December 15, 2000. Payment of the 
refund, at each taxing entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or 
from the proceeds of the judgment levy no later than December 31, 2001. 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in concert with 
Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State 
Tax Commission approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious 
manner. 
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching 
party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. 
^ R L L. HENDRICKSON 
Deputy District Attorney 
Tax & Revenue Unit Chief 
Telephone: (801)468-2657 
pc: David Yocom 
Mark Shurtleff 
Brent Overson 
Mary Callaghan 
cw.wp.word.kJh.OOItrs.klh 
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201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111-2218 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0898 
Telephone 801 532-1234 
Facsimile 801 536-6111 
E-Mail: pbl@pblutah.com 
A PROFESSIONAL 
LAW CORPORATION 
December 5, 2000 
Maxwell A. Miller 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial 
801 536-6790 
E-Mail 
MMiller@pblutah.com 
Karl Hendrickson 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State St., Suite S-3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Re: Settlement in Alliant Techsystems v- Salt Lake County Bd. of 
Equalization, 1995-1999 real property and personal property tax 
litigation 
Dear Karl, 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. hereby accepts the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization's counter-offer in settlement as stated in your letter to me dated December 5, 
2000. * 
Yours sincerely, 
(jkih^HMi^~-^-
Maxwell A. Miller 
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ATTACHMENT 3 
Excerpt from ATK's Responsive pleading dated 15 
January 2002 stressing that the refund Agreement does 
not achieve anyone's concept of fair market value. 
[R.2591] 
t 
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RANDY M. GRIMSHAW (1259) 
MAXWELL A. MILLER (2264) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER; 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY 
HORIUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in their 
official capacities as the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants, 
v. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE/REPLY 
TO: (1) TAX COMMISSION'S 
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 
ALLIANT'S MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND TAX COURT 
DECISION ; 
(2) SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO 
AMEND OR DISMISS ALLIANT'S 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF; 
(3) GRANITE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND TAX COURT DECISION; 
and 
(4) SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND TAX COURT 
DECISION 
(civil nos. shown on next page) 
o U i. 0 .) ; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
« 
I 
validity, and, accordingly, "any disapproval by the Tax Commission was sufficient to invalidate 
4 
the Agreement and render it unenforceable." Assessor Memorandum at 6. Granite repeats 
essentially the same argument, stating "The Settlement Agreement is unenforceable because a 
condition precedent [the Tax Commission's approval] failed." Granite Memorandum at 5. Such | 
arguments are specious for three reasons: 
First, this Court properly held that the Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and 
constitutionally sanctioned." Decision at 24. Not liking the Decision, the Assessor's 
Memorandum, Granite's Memorandum, and the Tax Commission's Memorandum rehash the 
previously advanced and rejected arguments against the Settlement Agreement, the gist of which 
is that settlement agreements of property tax cases that do not establish fair market value for each 
of the years at issue are illegal. Assessor Memorandum at 8. Granite Memorandum at 7. Tax 
Commission Memorandum at 6. In response, Alliant stresses that the Settlement Agreement, ^ 
like all such agreements, is a compromise, and for that reason, does not achieve anyone's 
concept of fair market value for the years 1995-1999 inclusive. Neither does the Settlement 
1 
Agreement prospectively establish property values. Alliant further refers the Court to its prior 
memoranda, with emphasis on the following: 
• For the Assessor to argue the Settlement Agreement is void because it { 
neither establishes value nor is in accord with the Tax Commission's final 
order in the 1997-1999 valuation cases is without merit. There is no case 
law that states or implies a settlement is something other than a 
compromise, or that one party must be totally vindicated for settlements to 
be binding and enforceable. This policy of compromise in settlements is ^ 
no different in a property tax context. Were that not so, literally hundreds 
of settlement agreements the Tax Commission and the courts have 
routinely approved over the years in property tax disputes would likewise 
be void. Such agreements do not arrive at fair market value from either 
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DATED this J$_ day of January, 2002. 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ATTACHMENT 4 
Affidavit of Brent Overson (BOE) dated 
20 February 2001. [R. 1771]. 
P 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
AFFIDAVIT 
Salt Lake County Assessor Case No. 99-0190 
v. Salt Lake Tax Commission 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
I, Brent Overson state and allege as follows: 
1) I was the Chief Deputy Assessor of Salt Lake County from January 1987 to 
February 1990. 
2) I was Vice President of Strategis Asset Valuation and Management Company 
from February 1990 until it was acquired by Real Estate Tax Services. 
3) I was Regional Vice President of Real Estate Tax Services from February 
1990 until December 1992. 
4) I was the Vice President of Real Estate for Trailside General Stores from 
March 1983 until December of 1985. I was responsible for the review of all 
real estate valuations for the company in eleven western states and the 
appeal of such valuation when appropriate. Trailside was regional retail 
chain with annual revenues of over $25 million. 
5) As a member of the 2000 Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, I did 
participate in and negotiate a settlement of the property taxes for Alliant 
TechSystems for the property tax years 1995 through and including 1999. 
6) As a member of the 2000 Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, I read 
the appraisals completed by Ed Kent, Salt Lake County Appraiser; Robert 
Reilly, appraiser for Alliant TechSystems; and Phil Cook, appraiser for the 
Salt Lake County Assessor. 
7) Although I am a state certified general appraiser, my participation in reading, 
discussing and negotiating a settlement of the Alliant TechSystems property 
taxes was solely done in my official capacity as a member of the 2000 Board 
of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 
RECEIVE® 
F&19 2MI 
APPW.S SECTION 
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8) I made no review of the appraisals as is defined in the Uniform Standards of 
Appraisal Practice. At no time did I state or recommend a valuation for the 
Alliant TechSystems property that was a part of the aforementioned 
discussions. 
9) Upon reading the Ed Kent Appraisal I was concerned about his "Supplement 
to Complete Appraisal" dated July 29, 1998. He made a substantial reduction 
in his overall valuation from the original appraisal without sufficiently clear 
explanation as to the reduction. This reduction was primarily related to the 
land value which was generated by a combination of computer assisted mass 
appraisal techniques and the use of additional land sales, but with out 
explanation as to which mass appraisal techniques and how the use of the 
additional land sales was integrated. 
10) In the Supplement to the Complete Appraisal, he stated that "because of the 
newness of the Bacchus West Plant, improvements locate here suffered no 
loss of value attributed to functional obsolescence. This did not take into 
consideration the changes of use for this facility and its underutilization for the 
purpose for which it was built. 
11) Kent also stated that "external obsolescence was determined with the 
assistance of two economic professionals". These professionals are not 
identified nor is their work explained. 
12) The Phil Cook appraisal was not a full appraisal within the terms of USPAP. 
His assignment was to determine economic obsolescence. But his report 
concludes an overall value of the Alliant TechSystems property. He accepted 
the Kent Appraisal, but did not explain why. Failure to explain why he had 
accepted Kent's Valuation led me to believe that there was not a thorough 
review by Cook of Kent's valuation conclusions. 
13) Cook utilized a method of calculation economic obsolescence that is more 
appropriately applied to state assessed properties. His use of a stock and 
debt approach, which attempts to quantify any economic obsolescence based 
on the stock value and net profit of Alliant TechSystems. This approach 
would not properly account for the valuation of the real property of such 
nationally known companies as Amazon.com. Amazon.com has never 
recorded a profit, but its stock value has been incredibly high and low at 
times. Using Cook's approach, the valuation of the real property of 
Amazon.com or any other publicly traded company would change based on 
stock market conditions and profit margins. 
14) Cook's reliance on capitalization on net profit does not take into account the 
difference in management of like companies. Company A and company B 
may be in the same business but one may have a higher stock price and net 
profit because of the quality of its management team. This should have no 
bearing on the value of its real property assets. 
15) The reading of these appraisals lead me to believe that Salt Lake County was 
at risk of losing its case before the Utah State Tax Commission, the Third 
District Court or any appellant court, including the Utah State Supreme Court. 
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Further, affiant saveth not. 
Jay of Dated this  f February, 2001. 
Signed __£ 
Brent Overson 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MADOLYN GRICE 
2001 S. State N1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
My Commission Expires 
June 4, 2004 
_ STATE OF UTAH 
, 2001 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
n U 1 7 R 9 
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ATTACHMENTS 
Affidavit of Lee Gardner with Attachments. 
[R. 1743]. 
* 
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Kelly W. Wright (5899) 
WRIGHT LAW OFFICES 
4618 North 3800 West 
Morgan, UT 84050 
Telephone: (801)791-1634 
Attorney for Intervenor Salt Lake County Assessor 
v , a " l **^{ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and THE UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION 
Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Intervenors. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Respondents 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEE GARDNER 
Fourth District Civil No. 990402607 CA 
(Consolidated Actions) 
Former Third District Civil No: 
000901301 (Lewis) 
Former Third District Civil No: 
000901449 AA (Medley) 
/ n 
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ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER 
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER; 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY ; 
HORJUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in ; 
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE ] 
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT ; 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF ; 
EQUALIZATION, ; 
Defendants. ] 
V S . ' j 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and ) 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) 
Intervenors ] 
) Fourth District Civil No. 990402607 
) (Independent Action) 
i / 
i Honorable: Lynn W. Davis 
' •
;
 • 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, LEE GARDNER, having been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the Salt Lake County Assessor and I make this affidavit based upon personal 
knowledge. The statements contained herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge 
and belief. 
2. Around the first week in September, 2000 I was told by the Salt Lake County 
attorneys that on or about September 6, 2000 they would brief the Salt Lake County 
Commissioners on the status of the Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("AUiant") appeal while I was 
inspecting the Alliant facilities with appraisers from both the county and Alliant. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. After the September 6 meeting was held, I learned that the County Commissioners 
had agreed to entertain an offer to settle tax years 1995 to 2000 from Alliant based upon a letter 
Alliant had sent to the Board of Equalization on August 31, 2000. During the September 6th 
meeting, the Board had apparently asked the county attorneys to make a settlement counter-offer. 
I directed a letter to Salt Lake County Commissioners dated September 8, 2000 requesting the 
opportunity to personally appear before the Commission to state my objection to the proposal. 
A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. A meeting was held on or about September 18, 2000 where I joined together with 
representatives from the Board, the Attorney's Office, and various staff members. The meeting 
was held to discuss the settlement of the litigation involving Alliant's property tax appeals for 
1995 to 1999 and possibly 2000. 
4. During this meeting, I expressed my objections to the settlement and the inequities 
it would create with other taxpayers within the county and that such settlement would violate fair 
market value. I asked the Commission to reverse it's decision to offer a settlement and allow the 
appeals process to take its natural course. 
5. During this meeting of September 18th, I handed a second letter to each of the Board 
members voicing my concerns about the efforts to settle and urging them not to go forward and 
settle. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
6. At no other time was I ever invited to attend any further meetings between Alliant, 
the Board and the Attorney's Office, including any meetings that may have been held leading up 
to the issuance of the December 5, 2000 settlement letter from Karl Hendrickson to Maxwell 
Miller, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. This letter sets forth the 
terms and conditions of the settlement reached by Alliant and the Board. I was never a party to 
this settlement. In fact I was deliberately prohibited from attending any further settlement 
discussions. 
1 
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7. During the County Commission meeting held on December 6, 2000,1 publicly 
voiced my objections to the proposed settlement. I explained that the proposed refund was unfair 
and would be essentially like asking other taxpayers to pay Alliant's taxes. I asked the 
Commissioners not to approve the refund, but allow the hearing to go forward before the Tax 
Commission. I indicated that both Alliant and the County had previously stipulated to apply the 
methodology that was to have been determined by the Tax Commission for the 1997, 1998 and 
1999 tax years to value Alliant for the year 2000. 
8. At no time was I ever consulted or asked to join in or agree to the settlement 
contained in Exhibit C. 
9. I object to the proposed settlement on constitutional, statutory and equitable grounds 
as set forth in my Memorandum filed herewith opposing the settlement. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 2001. 
LEE GARDNER 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this »2f (day of February, 2001. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Sandra K. Aloia 
2001 So. State St. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84190 
My Commission Expires 
March 4. 2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
d^C^U^— 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2001,1 served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT 
OF LEE GARDNER, as follows: 
Maxwell A. Miller 
Randy M. Grimshaw 
PARSONS BEALE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
J. Craig Smith 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Ste 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bill Thomas Peters 
PARSONS DAVIES KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
John E. S. Robson 
Robert A. Garda 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street, #1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
John C. McCarrey 
Michelle Bush 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
By:. 
pxQ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
0<Q Facsimile 
j^K) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
CX) Facsimile 
QxC) U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( X ) U.S. .Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
(X^U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
£><) U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Deliver 
£*C) Facsimile 
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Lee Gardiner 
S«// Ukw County Assessor 
Paul J , Lund 
Chui Deputy Asswsof 
Septembers, 2000 
Honorable Board of County Commissioners 
Salt Lake County Government Center #N2100 
Dear Commissioner Overson: 
It is my understanding that in Wednesday's staff meeting, the Commission agreed to settle the 
Alliant real property appeals fcr the years 1995-2000, and requested the County Attorney to 
offer a 3 5 million dollar refund for the years in question. As the elected official whose work is 
in question, i request the opportunity to personally appear before the Commission to state my 
objection to that proposal. 
In support of my request, I would like to provide additional information concerning the appeal, 
and perhaps answer some of the concerns of the Commission: 
1. There was a concern about the significant increase in value from 1994 to 1995. For 
the 1994 valuation, we relied on information from Ted Jones out of Texas, which related (0 
economic obsolescence, At the time it was the best information available. For the following 
year we received additional information concerning economic obsolescence as well as 
information on the sale of Hercules to Alliant which began in 1994 and which was completed 
around March 1995. That data resulted in significantly different values for 1995 through 1999 
when compared to the 1994 valuation of Hercules. There was also the suggestion that Alliant 
was somehow penalized the following years for initially appealing their value. I have n^^r 
advocated nor condoned that in any way, shape, or form. I am oound, however, to continue to 
search for data that will assist in the valuation process and help us arrive at Fair Market Value 
not only for Alliant, but for all properties within the county. I believe we h^e obtained good 
information in the case of Alliant and have prcperly utilized that information in the valuation 
process, 
2. Information provided to shareholders from Alliant officials indicated that the company 
was doing very well, which further supported the use of a much lower number for economic 
obsolescence or not to recognize any economic obsolescence at all. !n fact, while there are 
some differences in land values and functional obsolescence, the major differences in value 
result mainly from the differences in the amount of economic obsolescence attributable to the 
real property, 
3. For the 1995 appeal, Alliant hired a consulting firm (Marvin & Poer) who in the appeal 
used the argument that the majority of the value of Alliant consisted mainly of intangibles and 
that the actual value of the real property was virtually zero, In addition, during the discovery 
process, we received little cooperation in obtaining the proper documents to assist us in tho 
valuation process. That has continued until recently. 
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4, Due to the complex nature of the property, and to assist in the appeal process, we 
hired Phil Cook, an MAI appraiser of considerable reputation in the community, My directions 
to him were to simply come up with his best opinion of the Fair Market Value of Alliant. ! stated 
to him on more that one occasion that I was not looking for a high value, nor a low value nor 
any particular value. I was simply looking for Fair Market Value. 
5. I have read both appraisals (Phil Cook and Alliant). and consider Phil Cook's 
appraisal to be reflective of Fair Market Value. In fact, we have consulted with a professor of 
Economics who supports the appraisal, methodology and conclusion of Mr Cook. 
As the elected County Assessor, I request the opportunity to personally appear before the 
Commission. While I support mediation and settlement, it must be accomplished based on data 
and analysis of that data. Absence experts giving information to the contrary, I find no 
justification at this time to reduce tax dollars to Granite school district, West Valley city, and the 
other taxing entities by entering into a settlement with Alliant, In fact, the Beard of Equalization 
has rejected recommendations from the Assessor's office when they have not been supported 
with sufficient data and documentation. At the present time we have not received all of the 
requested information from Alliant, nor have we completed the depositions of several of Aiiiants 
management personnel. I request the Commission defer any settlement offer to Alliant until 
after we have received the requested information and completed the depositions with adequate 
time to complete a proper analysis of the information, 
In addition, simply refunding tax dollars, which Alliant has already paid, does no! solve the 
problem for future years. The data we have support a higher value than that proposed by 
Alliant Absence other information to the contrary, future valuations should be consistent with 
that data, 
Thank you for your time in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
^ Lee Gardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
cc: David Yocom 
Karl Hendrickson 
. Mary Ellen Sloan 
Craig Sorensen 
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Lee Gardner 
5SJ{ t a*e County Assessor 
Paul 4. Lund ,SRIT IRKE COUHTV 
CW#f Oopuiy Assizor 
September 18, 200C 
Honorable Board of County Commissioners 
2001 S. State Street, #N2100 
Salt Lake City/UT 84190-1300 
Dear Commissioner Shurtieff, 
It is my understanding that on September 6, 2000 the Salt Lake County Commission in 
a closed session directed Kari Hendrickson to offer a settlement of 3,5 million dollars to AHiant 
Techsystems for tax years 19S5 through 2000. At that same meeting, it is aiso my 
understanding that Commissioner Overson stated that when an appeal of a property value is 
made to Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County Assessor raises the value of that property 
asking for a higher value as a punitive measure for appealing. 1 would like to address this issue 
first as that allegation is not true. 
During the 1999 Board of Equalization, of the over 5,900 parcels appealed, 
approximately 39% were sent directly to Tax Administration with a comparable sale report 
generated on the Sigma system to support the value. The reports did not advocate a higher 
value. Of the remaining appeals filed, the Assessor recommended a decrease in value on 
approximately 56%, stipulated to the value on 15% and recommended a denial on 25%. A 
small percentage were withdrawn, dealt with exemption issues cr received a decision based on 
a hearing. Less than 1% or about 40 properties were recommended for a value increase. 
Many of those had additions or other factors that fully justified asking for an increase. 
On the issue of the refund the county has a fiduciary responsibility to the taxing entities 
under its jurisdiction, which to me means that we value properties fairly. With that in mind, 
properties are valued based on the best current market data available. Along with the 
valuation, there is an established appeals process. When the Commission decides to deviate 
from that process, it easily can find itself in a position to give preferential treatment to one 
particular property owner. With the case of AHiant, at least one Commissioner appears to have 
had conversations with people representing AHiant, had not consulted with the Assessor, and 
ignored the advice of the attorneys representing the county, With that information, a decision 
was made to offer a refund of 3.5 million dollars. Heck of a deal. Taik with the Commissioners 
and you can bypass the regular Board of Equalization procedures< What a mess we would be 
in if all property owners only need to call their Commissioner to receive a downward adjustment 
or an offer of refund. Former Tax Commissioner Rich McKeown taught in his classes on 
mediation, to make adjustments when supported by appropriate data., out to held fast when 
data did not support adjustments. The county has hired Phil Cook and the conclusion reached 
by him is well supported by good data and solid iogic. 
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It would be well to remember that the refund dollars that are at stake are dollars that 
Alliant itself has paid to the county, So while the county has a fiduciary responsibility to the 
various taxing entities, it also has a responsibility to the individual taxpayer or Alliant in this 
case. If the data gathered ultimately inaicates a lower value, then the/ are entitled to a full 
refund of the dollars in question. As such, there is no need at this time to offer millions of 
dollars in settlement Again, the value offered by Mr, Cook is based on a thorough examination 
of the facts and is welt supported. 
So that there is no misunderstanding, I do not support a settlement offer at this time, ! 
would ask the Commission to reverse its decision to offer a settlement at this time to Alliant and 
allow the appeals process to take its natural course. If in the course of discovery or analysis, it 
is the conclusion of both the attorneys and myself that the facts warrant an adjustment, it will be 
recommended to the Commission at that time, 
Thank you for your time in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Lee Gardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
-?. f o r\ 
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DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAWO E YOCOM 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CIVIL DWWCN JERRY G. CAMPBELL KENT$. LEWIS 
CH1EP0EPU1Y AvsiCtmOiiMor 
WILLIAM ft HYDE 
Divteicfi Director 
December 5? 2000 
Maxwell A. Miller 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main, Suite1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2218 
RE: Settlement of Outstanding Alliant Tech Litigation 
Dear Max: 
The Board has requested me to communicate a final settlement counteroffer to you to be 
presented to your client. The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999, 
inclusive, and is in the amount of $5 Million dollars. That settlement number includes all claims 
in all outstanding actions for those tax years involving real and personal property. NiROP, and is 
inclusive of all interest, both that accruing prior to the issuance of the judgments or orders and 
that accruing after the issuance of the judgments or orders through the date of final payment. 
In proposing a settlement amount of $5 Million dollars, the Board specifically makes this 
a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No 
obsolescence percentage or amount will be applied to any particular year under appeal and any 
allocation of a reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with respect to any issue raised in 
Ailiant's appeals. Specifically included within that category are claims as to excessive or 
extraordinary functional obsolescence, economic or external obsolescence, environmental 
contamination and remediation, and any stigma associated therewith. With respect to the 
personal property inclusion within the settlement amount, acceptance of the settlement shall 
include all issues which have been asserted with respect to personal property, including but not 
limited to existence or nonexistence of items of property, extraordinary functional obsolescence 
economic or external obsolescence associated with production equipment and unresolved issues 
related to previously filed personal property affidavits by Alliant and audits performed by Salt 
Lake County. This settlement proposal is subject to execution of a settlement agreement and 
stipulation incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and 
the District Court and entr/ of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to authorize Salt Lake 
2001 SOUTH STATE, STREET, S36O0 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84190-1200 TELEPHONE (801) 468^3420 FAX (801) 468-26*16 
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Maxwell A, Miller 
December 5, 2000 
Page 2 
County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all refunds paid 
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy. Payment of the refund, at the taxing 
entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of 
the judgment levy. 
This settlement .shall be deemed by the parties to be a litigation settlement of disputed 
claims. To that end, in the event the settlement is not accepted, none of the communications nor 
correspondence relating to the settlement shall be introduced or produced by any party nor shall 
they be deemed admissible including by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the panics in 
any proceeding relating to the matters in dispute or any subsequent proceeding involving Alliant 
or Allianfs successors in interest. Jn the event the settlement is accepted, the prohibition against 
production, introduction, or admissibility in any proceeding shall extend to any and all 
correspondence, communications relating to the settlement proposal, the settlement adoption and 
the actual settlement documents themselves, including therein pleadings, orders and judgments 
except as may be required to enforce the terms of the settlement. 
Unless prohibited by an order entered in the intervention proceedings, the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation shall be signed and filed with the Third District Court and the Utah 
State Tax Commission, as the case may be, no later than December 155 2000. Payment of the 
refund, at each taxing entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or 
from the proceeds of the judgment levy no later than December 31, 2001. 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in concert with 
Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State 
Tax Commission approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious 
manner. 
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching 
party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in enforcing the .settlement agreement. 
-KARL L. HENDRICKSON 
Deputy District Attorney 
Tax & Revenue Unit Chief 
Telephone; (801)468-2657 
pc: David Yocom 
Mark Shurtleff 
Brent Overmen 
Mary Callaghan 
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wW twer advising that Salt 
, , cviiwysiems, Inc, a refund in the iount of $5 million for 
wvoi payment of 1£ ^9 real and personal property taxes. This settlement is in satisfaction of 
all disputed claims. 
Mr. Maxwell A. Miller, Attorney, accepted the offer on behalf of Aliant Techsystems, Inc. 
to settle the Allian Techystems v. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization litigation. 
Mr. Lee Gardner, County Assessor, stated that in 1995 Alliant Techsystems purchased 
the property and operations in question from Hercules and appealed the 1995 valuation to the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. It did not prevail. Again, in 1996, Aliant Techsystem 
appealed the 1996 valuation. The Assessor's original value was sustained. Aliant Techsystems 
then appealed the 1995 and 1996 valuations to the next level, the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Tax Commission.sustained the county's valuation with a 3 to 1 vote. Aliant Techsystems 
filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied. Alliant Techsystems also challenged the 
1997, 1998 and 1999 valuations. They bypassed the Board of Equalization and had hearings 
conducted by the Utah State Tax Commission. Both Alliant Techsystems and the County 
agreed that the methodology used by the Utah State Tax Commission for the years 1997, 1998 
and 1999 would be used for the 2000 valuation. Phil Cook was hired as an MAR appraiser for 
the years in question. It has been his position (Mr. Gardner's) all along that if Alliant 
Techsystems is correct they would be entitled to a full refund, not just a partial refund which 
would be in the neighborhood of $10 to $11 million, including interest. However, Aliant 
Techsystems has not proven to this point that they are right. Despite the various appeals, they 
have not prevailed. This refund is unfair and would be essentially like asking other taxpayers to 
pay Aliant Techsystems taxes. He requested that the Commission not approve the refund at 
this time and allow the hearing to go forward with the Utah State Tax Commission. Then the 
County can^use the methodology of the Utah State Tax Commission and apply it to Alliant 
Techsystems' 2000 valuation. 
Commissioner Overson made a statement in response to the Assessor's allegation 
that the county's values were upheld by the Utah State Tax Commission. The Assessor's 
originaM/alue in 1995 was about $152 million. During the Board of Equalization hearings, Aliant 
Techsystems asked for a higher value of about $163 million, which was denied. Aliant 
Techsystems appealed this decision to the Utah State Tax Commission and the Utah State Tax 
Commission also denied the increase. To represent that the Utah State Tax Commission 
upheld the Assessor's value is somewhat misleading when one consideres the fact that A[ian 
Techsystems was trying to raise the value during the whole process, but was denied. In 
1996, the Assessor assessed the value of Alliant Techsystems' property at about $162 million. 
Alliant Techsystems went to the Board of Equalization and the Assessor tried to raise the value 
to the $220-$230 million dollar range. Once again the Board of Equalization denied the 
increase and upheld the Assessor's original value of $162 million. Again, the Assessor went to 
the Utah State Tax Commission to attempt to increase the value to $230 million and the Tax 
Commission ruled against the Assessor, sustaining the original value of $162 million. It is 
important to put this in the proper context. The Assessor's assertion that the Utah State Tax 
Commission upheld the county's value failed to clarify that he was trying to get much higher 
values than what the Utah State Tax Commission actually approved. 
Mr, John Robson, Attorney representing Granite School District, stated that the District 
has had the opportunity to hear presentations on this matter from the County Assessor, from 
Aliant Techsystems and from the County Commission. Based on that information, the District 
opposes the County entering into the settlement agreement. Settlements make sense when: 1) 
they are economically justified, and 2) they resolve the dispute. There' is clearly a dispute 
between the Assessor's Office and the Commission as to whether this settlement is 
economically justified. More importantly, this settlement dos not resolve the dispute. The 
issues that underlie five years of appeals relate to what methodology should be used and what 
factors should be considered. The settlement does nothing but return money without resolving 
any issues. The issues wills still remain and the values will again be challenged in the year 
2001. Allowing the matter to proceed to hearing and to court is the only way that the Assessor 
and Alliant Techsystems will ultimately resolve the complex valuation issues. The timing of the 
settlement will prejudice Granite district's students, employees and taxpayers. Approximately 
50 percent of any refund agreed to by the settlement will be paid by Granite School District. In 
this case, $2.5 million. This is the reason that the District has filed a motion to intervene before 
the Utah State Tax Commission and will file a similar motion with the court. If the settlement is 
approved, the District will either have to cut educational services or replace the money through 
a judgment levy that will increase the tax burden on its other taxpayers. There is no compelling 
reason that this settlement needs to be entered into at this time. The District does not 
understand the urgency in trying to conclude the settlement now. The hearing isn't schednioH 
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the County Couru .as had an opportunity to review it. If the new County Council will have to 
live with the consequences of this settlement, they should have an opportunity to address the 
issues themselves. For the foregoing reasons, he urged the Commission to not enter into a 
settlement with Alliant Techsystems at this time. 
Commissioner Overson asked Mr. Robson if he had heard of the settlement cases 
involving Hercules, U.S. West, and Kennecott. There have been large tax settlements of a 
similar nature over the past eight years that he has been involved with that the school districts 
have not raised a question about. These settlements impacted school districts, but there was 
no loss in teacher, or books and supplies. It some cases, not all of the issues were clarified. 
Many issues were left on the table and not settled. Between now and July 1, if Granite School 
District were to prevail in its intervention and the case goes forward and the court decides that 
the Commission acted improperly, the district has all the time in the world to recover funds or to 
enter any judgement levy if necessary. Just as the District has the opportunity to recover such 
funds, as it has in the past, relative to other large settlements. 
Mr. Robson stated that the District understands that it has an opportunity that if a 
settlement is ultimately approved to execute a judgement levy and charge those funds back to 
the taxpayers. 
Mr. Max Miller, representing Alliant Techsystems, stated that the potential liability to the 
County and the taxing entities within the County is $10 to $11 million. He felt the settlement of 
$5 million was reasonable and a prudent compromise between the extremes of the Assessor, 
which would be $0, an increased tax burden to Alliant Techsystems, or an $11 million refund by 
the county. * Litigating this matter is not a prudent use anyone's time. He wanted to correct one 
of Commissioner Overson's statements. The Utah State Tax Commission hekd in the 1995-96 
proceeding that obsolescence had been significantly understated by the assessments. Alliant 
Techsystems lost that case becauseit had a two-fold burden of proof. It had to prove that the 
Assessor was wrong and that Alliant Techsystems was right. Alliant Techsystems was able to 
prove that the Assessor was wrong, but not that it was right. Allient Techsystems has to come 
back in 1997, 1998 and 1999 to-show that obsolescence had been significantly understated. 
That is what essentially what this dispute is about. He believed that the evidence is 
unassailable that Alliant Techsystems' property has suffered significant obsolence. Because 
Alliant Techsystems and<the County Assessor are at polar opposites, the settlement would be 
prudent because it allows for recognition of the risks inherent in litigation. A compromise is in 
the best interest of everyone. 
With respect to Granite School District, he didn't think they would lose a nickel because they 
have a judgement levy available to them. 
Mr. David Yocom, County District Attorney, stated that he was representing the citizens 
and taxpayers of Salt Lake County. He stated that case should not be settled as this point, but 
should go forward to the April hearing date. 
Mr. David Yocom, District Attorney, spoke in his dual capacity of representing the 
citizens of Salt Lake County, and representing the Commission and the Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization who made the decision to settle the case at this time for the amount specified. 
The District Attorney's Office has taken an adverse position to the Commission and does not 
support the settlement. At the Commission's request, his office has supplied a detailed analysis 
to the Commission as to why this matter should go forward to a finish with the Utah State Tax 
Commission and the courts. This analysis is based upon the experience of qualified tax 
attorneys and government tax attorneys, whose combined experience is well over 50 years. He 
expressed amazement of the suddenness of the settlement decision, which-will be forced upon 
council as well as upon the taxpayers of the county, Alliant Techsystems offered to settle this 
matter on August 31st. Since then, the offer and counter offers were being considered until 
yesterday, when the Commission made a final settlement. The litigation has gone on for a 
number of years. A great deal of money and time has been spent on it. The best experts have 
been brought in to represent the County's interest. He felt the case should go forward, 
although it has been damaged somewhat by the continuance the Commission ordered in 
November of the proceeding before the Utah State Tax Commission. He believed a recovery 
could be made at the April hearing date and his office can move forward and represent the 
taxpayers in a very competent manner. This will lead to a final resolution of the case and future 
protests will be avoided. He urged the Commisison to not settle the case at this point. 
Commissioner Shurtleff stated that the Commission has the ultimate decision in this 
matter. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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—* v.c v>ommiss has the ultimate authority 
... ,y iw ueiermine what settlement amounts shot je offered. 
Commissioner Shurt/eff stated he appreciated the District Attorney's advice, but he 
did not want to put this settlement off for the council to take care of. The dispute occurred 
during the Commission's administration, and they should take care of it. 
Commissioner Overson stated he had one final statement to make. He stated that 
his reasons for moving towards a settlement were that he did not believe the County's case was 
not strong enough and that the loss would be too great. He wanted to come to a middle ground 
for everybody. 
Commissioner Overson stated that the Commission is looking at both ends of the 
spectrum. The County will either win or lose. There is a big difference between the two relative 
to the amount that will have to be paid by either party. This weighs heavily on the minds of the 
Commissioners. It has been stated that the District Attorney and County Assessor that they 
have good witnesses. He is familiar with some of those witnesses. He has a great deal of 
respect for Phil Cook, but in this particular matter, the Commission is the client and it was never 
consulted as to whether Mr. Cook should represent the Board of Equalization in this 
proceeding. In the cases he cited earlier, Hercules, U. S. West and Kennecott, the Commission 
essentially received notification of potential settlements from the Attorney's Office and blindly 
followed the Attorney's advice without asking questions. In this particular case, he is aware of a 
number of cases where Mr. Cook made similar arguments in different cases, asserting higher 
values, which have been overturned on a pretty regular basis. He, himself, is a state certified 
general appraiser. He does not currently appraise property because it would be a conflict of 
interest with his role as a Commissioner. However, as he reviewed the expert witness 
calculations, who came up with zero obsolence in one year and very, very little economical 
obsolence in a number of other years. This really bothered him. It concerned him that there 
was no economical obsolescence considering the the size, nature and complexity of a facility 
like Alliant Techsystems. Mr. Cook uses the stock and debt approach. He looks at the value of 
the overall company and trys to segregate out that portion of the company that is being valued. 
This is not an uncommon practice with state assessed properties, especially those who have 
assets spread over multiple jurisdictions and states. However, Hercules is a locally-assessed 
property. He didn't think that the stock and debt valuation would be appropriate for this 
particular property. For example, it has been stated that Hercules' stock is very healthy, which 
reflects the value of the assets. He has seen the stock ofAmazon.com sour up to $400-$500 
per share and he has seen numerous stocks split. Despite this, the company does not make a 
dime. He asked if the company doesn't make a dime, yet its stock is worth a lot, if its assets 
and real estate assets are worth more or less as the value of the stock goes up or down or 
whether it makes a profit or not. Currently, Amazon.com has a very low stock price, as do 
many companies. He didn't think it was appropriate to use the stock and debt approach to 
determine economic obsolescence of a company because of the changing nature of market 
places. Just because Company X has a good management team and is able to turn a 
company around and make it profitable, it does not mean that the real estate assets are more 
valuable. If Company Y has a good management team and sells to a company with a bad 
managemen and the stock loses value and the company makes no profit, the real estate assets 
should not be less valuable as a result of the management's activity. In reviewing this particular 
case, economic obsolescence is a very difficult thing to arrive at. Although he didn't 
particularly agree with Alliant Techsystems position as to the amount of obsolescence they 
acclaim, he wholly rejected the idea that there is zero economic obsolescence in the Alliant 
Techsystem's facility for at lease one of the years and very, very little economic obsolescence 
in a couple of the other years. This is the reason that he reviewed Mr. Cook's appraisal. As a 
member of the Board of Equalization, he knows that there is something somewhere in the 
middle with regard to economic obsolescence. Mr. Cook is not infallible. He has lost on issues 
of a similar nature in asserting higher values. This is his reason for settling the matter 
somewhere in the middle, although it may not be to the satisfaction of Granite School District. 
He believed that the taxpayers should be justly treated their valuations should reflect the actual 
value of their properties. He cannot, with a clear conscience, accept that Allient Techsystem's 
value on this particular property went from $110 million in 1994 to $200 million plus in 1999-
2000. 
Commissioner Shurtleff stated he disagreed that the settlement was rushed. The 
Attorney's asked the Commission several months ago to not make a decision until discovery 
was completed. The Commissioner agreed to this request. He did not entertain any additional 
thoughts or counter offers until he reviewed the depositions, the appraisals, and the detailed 
analysis provided by the District Attorney's Office. Although he doesn't have experience 
totaling 50 years, he tried to step back and look at the case as a judge or jury would w* 
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District. He felt the vould be inappropriately unreasonable and risky to continue litigating this 
matter. Some may argue that Alliant Techsystems is a large corporation, but they are a 
taxpayer. They Board of Equalization has to treat them as they would any other taxpayer. If 
Alliant Techsystems has been unfairly taxes, inappropriately taxes or over taxes, it is the duty of 
the Board of Equalization to make it right. He felt the settlement was wholly appropriate. By 
settling this case, the Commission will be resolving a five-year dispute and avoid haveing to pay 
an $11 million settlement later. 
Commissioner Overson recommended that the settlement be approved and a refund 
issues to Alliant Techsystems. 
Roll was called approving the settlement, authorizing the District Attorney to effect 
payment of the $5 million refund to Alliant Techsystems, showed the vote to be: Commissioner 
Shurtleff "Aye," Commissioner Callaghan "Aye," and Commissioner Overson "Aye." 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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ATTACHMENT 7 
County Clerk letter dated 6 December 2000 reflecting 
Commission approval of Agreement [R. 1683]. 
4 
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Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners 
Mark LShurtleff, Chair 
Mary Callaghan 
Brent Overson 
% \ 
December 6, 2000 
Mr. David E. Yocom 
District Attorney 
Rm. S3500, Government Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attn: Karl L. Hendrickson 
Dear Mr. Hendrickson: 
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved a refund 
in the amount of $5 million to Affiant Techsystems to settle the disputed 1995 - 1999 
real and personal property taxes (Affiant Techsystems v. Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization). 
Pursuant to the above action, you are hereby authorized to effect the same. 
Very truly yours, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK 
s.wir iflKE.counrv 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N2100 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-1000 
By 
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ATTACHMENT 8 
ATK letter offer to BOE dated 30 November 2000. 
[R. 1708]. 
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1^ )002 
Parsons 
Behfc & i; 
Latimer 
201 Soitt Mate 51^*1 
?g*OD<wfc« 486*6 
Kari Hendricteon 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State $tu Suite 5^3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 841SKM200 
LtrG6l*uitM 
November 30,2000 
Ret Counter Offer of Setfleme*t in Affiant Techsysteins v. SaK LaJce 
County B<L of Equalization 1995-1999 m l property and 
personal property Yafaattoa cases 
Pear Karl, 
This is an amended version of my letter to you dated November 27, 2000 i; i which 
AlHact responded to your letter dated November 21,2000 proposing the Salt take Connty 
Board of Equalization1 a counteroffer to settle tbc aboves;«ptioued dispute for a j-^ fimd to 
AUiwt of $4.5 million. 
Affiant's previous ^unt^-oflfer to the Board, dated October 23 > was a n^und to 
Alliant of S4.5 million for r$al property only, -Affiant declines the Board's Novexibcr 21 
counter-offer but further extends a comttc offer of a $5 million raftnd to A limn t for all 
real and personal property cases for 1995 to and including 1999, This counter offer is 
subject to the following conditions* 
l% Refimd to Alliant of $5 imUlon in settlement of all real mi personal 
property disputes before the Utah Stare Tax Coxnadssion arid the TWrd District 
Court 
Z Settlement shall be with respect to all issues asserted by ezt'isr party 
before the Utah State Tax (^ounissiott and the Third District Court, J deluding 
dismissal of all legal claims and suit* related to NIR.OP, 
3. Settlement shall be subject to execution of & Settlement Agreement 
and Stipulation Incorporating the terms thereof, and final approval of the wmc by 
the Utah State Tax Commisdon and the Third Distriet Coxcrt through en&y of 
appropriate Judgment and Order sufficient to authorize Salt Lake Count), and the 
affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to rwov«r all rcfand? paid to 
Alliant ttaoygh imposition of an appropriate judgment levy. The Settlement 
N0U 30 '00 09^39 pflse.e®* 
001708 
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JtarlHendrickson 
November 30,2000 
Page Two 
Agreement and the Stipulation shall b* signed and filed with the Third District 
Court and the Utah 5t3te Tax Commission, as the case xo&y be, no later thai 
December 15,2000. 
4. Salt Lake County, it* officer, attorneys tod assessors, shall, in /rood 
faith and acting in concert with Alliant, secure an appropriate Order from the Third 
District Court ard the Utah State Tax Commission approving the Settlement 
Agreement and Stipulation in an expedition manner. 
5. Payment of the refund, at the taxing entity'a option, will be ia*de 
either from cwrea; cash flows and reserves OT from the proceeds of the judgment 
levy no later than December 3V, 2001 with appropriate interest in addition to the $5 
million from the date erf Judgment or Oder, 
6. Settlement shall he deemed by the parties to be a litigation 
settlement of uisjreted clskns. la the event sstfiesnsnt is nOT achieved, none < f the 
commxmications nor correspondence reiati&g to settlement shall be infcrodnc-rd or 
produced by any party, nor ahiU they be deemed admissible in any proceeding, 
inoltiding by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the parties in my proceeding 
relating to matters in dispute or any subsequent proceeding involving AJlwnt or 
Allianf s suec«s$ors in i n t e r s 
7* In the eveat the Settlement is accepted, the prohibition against 
' production, introduction, or admissibility in any proceeding shall extend to an jr and 
all correspondence, communications relating to the settlement proposal, the 
settlOTeci adoption and the actual settlement documents themselves* kctidmg 
therein pleadings orders and judgments except as roay ba required by the terns of 
the settlement 
8. la the event any party breaches the fbrego.bg condition of 
settlement, the con-breaching party la entitled to attorney's fees or costs incurred m 
enforcing: tbe settlement: &gr9*ment 
Again, whatever protocol toe Board of Equalisation chsoses to respond to this 
counter-Offer is acceptable to AIKanL 
Yours smcerely> 
Maxwell A. Miller 
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ATTACHMENT 9 
Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval 
and Entry of an Order Approving Settlement. [R. 2065]. 
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^ 
MAXWHl .LA. MILLER (.2264) 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW (1259) 
PARSONS BEHLU & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner AUiant Tech$ystems, inc. 
20 J South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Poit Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
K ^ 
AJLLIANT TRCHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff. 
y$. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER, IN HIS 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON, IN HIS 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SALT LAKE COUNTY 
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN. MARK 
SHURTLEFF AND BRENT OVHRSON. IN THEIR 
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION, AND THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY BOARD Of EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants 
and 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Intenenor/Defen Jam. 
STIPULATION FOR 
SETTLEMENT AND JOINT 
MOTION FOR APPROVAL 
AND ENTRY OF AN ORDER 
APPROVING SETTLEMENT 
4th District Civil No. 9S 0402607 
3rd District Civil No, 9V0901298 
Judge Lynn W, Davis 
r> 177004 j 
b u & u b l) 
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i 
Plaintiff Alliant Tcchsystems, inc. (Alliant) and Defendants Salt Lake County; Larry 
Richardson, in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Treasurer: Mary Callahan, Mark 
Siwrtlcff and 3rent Overson, in their official capacities a* the Salt Lake County Commission, 
and the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("County Board'*) hereby agree anc stipulate as | 
follows. 
1. From a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission in Appeal No. 97-0031 
relating to the valuation of Alliarrt's real property for 1995 und 1996, both All ant and the I 
County Board appealed to the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, Third Di it. Civil No. 
000700001, Third Dist CiviJ No, 990912695, Third Dist Civil No. 00090065 AA Third Dist 
Civil No. 000901301 and Third Dist. Civil No. 000901449 AA, which matters were consolidated * 
before the Honorable Lynn Davis, 
2 . In addition, Alliant filed a separate action against the County Boavd and other 
county officials, which case was also assigned to the Honorable Lynn W Davis v.nder Fourth 
Dist. Civil No. 990402607 and Third Dist. Civil No 980901298. 
3. On December 5,2000, Alliant and the County Board agreed to a Sett «ment of all 
the foregoing matters. The terms of the settlement are contained in a letter dated December 5, 
2000 from Karl Hendrickson to Maxwell Miller, and a letter of acceptance dated December 5, 
2000, from Maxwell Miller to Karl Hendrickson, Both of .said letter* <tre attached i>; Exhibit A 
to this Stipulation and are incorporated by reference and made a part hereof. Under ihc terms of 
i 
-V70O4.I 2 
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this Settlement, the County Board agrees to refund to Alliant $5 Million no later than December 
31,2001, 
4. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Settlement as stved in the 
aforementioned December 5, 2000 letters, Alliant and the Comity Board jointly move for an 
appropriate Order of the Court approving said Settlement of the real property tax actions 
DATED this of December, 2000. 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
RANDY M. GRIMS11AW 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
DATED t h i s / V . day of December, 2000. 
L. HEKDRJCKSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
L-/ J??0O4.l 
U U L U D O 
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[ V d a y o f ] I hereby certify that on this T da  of December, 2000, 1 caused to be mailed, first 
classy postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregcing STIPULATION FOR 
SETTLEMENT AND JOINT MOTION FOR APPROVAL AND ENTRY OF AN ORPER 
APPROVING SETTLEMENT, to: 
David E. Yocom 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
2001 So. State Street, S-3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Parsons Davies Kinjjhoni & Peters 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lafcc City, UT S41I1 
John McCanrey 
Asst. Attorney General 
t60E. 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
tiu^tflM^. 
^ 
anoo4j 
uu2u82 
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ATTACHMENT 10 
Excerpts from BOE objection pleadings dated 22 October 
2001 and 21 December acknowledging that Gardner was 
not a party to the refund Agreement. [R. 2126, 2495]. 
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0s 
J. Craig Smith (4143) 
Brett B.Rich (7293) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALL1ANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR, LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER, 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY HOR1UCH1, 
and BRENT OVERSON, in their official 
capacities as the SALT LAKE COUNTY 
COMMISSION and the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ON JOINT MOTION TO 
APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
4th District Civil No. 990402607 
3rd District Civil No. 980901298 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("the Board"), by and through its attorneys o 
record, hereby objects to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Joint 
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Motion to Approve Settlement, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
In addition, said Defendant requests a hearing before the Court in this Matter.1 
Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization respectfully submits that no attorneys' fees 
are appropriate in the case, and that if any such fees were appropriate, the information provided by the 
Plaintiff is inadequate to justify its claims. Therefore in accordance with the purpose for an objection: 
"to put the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding,.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the following 
bases are submitted for the Court's consideration. 
I. The proposed Order requires the Assessor to pay attorneys' fees for breaching a contract 
to which he was not a party. 
A. The record indicates that Assessor Gardner never consented to the proposed 
settlement, and has in fact expressed his opposition on the basis that the agreement violates Utah 
law. 
Gardner was also deliberately excluded from the meetings wherein the subject settlement was i 
discussed by County Commissioners and others. His opposition never violated an agreement to which 
he was a party. 
I 
Mr. Gardner has consistently vocalized his objection to the settlement agreement ("the 
Agreement"). The substance of the Agreement was proposed in a letter from Karl Hendrickson to 
counsel for the Plaintiff dated December 5, 2000. On that same day, Alliant "accepted" the proposed 4 
settlement. On the very next day, December 6, 2000, both Mr. Gardner and counsel for Alliant attended 
1
 By this reference the Board of Equalization adopts the Objection and Motion for ( 
Reconsideration made by Assessor Lee Gardner, and also the Objection of Granite School 
District. 
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a meeting of the Board of Equalization, where this matter was discussed. During that meeting, Mr. 
Gardner as the County Assessor "requested that the Commission not approve the refund at this time and 
allow the hearing to go forward with the Utah State Tax Commission." Notwithstanding his request, the 
Agreement was approved; however, counsel for the Plaintiff clearly understood that such action was 
taken over the objection of the Assessor. In addition, Mr. Gardner reacted to the Agreement 
immediately by filing a Motion to Intervene with this Court on December 13, 2000. 
One day later, the Plaintiff served its Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval 
and Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with this Court, the caption of which includes "LEE 
GARDNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR" as a Defendant. 
However, the language of the pleading, as drafted by counsel for the Plaintiff begins as follows: 
Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (Alliant) and Defendants Salt Lake County; Larry 
Richardson, in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Treasurer; Mary Callaghan, Mark 
Shurtleff and Brent Overson, in their official capacities as the Salt Lake County 
Commission and the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("County Board") hereby 
agree and stipulate as follows. , 
Plaintiff specifically excluded Mr. Gardner as one of the parties to the agreement. It excluded 
him for the simple reason that everyone understood that he was neither a party to the Agreement, nor 
consented to be bound by its terms. Only in the months following the execution of the Agreement does 
Plaintiff creatively seek to twist the intention of the Agreement to include Mr. Gardner as a party. 
Justification for deviating from long-standing policy that each litigant shall bear his own costs and fees 
does not exist where Mr. Gardner did not consent to that provision, and where clearly even the Plaintiff 
did not consider him a party to the Agreement. 
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B. Gardner is not a party to the settlement agreement, notwithstanding the inclusions 
of the term officials in the agreement itself. 
Title 17 of the Utah Code specifically defines the roles of the various elected offices of the 
Counties. Unlike the statutory structure applicable to municipalities, the governing body of a county has 
only limited authority as to the other offices of county government. Although the County Commission 
had some broad oversight in administrative matters, Utah Courts have consistently held that the neither 
the Commission, nor the individual Commissioners has statutory authority to direct the day-to-day 
affairs of the other elected offices. See Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board ofComm'rs, 268 P. 783 
(Utah 1928); In fact, effective April 30, 2001, the Utah Legislature repealed Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-
213, which authorized the supervision of the official conduct of county officers by the county 
commission. Presently, the authority of a county governing body concerning the supervision of other 
county offices is outlined in Chapter 53 of Title 17. 
A county legislative body and a county executive each: 
(i) may generally direct and supervise all elected county officers and employees to ensure 
compliance with general county administrative ordinances, rules, or policies; 
(ii) may not direct or supervise other elected county officers or their sworn deputies with 
respect to the performance of the professional duties of the officers or deputies;. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-106(2)(a) (2001). 
Although the above section became effective after the Agreement in this case, this statutory 
change merely codified case law concerning the relationship of various county officials. Gardner 
correctly interpreted the Utah Code regarding his professional duties, and assessment of property taxes 
and was duty-bound to work to achieve the purposes of the Code. Whether or not the settlement 
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agreement purported to include the assessor as an "officer' of Salt Lake County, the Assessor cannot be 
bound to the terms of an agreement signed by someone not authorized to act in such matters on behalf of 
the duly elected Assessor. 
II. The amount of attorneys fees claimed by Alliant is excessive in that Alliant failed to 
mitigate its fees, or provided sufficient information supporting its claim. 
A. Utah courts generally award attorneys1 fees only as required after the required 
showing of appropriateness. 
"The general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain exceptions, a party is entitled to attorney fees 
only if authorized by statute or by contract." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 177 (Utah 
1998) (citing Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994); Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)). Even where so provided, such terms have been narrowly 
interpreted by the courts. See Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978) (determining that the term 
"costs" in Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure did not include attorney fees). 
1. Attorneys fees awarded in accordance with contractual provisions, assume the 
consent of all of the parties to the Agreement. The basis of the Court's decision awarding attorneys' fees 
against Assessor Gardner is that the agreement itself states that the former County Commission had the 
authority to settle litigation on behalf of the "officers"of Salt Lake County. For the reasons stated 
above, Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization respectfully submits that the Commission had 
no such authority, and that Mr. Gardner is not and was not a party to that agreement, and is therefore not 
* 
bound by its terms. 
-5-
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Attorney Fees in Utah: A Procedural Primer for Practitioners, 23 University of Utah J. Contemp. L. 
379 (1997). In the event that the Court does not intend to simply deny the attorney fee request, 
Defendants are entitled to and request discovery and a hearing on the attorney fee application. See 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization objects to the award of any 
attorneys fees against Mr. Gardner in this matter on the basis that all parties to the Agreement 
understood that Mr. Gardner was not a party and opposed the Agreement from the beginning. Further 
the Board contends that if any award is sustained, Plaintiff must provide detailed specific information 
justifying said fees as necessary and reasonable in opposing the actions of Mr. Gardner. In addition, 
Plaintiff must redact all charges presently included which are applicable to the actions of others. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2001. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
J. Craig Smith 
Brett B. Rich 
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
Brett B. Rich (7293) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRJCT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALL1ANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR, LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER, 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY HORIUCHI, 
and BRENT OVERSON, in their official 
capacities as the SALT LAKE COUNTY 
COMMISSION and the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND TAX COURT 
DECISION 
4th District Civil No. 990402607 
3rd District Civil No. 980901298 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("the Board"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, hereby submits this Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court 
Decision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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previouly stated in its objection to the Plaintiffs earlier proposed order, which the Board incorporates 
herein by reference. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPLY THAT THE PERCEIVED NEUTRALITY OF 
THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION VIOLATES THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ARE 
UNFOUNDED. 
Despite the Plaintiffs allegations that the Board violated the Settlement Agreement by failing to 
more vigorously seek its ratification, this Court referred to the position of the Board as "benign 
neutrality". Although the Plaintiffs carefully crafted statement in its supporting memorandum 
regarding the fact that the Court awarded attorneys' fees in this matter is technically correct, it is correct 
only as to the County Assessor. After thoroughly reviewing the position and conduct of the Board, the 
Court did not award attorneys' fees against the Board. Notwithstanding, the Plaintiff continues to imply 
that the conduct of the Board violates the Agreement. 
The fact that the Board is not neutral on the issue of the appropriateness of an award of attorneys' 
against the Assessor does not constitute conduct in violation of, or is in any way contrary to the 
Agreement. Because the County will be responsible to pay for any award of attorneys' fees against the 
Assessor in this case, it is certainly interested in any such award. As outlined in the Board's objection to 
the Plaintiffs earlier proposed Order, the Board does not believe that the Assessor was a party to the 
Settlement Agreement and thus is not liable for attorney fees incurred by any breach of the Agreement. 
Arguments supporting that position do not constitute working against the Agreement. 
In contrast, following the initial decision by the State Tax Commission against ratification of the 
Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiff promptly pursued the review before the Commission, of the 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2001. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
J. Craig Smith 
Brett B. Rich 
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization 
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Indiana State Highway Com 'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 
(Indiana 1998). 
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Indiana Case Law 
INDIANA STATE HIGHWAY COM' N v. CURTIS, 704> <N.E.2d^ < 1-015 (Ind. 1998) 
704 N.E.2d 1015 
INDIANA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, STATE OF INDIANA, AND BROWN, INC., 
APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS BELOW), V. BILLY D. CURTIS AND VIRGINIA M. CURTIS, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND CARL SUTTON AND LORRAINE SUTTON, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS BELOW). 
No. 37S05-9810-CV-557. 
Supreme Court of Indiana. 
December 18, 1998. 
Appeal from the Jasper Circuit Court, The Honorable E. Duane 
Daugherty, Judge, Cause No. 37C01-8806-CP-169. 
Indiana Court of Appeals, Cause No. 37A05-9711-CV-498. 
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Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, A. Scott 
Chinn, Jon Laramore, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants. 
Gary K. Matthews, Hammond, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees. 
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER 
BOEHM, Justice. 
This case holds that a settlement agreement that explicitly 
requires approval by the Indiana Department of Transportation is 
not enforceable against the State without that approval. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
In 1985, Carl and Lorraine Sutton[fnl] granted the State of 
Indiana an easement onto their commercial property to complete 
highway drainage work along State Road 10 in Jasper County. In 
198 8, the Suttons sued the State of Indiana, the Highway 
Commission[fn2] and the State's contractor, Brown, Inc., 
alleging that the drainage work had destroyed their septic system 
and caused loss of business by restricting access to their 
property and rendering their parking lot useless. The State was 
represented by several deputy attorneys general and also by a 
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private attorney, Michael Blaize, over the several years of the 
litigation. 
In January, 1997, four days prior to the scheduled trial, 
Blaize contacted the Suttons* attorney, Gary Matthews, to discuss 
settlement. Although Blaize indicated that he had authority to 
discuss a settlement, he advised Matthews that a monetary 
settlement required approval by the Governor, and that any Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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easement over State property to deal with the septic tank 
required approval by the Indiana Department of Transportation 
("INDOT"). Blaize was in communication with a deputy attorney 
general during the settlement discussions. The deputy observed 
that a monetary settlement required the Governor's approval, but 
also stated that she had no reason to believe that the Governor 
would not approve the settlement. This information was relayed to 
Matthews. Ultimately, Blaize and Matthews arrived at an agreed 
amount for a monetary settlement from the State and the State's 
grant of an easement onto State property to install a new septic 
system. The two also agreed that the monetary settlement would be 
paid within forty-five days. 
On the same day as the negotiation, Matthews reduced the 
agreement to writing and faxed it to Blaize who signed and 
returned it via fax. Paragraph five of the agreement granted the 
Suttons access over State property. Paragraph seven provided: 
"access through State Road 10's existing guardrail and any 
driveway therefrom as described in paragraph five (5) of this 
agreement is subject to approval by INDOT." The parties then 
informed the trial court that a settlement had been reached, 
apparently without mentioning the conditions in the agreement. 
Forty-five days after the agreement was signed by Matthews 
and Blaize, the Suttons filed a motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement. At that time, the State had neither made the monetary 
payment nor provided the easement and neither the Governor nor 
INDOT had given approval to the agreement. After a hearing in 
September, 1997, the trial court found that the "parties entered 
into a binding settlement agreement" and granted the Plaintiffs' 
motion to enforce the settlement. The trial court ordered the 
State to pay the settlement, permit the easement for the septic 
system and pay attorney's fees to Plaintiffs. 
The State appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by 
finding that a lawyer representing the State could bind the State 
as to the easements; (2) the agreement was insufficiently precise 
to establish a binding agreement; and (3) the award of attorney's 
fees was error. Because the monetary award had been approved by 
the Governor between the time of the trial and appeal, only the 
requirement of approval of the easement was before the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's 
enforcement of the agreement; (2) found sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate an agreement was reached; and (3) reversed the award 
of attorney's fees. Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 
695 N.E.2d 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). We granted the State's petition 
to transfer. 
The State presents two issues on transfer that we restate as: 
(1) Is a settlement agreement that explicitly requires the 
approval of a component of a party binding on the party without 
that approval? 
(2) Can attorneys representing the State bind the State to a 
settlement of a tort claim not authorized by the Governor? 
Standard of Review 
The trial court made findings of fact pursuant to Indiana 
Trial Rule 52. These will not be set aside unless clearly Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter L w Library, J. Reuben Clark L w School, BYU. 
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erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). The findings are clearly 
erroneous only when a review of the record leaves the appellate 
court firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Chidester v. City 
of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Ind. 1994); see also State v. Van 
Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ind. 1996), cert, denied U.S. 
, 118 S.Ct. 1060, 140 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998). We disturb the 
judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings 
or the findings fail to support the judgment. Chidester, 631 
N.E.2d at 910; see also Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 208, 211-12 
(Ind. 1991). 
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Enforceability of the Settlement Agreement 
The State argues that the agreement is not binding on the 
State because only the Governor can settle a claim on behalf of 
the State. The Plaintiffs contend that the easement agreement is 
enforceable without approval by the Governor or INDOT because 
Blaize and the deputy attorneys general had the authority to bind 
their client, the State. Resolution of these issues turns on both 
the authority of the State's private attorney and the deputies to 
bind the State, and also the terms of the agreement. In brief we 
hold that (1) the State, like any other party, may include 
enforceable conditions precedent in a settlement agreement that, 
if not met, render obligations not binding and (2) the Governor's 
approval is required to compromise a tort claim against the State. 
A. Approval by INDOT is an Enforceable Condition 
The trial court made several findings bearing on the 
requirement of INDOT approval. The trial court found that "the 
parties' settlement agreement does make said agreement subject to 
the approval of the Governor and the Indiana Department of 
Transportation." The trial court also made several other findings 
regarding the communication between the attorneys and the 
assurances made regarding the availability of approval by the 
Governor and INDOT. The record is replete with evidence 
supporting these findings, including affidavits of the attorneys 
who took part in the settlement discussions. There is no finding 
by the trial court and no evidence in the record that INDOT ever 
approved the easement provision of the agreement. Apart from the 
expiration of the forty-five day period without any further 
action, there is no fact found that bears on waiver of the 
condition or estoppel preventing the State from asserting that 
requirement. 
The trial court found that "the Defendants had a reasonable 
time for the Governor to accept or reject said settlement" and 
that the court was "left without any information as to whether or 
not the parties' settlement agreement was ever presented to the 
Governor, and if so, whether or not the Governor has accepted or 
rejected the same." By this, the trial court apparently found 
that the State's delay in providing information about approval 
constituted a waiver of the condition by the State. 
The trial court also found that the "parties entered into a 
binding settlement agreement, and that the Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Enforce the Settlement should be granted." This is a conclusion of 
law. We conclude that because the terms of the agreement required 
INDOT•s"approval of the easement provisions, and there is no Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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evidence in the record and no finding by the trial court to 
indicate that approval was given or waived, the conclusion that 
the agreement is enforceable is erroneous as a matter of contract 
law. 
Construction of settlement agreements is governed by contract 
law. 5 I.L.E. Compromise & Settlement &sec; 21 (1958). Under 
contract law, a condition precedent is a condition that must be 
performed before the agreement of the parties becomes a binding 
contract or that must be fulfilled before the duty to perform a 
specific obligation arises. Blakley v. Currence, 172 Ind. App. 668, 
670, 361 N.E.2d 921, 922 (1977); Capitol Land Co., Inc. v. 
Zorn, 134 Ind. App. 431, 443, 184 N.E.2d 152, 158 (1962); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts &sec; 224 (1981) (a condition is an 
event that must occur before performance under a contract becomes 
due); 5 Williston, Contracts &sec; 666 (3rd ed. 1961) (a condition 
precedent may be either a condition to the existence of a contract 
or to an immediate obligation under a contract); accord 17A C.J.S. 
Contracts &sec; 338 (1963). INDOT's approval of the easement 
provisions is a condition of the settlement agreement. The 
condition was supplied by the parties when they agreed explicitly 
in the settlement document that the easement provisions required 
INDOT * s approval. 
As a general rule, an express condition must be fulfilled or 
no liability can arise on the promise that the condition 
qualifies. 5 Williston, Contracts &sec; 675 (3rd ed. 1961); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts &sec; 225 (1981) (if a condition 
does not occur, performance of a duty subject to a condition 
cannot become due and if the condition can no longer occur, the 
duty is discharged). Indiana courts have consistently recognized 
this rule. The Court of Appeals held in Blakley that an 
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agreement containing the clause "subject to loan approval" did not 
become a binding contract because approval was not obtained. 361 N.E.2d at 
923. Similarly, in Wetzel v. Andrews, 13 6 Ind. App. 117, 
198 N.E.2d 19 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that a lease was not 
valid where the condition precedent of statutorily required 
approval by the governmental entity was not met. Performance of a 
condition may be excused by waiver. However, the waiver must be 
the "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
6 Williston, Contracts &sec; 678 (3rd ed. 1961); accord Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago Southshore, 
685 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 1997) (waiver of contractual right requires intentional 
relinquishment of known right). 
The trial court found that "it is not equitable for the State 
to settle a case upon certain agreements . . . and then some eight 
months later repudiate the agreement." Failure to gain a required 
approval is not repudiation of an agreement. Rather it is 
insistence on compliance with the terms of the agreement. "The 
mere fact that a promise or condition is somewhat harsh or unfair 
in its operation is not enough to furnish such an excuse." 5 
Williston, Contracts &sec; 769 (3rd ed. 1961). A condition may be 
excused if the requirement "will involve extreme forfeiture or 
penalty and its existence or occurrence forms no essential part of 
the exchange for the promisor's performance." Id. at n. 2 (quoting 
Restatement of Contracts &sec; 302 (1932)). Because the condition &mdash; 
approval by the Governor and INDOT kmdash; is an essential part of the 
exchange and there is no evidence of extreme forfeiture or penalty 
the condition in this case is not excused. There are obvious 
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public safety concerns involved in the granting of an easement 
that affects a safety rail on a public highway. It is quite 
reasonable that the contract required that INDOT approve such an 
arrangement, and that it be quite specific as to where and when 
and how rights under the easement are to be exercised. 
The Court of Appeals, citing Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d 535, 
540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), noted the doctrine that a party may 
not rely on a failure of a condition precedent where that party's 
inaction caused the failure. Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. 
Curtis, 695 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). This does not 
mean that every failure of a condition results in an estoppel 
against asserting the condition as a proper reason to avoid the 
contract. Rather, as the court in Hamlin went on to explain, the 
parties "have an implied obligation to make a reasonable and good 
faith effort to satisfy the condition." Hamlin, 622 N.E.2d at 
540. "Causing" the failure of a condition means more than the 
mere rejection of the contract for sound reason or for newly 
discovered information, if the right to do that is preserved in 
the contract. The Hamlin doctrine prevents a party from acts of 
contractual sabotage or other acts in bad faith by a party that 
cause the failure of a condition. Where the condition is itself 
the approval by some division or component of the party, however, 
the obligation is only to consider that approval in good faith. 
The mere passage of time does not create an inference of bad 
faith, and there is no other evidence that the State or its 
representatives did not act in good faith to evaluate the 
approval. Accordingly, the condition is available to the State as 
a bar to its obligations. The requirement of approval is for the 
benefit of the State, and the requirement that approval be 
obtained within forty-five days is for the benefit of the Suttons. 
The passage of the time specified in the agreement gives the 
Suttons the right to revive their lawsuit, but it does not create 
an enforceable settlement. Cf. Barrington Management Co., Inc. v. 
Paul E. Draper Family Ltd. , 695 N.E.2d 135, 141-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998). 
Finally, even in non-public contracts, it is not uncommon for 
a settlement agreement to require approval by some agency or 
organization such as a party's board of directors or to require 
study that cannot be accomplished in the time frame available on 
the courthouse steps. This may be because the agreement calls for 
an authority not previously given to the negotiator, because some 
aspect of the proposed settlement involves technical or other 
expertise not immediately available, or for other good reasons. 
Most of these approvals are given in due course. But upholding 
the right of a party to insist on such a condition ultimately 
facilitates settlement by permitting an agreement to be made with an 
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enforceable condition, even if the condition is likely to be 
fulfilled. Accordingly, as a matter of contract law, because 
INDOT approval was required by the settlement agreement, and that 
approval was not obtained, the agreement, as to the easement 
provisions, is not enforceable. 
B. The Governor's Approval is Required by Statute 
We also agree with the State that the Governor's approval is 
required for any compromise of a claim against the State. The 
Court of Appeals observed that as a general proposition there is 
not one law for the State and another for its subjects. Curtis, Digitiz d by he Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•mi , r. ^ u i v n u , /v-n^.^.^u l u u ^inu. i w o ) imp.//1mucnen:iyjznauiai^www.IOIS...Aa^=&sonspec=DateStr+desc&curdoc==0 
695 N.E.2d at 148 (quoting State v. Feigel, 2 04 Ind. 43 8, 445, 
178 N.E. 435, 437 (1931)). This statement, although generally true, 
is not entirely correct. Specifically, in the area of tort claims 
we do have a separate body of law &mdash; the Tort Claims Act kmdash; that 
is applicable only to claims against governmental entities. One { 
feature of this statute is its requirement that "the governor may 
compromise" suits. Ind. Code ksec; 34-13-3-14 (1998). As the Court 
of Appeals held in State v. Carter, this means only the Governor 
has ultimate authority to compromise a claim. 658 N.E.2d 618, 622 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Presumably the reason for this requirement 
is to focus responsibility and accountability and avoid negligent i 
or intentional waste of public assets. Whatever its objective, 
the legislature is free to change that requirement, but unless and 
until this occurs, the Governor's approval is required before the 
State can compromise a tort claim. 
Conclusion * 
The trial court's order enforcing the settlement agreement as 
to the easement provisions is reversed. The Court of Appeals 
decision with regard to attorney's fees is summarily affirmed. 
Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3). 
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and SELBY, JJ., concur. * 
[fnl] Billy and Virginia Curtis, the previous landowners, 
were also named as plaintiffs in the lawsuit, but the Suttons 
appear to be the parties principally and perhaps solely interested 
at this point.&end; 
( 
[fn2] The Highway Commission was replaced by the Indiana 
Department of Transportation which was established in 1990. See 
Pub. L. No. 112-1989, &sec; 5, 1989 Acts 1140-47.&end; 
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Tax Commission Order on Joint Motion for Approval of 
Settlement [R. 2449.] 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON JOINT MOTION FOR 
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 
Consolidated Appeal Nos. 
99-0910, 98-0608 and 98-0452 
Account No. 2015400008 
Tax Type: County-Assessed Property 
Judge: Davis 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Commission for hearing on the Joint Motion for 
Approval of Settlement on March 1, 2001. G. Blaine Davis presided, together with Pam 
Hendrickson, Commission Chair, R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner, Palmer DePaulis, 
Commissioner, and Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner. Petitioner was represented by Mr. Maxwell 
A. Miller and Mr. Randy M. Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer. 
Respondent, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, was represented by Mr. J. Craig Smith, from 
the law firm of Nielsen & Senior, P.C. Intervenor, Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor, was 
represented by Mr. Kelly W. Wright, Attorney at Law. Intervenor, Board of Education of Granite 
School District, was represented by Mr. John E.S. Robson, from the law firm of Fabian and 
Clendenin. 
The relevant facts upon which the Commission has based this Order are: 
1. The above-referenced consolidated appeals involve property owned, leased or used 
by Alliant. Alliant has challenged the Salt Lake County Assessor's valuation of its property for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1995,1996,1997,1998 and 1999. This Commission has previously ruled on Alliant's real property 
for tax years 1995 and 1996 and Alliant has challenged that decision in District Court. Alliant's 
personal property for 1995 and 1996 is still before this Commission. 
2. Alliant timely appealed the Assessor's respective assessments for real and personal 
property for 1997,1998 and 1999 to the County Board of Equalization. To facilitate the resolution < 
of those appeals, the parties stipulated to a decision by the County Board of Equalization adverse 
to Alliant and upholding the Assessor's original assessments. 
3. All appeals currently before the Tax Commission have been consolidated into this 
proceeding. 
4. By a scheduling Order dated March 8, 2000, a formal hearing on the real and < 
personal property tax issues was set for November 2000. Subsequently, the County Board of 
Equalization and Alliant stipulated to a continuance of the hearing until April 2001 for the purpose 
of discussing settlement. 
5. On November 17, 2000, the Board of Education of Granite School District, filed 
with the Utah State Tax Commission its Petition to Intervene. 
i 
6. On or about December 5, 2000, Alliant and the County Board of Equalization 
agreed to settle their dispute of the foregoing matters. The terms of the settlement are contained in 
a letter dated December 5, 2000 (the "Settlement") from the attorneys for the County Board of * 
Equalization to Alliant's counsel. £• 
7. In a Commission meeting on December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County 
-2 -
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Commission voted to authorize the settlement outlined in the letters exchanged between the parties. 
8. On December 13, 2000, Mr. Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor, filed with 
the Utah State Tax Commission his Petition to Intervene. 
9. On December 15, 2000, Alliant and the County Board of Equalization filed a 
"Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving 
Settlement" with this Commission. 
10. Under the terms of the Settlement, to resolve all Alliant claims for tax years 1995 
through 1999, the County Board of Equalization agreed to refund five million dollars ($5,000,000) 
to Alliant. 
11. Under the terms of the Settlement, "[n]o obsolescence percentage or amount 
[was] applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a reduction in value to any 
particular year shall be for refund calculation percentages only and shall be neither indicative or 
dispositive with respect to any issue raised in Alliant's appeals." 
12. The Settlement was conditioned upon "final approval by the Utah State Tax 
Commission and the District Court and entry of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to 
authorize Salt Lake County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all 
refunds paid through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy." 
13. Granite School District is the single largest recipient of the property tax revenue 
that was the subject of the dispute and would be responsible for approximately fifty percent of the 
refund, or about $2.5 million. 
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14. On January 29, 2001, the Utah State Tax Commission issued an Order 
authorizing the Board of Education for Granite School District and Mr. Lee Gardner, Salt Lake 
County Assessor, to intervene and become parties to the action. 
The parties have presented written briefs, memorandums, and oral arguments. The 
Parties have also presented numerous issues, arguments and legal authorities to support either { 
approving or rejecting the proposed settlement. 
Based upon the foregoing facts presented to the Commission, and the briefs, 
memorandums, and oral arguments presented to the Commission, it is hereby determined as follows: 
1. The Petition to Intervene filed by the Board of Education of Granite School 
District was filed with the Utah State Tax Commission on November 17, 2000. { 
2. During the time Alliant Techsystems and the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization were negotiating a possible stipulated settlement of the cases before this Commission, 
they were each aware that Granite School District had a substantial financial interest in any 
resolution of those cases and had requested to be made a party so it could fully participate in the 
resolution of those cases. . 
3. After the Petition to Intervene filed by Granite School District was granted, it 
became a necessary party to any stipulated settlement of the issues before the Commission. In the 
interest of justice, and because Granite School District had done all it could to protect its rights, we 
determine its status as a party should be effective as of November 17, 2000, the date of the Motion 
to Intervene. 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal No. 99-0910 
4. Under the circumstances here, this Commission determines it is not appropriate 
to approve the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, because to do so would require a necessary 
party that had moved to intervene prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such a settlement 
against its will. 
5. Because of the Commission's determination on this issue, it is not necessary for 
the Commission to decide any of the other issues briefed and argued by the parties. 
6. The Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement is denied. 
7. The Formal Hearing previously scheduled to commence April 23, 2001 will go 
forward unless otherwise ordered. 
DATED this 7 day of ^ ^ d J ^ 2001. 
G. Blaine Davis 
Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this 
.1... dayof <-?7P?tsA _,2001. 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair % 
\ R. Bruce Johnso 
Commissioner 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
GBD/ssw/99-0910.ojm 
/LLT^AJ^^ 
MarcB. Job/son 
Commissioner 
^ V Z ^ - v . 
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Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson, concurring. 
I join in the decision above. For the reasons set out below, however, I feel it 
appropriate to write a concurring opinion as well. 
There is much to be said for the concept that a court should only decide the specific 
case before it and should base that decision on the narrowest possible grounds. Judicial resources 
are not expended unnecessarily and carefully tailored decisions result. As an administrative agency 
with quasi-judicial powers, however, it may be appropriate for us to give more guidance to the 
parties regularly appearing before us. 
The Commission's opinion is based on our determination that we should not force 
the District, having timely intervened, to accept a settlement against its will. Similar considerations, 
however, should preclude the District from forcing the County Board of Equalization to litigate an 
issue against the Board's better judgment. In my view, there is no public policy that would prevent 
Alliant and the County from agreeing to a reasonable value for settlement purposes and calculating 
a refund of a portion of the taxes paid to the County itself and all nonintervening entities based on 
that settlement. Alliant would still be free to contest the Board of Equalization's original value for 
purposes of obtaining a refund of taxes paid to the District, and the District would still be free to 
defend the value for purposes of avoiding any such refund. Such a bifurcated approach may or may 
not be acceptable to Alliant. It is certainly not presented in the instant case. But I do not believe 
such an approach should be precluded by our decision. 
- 6 -
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With regard to the settlement that is before us, the Intervenors have strenuously 
argued that this settlement is based only on a specific refund amount, not on the fair market value 
of the Subject Property. Accordingly, it violates, in their view, the uniformity and fair market value 
requirements of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution. Moreover, the Intervenors argue that the 
amount of a refund (or additional tax payment) is not an issue for the Commission to decide. They 
would argue that our role is only to determine fair market value; the amount of any refund or 
additional payment is arguably beyond our jurisdiction. 
This argument has caused the Commission serious concern. Our constitutional duty 
to supervise and administer the tax laws of the state is broad, but not unlimited. We clearly do not 
have jurisdiction over everything that relates to the payment or refund of property taxes. For 
example, the Board of County Commissioners has discretion, in certain cases, to refund property 
taxes that is reviewable only by a court, not this Commission. See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 870 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Nevertheless, I believe a refusal to 
consider any settlement, because it is originally denominated in terms of tax dollars, rather than fair 
market value, would constitute an unwarranted abdication of our responsibility. 
Indeed, the judgment levy statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-1330, seems to approve such a 
course. It provides in part that "[i]f the commission or a court of competent jurisdiction orders a 
reduction in the amount of any tax levied against any property for tax purposes, the taxpayer shall 
be reimbursed under Subsection (3)." It is hard to reconcile this language with the claim that the 
Commission can never order (or approve) a refund of property taxes and is limited only to 
-7-
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determinations of value. 
This case, however,involves multiple years and jurisdiction over the matters in issue 
is now divided between the Commission and the District Court. Accordingly, there must be some 
allocation of value among those years. Indeed, the settlement agreement explicitly contemplates 
such an allocation. 
The evidence before us, primarily the minutes of the Board of County 
Commissioners, indicate that valuation issues were of paramount concern to the Commissioners. 
Those were also their concerns in their roles as members of the Board of Equalization. They 
reviewed the appraisals, they came to their own conclusions about the relative merits of the 
appraisals and the risks of litigation. Their failure to prescribe a specific dollar value for each year 
before approving the settlement should not necessarily be fatal where qualified experts had widely 
disparate views as to fair market value. 
Unfortunately, at this point in time, there is still no allocation. Only one of the 
parties, Alliant, has attempted to allocate the reduction among the years in issue. That allocation is 
illustrative only. It does not purport to represent the agreement of the parties. Without such an 
allocation, however, we have no way of evaluating the merits of the proposed settlement. In the 
absence of intervention, this shortcoming could easily be remedied by allowing the County and 
Alliant to agree on a specific allocation of values for the years in issue. Of course, any such 
allocation is now moot, given our decision that Granite School District should not be forced to 
accept a settlement against its will. Where there is no such allocation, this Commission cannot know 
-8-
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what it is approving in terms of market value or even how much of the settlement is still within its 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, I concur in the decision not to approve the settlement. 
R. Bruce Johnso^/ 
Commissioner/'/ 
- 1 0 -
u i i ^ t ^ "J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah State Tax Commission 
USTC-Appeal 
Certificate of Mailing 
C7 
Uliant Techsystems Inc. vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0452 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
c/o Robert Berg 
600 2nd Street NE 
Hopkins, MN 55343 
Craig B. Sorensen 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
J. Craig Smith Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jodi A. Martin 
Tax Administrator 
2001 South State N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Attorney for Interested Party 
Interested Party 
**** CERTIFICATION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date 
o&lanioi 
Signature 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Mailing 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0452 
John Robson 
215 South State Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Karl Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Kelly Wright 
4618N3800 W 
Morgan, UT 84050 
Lee A. Gardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State N2300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Mary Ellen Sloane 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Attorney for Intervening Party 
Interested Party 
Attorney for Intervening Party 
Respondent 
Attorney for Affected County(s) 
****CERTIFICA TION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date 
03/01101 
'Signature 
1/07/01 1:24 pm 
y U t\ :f *t * 
Page 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Mailing 
dliant Techsystems Inc. vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0452 
Maxwell A. Miller Attorney for Petitioner 
PO Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
****CERTIFICATION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date Signature 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah State Tax Commission 
USTC-Appeal 
Certificate of Mailing 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0608 
Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
c/o Robert Berg 
600 2nd Street NE 
Hopkins, MN 55343 
Craig B. Sorensen 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
J. Craig Smith Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jodi A. Martin 
Tax Administrator 
2001 South State N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
Attorney for Interested Party 
Interested Party 
****CERTIFICA TION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date 
03/Oil 01 
Signature 
UUC:t'i J 
1/07/01 i:25pm Page 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Mailing. 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0608 
JohnRobson 
215 South State Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Karl Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Attorney for Intervening Party 
Interested Party 
Kelly W. Wright 
4618 N 3800 W 
. Morgan, UT 84050 
Lee A. Gardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State N23 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Mary Ellen Sloane 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Attorney for Intervening Party 
Respondent 
Attorney for Affected County(s) 
****CERTIFICA TION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
os/on Ioi 
Date Signature 
7/01 1-?Snm Vnop ? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Mailing 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc vs. Salt Lake County BOE 98-0608 
Maxwel l Mil ler Attorney for Petitioner 
PO Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
""CERTIFICATION**** 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named parties. 
05/01/01 At/JAM/</jtrffA_j} 
Date Signature 
._ ...... . •• >: <\ • r 
3/07/01 l:25pm 
U U iL i {i '** 
Page 3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ATTACHMENT 13 
Tax Commission ruling for 1995 and 1996 assesments. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,!/%M 
©ptf 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
•v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
) 
) Appeal No, 97-0031 
\ 
) 
) Tax Type; Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
) Commercial Property 
) Tax Years; 1995 & 1996 
) ) Judge: 
) 
Davis 
Presiding: 
G. B'aine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
Present for AH or Part of the Hearing: 
Richard B. McKeown, Commission Chair 
Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner 
Pam Hendnckson, Commissioner 
R Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
Appearances; 
For Petitioner: Mr. Maxwell Miller, from the law firm of Parsons, Behfe & Latimer 
Mr, Randy Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons, Behlc & Latimer 
For Respondent; Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn 
& Peters 
Ms. Angela Marie Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn 
& Peters 
Ms. Mary Eilen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
August JO, 1998. After two days of hearings, because of health problems of Mr, Peters, the hearing 
was continued to January 1 L 12, 13, H and 15. 1999. Closing arguments were heard on February 
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12, 1999. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission 
hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
JJuProperry 
1, The tax in question is property tax. 
2, The years in question are 1995 and 1996 
3, The subject property is operated as a rocket motor manufacturing and 
aerospace technology facility, commonly called the "Bacchus Works/1 which is located at 
approximately 4600 South and 7200 West in West Valley City in Salt Lake County 
4
' ™
scase> A i i i M L l j ^
 A p p c a ] 
No. 97^0031, addresses the real property issues of a consolidated appeal of AHiant's real and personal 
property assessments for 1995. AJliant's appeal of its persona! property assessment for 1995 is 
Capti0nt
'
d
 H f i s a k s J t o m ^ County Board of Equal i™.™ Appeal No 97-1260, 
It was agreed that the real property issues for 1995 would be tried separately from the persona! 
property issues. AHiant's 1996 real property appeal from an adverse ruling of the County Board is 
captioned MmnOjti)$memiv__Ml Lake Cnnntv »„flrH n f F g n . i ^ f a A p p e a , No_ 97.0754. 
AJliant's 1996 personal property appeal has not been consolidated with this case. 
5. For 1995, the Salt Lake County Assessor originally determined a value for AHiant's 
real property in Salt Lake County of SI 68,801,600. Before the County Board of Equalization, Alliant 
sought
 a value reduction to $82,865,641. The Couniy Assessor sought a reduction to $152,725,521. 
-2-
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The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization sustained a value of $152,725}521. 
6. For 1996, the Salt Lake County Assessor originally determined a value for Alliant's 
real property in Salt Lake County of $168,003,500. Before the County Board of Equalization, Alliant 
sought a value reduction to 532,965,641. The Salt Lake County Assessor sought an increase to 
$253,197,000. The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization denied both requests and sustained the 
original assessed value of $168,003,500, 
7. The property contains a gross building area of 1,893,053 square feet. There are 
297 primary structures which comprise a gross building area of 17660,890 square feet. In addition 
there are 371 support buildings and storage structures containing 232,163 square feet. The 
improvements are located on 4278.50 acres of land. The appraisers for each of the parties used 
slightly difference figures, but the Commission finds that any differences are not material in the 
determination of the fair market value of the property at issue in [his proceeding. 
• 8. The property is zoned for commercial and industrial purposes and West Valley City 
and Sah Lake County have imposed an over pressure zone which prohibits residential development 
around the site. Further gullies and canyons divide the property and a railroad right-of-way exists 
through the subject property, therefore the site can't be utilized fully due to the development difficulty 
posed by the subject's terrain The property is not vacant or available for development for residential 
use There was no evidence of the likeiihood of a change in zoning from industrial to residential in 
1995 and 1996. The buildings and structures are widely dispersed because of the highly explosive 
nature of the manufactured products. 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal No, 97-0031 
9. The Bacchus Works includes three plants; Plant One, Bacchus West, and the 
Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP")< 
Plant One includes more than 450 buildings, slightly over^0% of which are devoted 
to primary purposes (i.e. earth protected and bunkered high tech research and development 
structures, administrative, directive and security) and the rest are support facilities (i.e. storage and 
shipping), 
Bacchus West includes 34 major buildings and 27 support structures. Bacchus West 
includes "specialized features which are uniquely geared toward the construction of rocket motors." 
NIROP is owned by the United States Navy and leased to Aljiant. NIROP includes 
62 major structures and S3 support buildings. The uses and features of the structures within this 
facility [NIROP] are similar to those of Plant One. 
NIROP PROPERTY 
10. Petitioner has alleged that the NIROP property is exempt from property taxes and 
is not subject to the privilege tax; imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, ei.seq. 
11. NIROP is a facility which is owned by the United States Government, but is used 
by Petitioner to fulfill and perform its government contracts. 
12, The NIROP property is used for Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programs, 
including D5 (Trident), C3 (Trident), C4 (Poseidon), A3 (Polaris), which are all U.S. Navy missile 
systems worked on by Petitioner. 
13, The Navy does have some employees on the property who are there primarily for 
- 4 -
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repair, maintenance, and administrative purposes. 
14 AJliant acquired the Bacchus Works facility as part of ifs purchase of the Hercules 
aerospace business from Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules"). The Hercules/AJliant sale occurred 
pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties dated October 28, 1994. The closing 
date of the sales transaction was March 15, 1995, 
15. At the time of the sale, Alliant and Hercules were public companies, having no 
common directors, officers or employees, Both parties to the sale undertook extensive due diligence. 
The sale price was negotiated by the parties at arm's length, 
16. Hercules and AJliant determined that the purchase price Alliant would pay 
Hercules for its aerospace assets "shall be the net book value as of the closing date plus 66 million 
dollars." By "net book value/ the parties to the sales transaction meant "assets transferred minus 
liabilities assumed." 
17. Petitioner represents that the amounts paid for the property of Hercules are as 
follows: 
Cash paid from Alliant to Hercules 5247,547,000 
Advance payment under license agreement S 14,099,000 
Interest paid on advance payments $ 551,000 
Stock paid from Alliant to Hercules 
(3,862,069 shares @ $29/share) SU2.0CO,0_OC 
-5-
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Total consideration paid from Alliant to Hercules $374,197,000 
Transaction expenses paid to third parties 
(investment bankers, accountants, lawyers) $ 11,250,000 
Total purchase price AJliant paid for Hercules 
assets IMM£LQS2 • 
18. In addition, Alliant also assumed $230,662,574 of the current liabilities of 
Hercules, raising the total consideration for the assets of Hercules to $616,109,574, 
19. The property purchased from Hercules included real persona! and intangible 
property in Utah and other states, The Utah property was located in Salt Lake, Davis and Tooele 
Counties, with the majority being in Salt Lake County. 
20. Petitioner made accounting allocations of the purchase price between real, 
personal and intangible properties, and additional accounting aliocations between the various 
geographical locations, Those aliocations were based primarily upon the net book value (original cost 
less depreciation) on the books of Hercules at the time of the purchase. 
21. Net book value (defined by Petitioner as original cost less depreciation) is not the 
same concept as the cost method of valuation which is usually replacement cost (at the lien date) less 
depreciation. Further, the depreciation for the two concepts is calculated dilTerently. Therefore, the 
Commission finds that net book value of each asset does not necessarily equal fair market value of 
that asset. In addition, assets operating as a unit have an enhanced market value over the separate 
value of each individual asset, because those assets are already installed and earning revenue. 
Therefore, fair market value is not the same thing as net book value as that term was used by 
- 6 -
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Petitioner 
Petitioner's Appraisals 
22. Petitioner submitted an appraisal from Mr. David VanHDrimmelcn and Mr Mark 
Wall from the Salt Lake City, Utah appraisal firm of Boddl, Van Drimmelen Commercial Appraisers, 
Inc. 
23. Petitioner's appraisal was presented by Mr. David Van Drimxneien, M A I . The 
original appraisal was amended by several supplemental exhibits, which will be the ones referred to 
herein 
24. Petitioner's appraisal used a production capacity utilization model and a space 
utilization model The primary difference is in the calculation of functional and economic 
obsolescence. For the production capacity utilization model two different scenarios were used, based 
upon the "average number of mixes'1 (243) and the "best case mixes" (275), Those same methods 
and calculations were used for both 1995 and 1996. 
25. Under all of the methods and scenarios, Mr. Van Drimmden determined a 
replacement cost of $265,203,189 for 1995, and $269,874,696 for 1996, and he then deducted 
physical depreciation of $60,370,729 for 1995, and $66,507,642 for 1996. He therefore determined 
a physical depreciated value of $204,832,460 for 1995, and $203,367,054 for 1996 He then 
calculated functional and economic obsolescence based upon the capacity utilization (both average 
number of mixes and best case mixes) and the space utilization methods recommended by Dr. Robert 
Crawford, Those determinations of obsolescence were not appraisal determinations of Mr. Van 
- 7 -
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Drimmelen, but were his mathematical calculations of the theory developed by Dr. Crawford and Dr. 
Gary Cornia, 
26. After the subtraction of the functional and economic obsolescence, x\lr. Van 
Drimmelen then added his estimated land values of $19,680,000 or 4600 per acre for 1995, and 
520,965,000 or 4900 per acre for 1996. 
27. Based upon those calculations, Mr. Van Drimmelen determined values of 
$85,513,153, 594,198,049, and $96,001,868 for 1995, which he correlated to arrive at a 
recommended fair market value of the real property for 1995 of $95,000,000. for 1996, he 
determined values of $86,327,171, $94,949,939, and $97,501,259, which he correlated tc arrive at 
a recommended fair market value of the real property for 1996 of $96,000,000, 
28. Mr. Van Drimmelen did not correlate the values for NIROP, but for 1995 his 
different models determined an estimated value for NIRQP of between SI 1,726,699 and $13,273,719. 
For 1996, his estimated values for NIROP were between SI 1,484,040 and $12,999,047. 
29. Petitioner submitted several other reports, including a Business Enterprise Value 
and Intangible Asset Valuation Analysis Pveporx by Mr. Robert Boudreau which counsel for Petitioner 
has characterized as an appraisal. However, that report does not rise to the level of an appraisal, and 
the determination of intangible values made therein are found by the Commission to not be &n 
accurate detemiination of the fair market value of the intangibles of Petitioner, Those other reports 
are interesting but the Commission does not adopt those reports as the correct method for 
determining the fair market value of the. real property of Petitioner. 
- 8 -
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Respondent's Appraisals 
30. Respondent submitted two appraisals, one from Mr, Ed Kent, a Commercial 
Appraiser in the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office, and the other from Mr. Eckhardt Prawitt, a 
Registered Appraiser, on behalf of the Utah Association of Counties 
31. Mr. Kent determined a land value of $42,800,000 or $10,000 per acre for 1995, 
and $47,100,000 or $11,000 per acre for 1996, 
32. Mr. Kent then determined the total cost new estimated value of ihe real property 
improvements, less physical deterioration was $206,382,130 for 1995, and S2Ct,834J09 for 1996. 
33. Mr, Kent next deducted incurable functional obsolescence of $15,140,323 for 
1995, and S15,411,26? for 1996. He also deducted external obsolescence of 15% in 1995, and 26% 
in 1996, for a total external obsolescence of $28,686,271 for 1995, and $48,470,094 for 1996. 
34. Based upon a summation of those numbers, Mr. Kent made a final estimate of 
value based upon the cost approach to value of $205,000,000 for 1995, and $185,000,000 for 1996. 
35. Mr, Kent determined that neither the sales comparison approach nor the income 
capitalization approach would be an accurate indicator of value for this property, and he therefore 
recommended the values which he determined based upon the cost approach of 5205,000,000 for 
1995, and 5185,000,000 for 1996. 
36. Respondent also submitted a limited appraisal prepared by Mr. Eckhardt Arthur 
Prawitt, a registered appraiser, on behalf of the Utah Association of Counties Mr. Prawitt's appraisal 
valued all of the tangible and intangible persona! and real property of Petitioner, but it did not identify 
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the value of the real property of Petitioner located in Salt Lake County. The issue in this proceeding 
was limited to the value of Petitioner's real property located in Salt Lake County. Since Mr Prawitt's 
appraisal did not address that issue, ix was not given any weight by the Commission 
APPLICABLE LAW 
• 1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just administration of property 
taxes to ensure that property is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-210(7). 
2. Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish that the market value of the 
subject property is other than that as determined by Respondent. Utah Admin. R. RS61-1 A-7 (G) 
3. To prevail, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original 
assessment contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for 
reducing the original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V. Bd Of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997). Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 590 P.2d, 332 (Utah 1979). 
4. A tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person 
of any real or persona) property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is used 
in connection with, a business conducted for profit. This includes property which is owned by the 
United States Government but used in connection with a business conducted for profit. Utah Code 
Aim. §59-4-101. 
- 1 0 -
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DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Petitioner has suggested the first decision to be made by the Commission is whether 
the sale from Hercules to Alliam was an arms-length sale for fair marker value, and if so7 was the 
parties agreed value of the fixed assets, exclusive of intangibles, a proper allocation of value to 
Petitioner's taxable tangible property. 
There is no evidence to indicate the sale from Hercules to Alllant was not an arms* 
length transaction, but the Commission has not attempted to make a determination of whether the 
total sale was at fair market value. The only issue before the Commission in this proceeding is a 
determination of the fair marker value of the property owned by Petitioner which is located in Salt 
Lake County. However, if the purchase of all of the property was at lis total fair market value, the 
Commission is convinced, and so finds, the allocation made to real property in Sail Lake County is 
not an accurate reflection of the fair market value of that property. Accounting entries, even when 
made correctly; are designed to establish a historical record of the income, expenses, assets, liabilities 
and capital accounts of a business. Those accounting records arc not intended to establish the price 
at which those assets might sell on the open market between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
Petitioner attempted to establish the value of the reai property by first determining a 
value for the intangible (non-taxable) property and deducting that amount from the total purchase 
price, and then allocating the balance between real and personal property Where the values 
determined for the intangible (non-taxable) property were clearly excessive, inflated and bloated, the 
amounts left to be allocated to real and personal property were inadequate to be reflective of correct 
- 1 1 -
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fair market value. 
Petitioner has also alleged that the NIROP property which is owned by the United 
States Government, is not subject to the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4401. 
However, the Commission finds that Petitioner and one of its subsidiaries have the right to the 
exclusive possession or other beneficial use of the NIROP real property, and that Petitioner's 
possession or other beneficial USQ of the property is in connection with a business conducted for 
profit. The NIROP property is therefore subject to the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. 
§59-4101, 
The real issue in this proceeding is the fair market value of the real propeity of Alliant 
located in Salt Lake County on the lien dates, January 1; 1995 and January 1, 1996. The controlling 
evidence consists of the Van Drimmelen appraisal and the Kent appraisal. 
There are two primary differences between the Van Drimmelcn appraisal and the Kent 
appraisal; (a) obsolescence as applied to the replacement cost new of the facility, and (b) land values. 
All other differences are minor and relatively immaterial. 
The most significant difference between the two appraisals is the appropriate amount 
of obsolescence to be deducted from the replacement cost new of the facility. 
The difference between the replacement cost new less physical depreciation or 
deterioration for the real property improvements determined in the Van Drimmelcn appraisal and the 
Kent appraisal is not significant, For 1995, the replacement cost new less depreciation for Mr. Van 
Drimmelen was 5204,832,460, and for Mr Kent was 5206,382,130. The difference tor 1995 is 
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$1,549,670, or only ,76%. For 1996, the replacement cost new less depreciation for Mr. Van 
Dnrnmeien was $203,367,054, and for Mr, Kent was 5201,834,709 The difference for 1996 is only 
$1,532,345, or only .76%. Therefore, with a difference of less than one percent in the physically 
depreciated value of the real property improvements, both appraisals are deemed to be reasonable 
appraisals up to that point. The only significant differences between the appraisals relate to 
obsolescence and land value determinations, 
For 1995 and 1996, the Van Dnrnmeien appraisal deducts 67,86% of the replacement 
cost for obsolescence. The Van Drimrnelen methods for measuring obsolescence are (1) "capacity 
utilization0 approach; and (2) "space utilization" approach. 
(1) Capacity Utilization 
The capacity utilization approach was recommended by Dr. Robert G. Crawford and 
Dr. Gary C. Cornia in "The Problem of Appraising Specialized Assets," The Appraisal Journal 
(January 1994), By this method, obsolescence is measured by (i) determining the percentage 
difference between the intended capacity in normal or regular use per year based on the number of 
propeliam mixes, allowing for necessary maintenance and repairs, and the actual number of propellant 
mixes Affiant completed per year in manufacturing rocket motors; and (ii) deducting that percentage 
difference from the replacement cost new. Using this method, obsolescence was estimated at (57,56% 
using scenario 1, and 63.62% using scenario 2. These percentages of obsolescence were consistent 
for both 1995 and 1996. 
(2) Space Utilization 
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As to space utilization, Mr, Van Drimmelen explains that "the functional economic 
obsolescence of the subject was based on the actual utilization of the facilities space/' Using this 
method, the obsolescence was estimated at 57 1% for Plant One, 66,93% for NIROP, and 63,52% 
for Bacchus West. 
By contrast, Mr. Kent's appraisal categorizes obsolescence into functional and 
economic; 
(1) Functional Obsolescence 
Mr. Kent's apprai$al determines Bacchus West does not suffer any functional 
obsolescence because, it is the newest and most modern of the three planis. As to Plant One and 
NIROP, the Kent appraisal estimates incurable functional obsolescence by eliminating from the 
improvements those buildings and structures that have outlived [heir functionality or that have been 
abandoned. 
(2) Economic Obsolescence 
Mr Kent's appraisal estimates economic obsolescence to be 15% in J995 and 26% 
on 1996. These percentages are calculated by comparing the net sales from the aerospace segment 
in 1995 and 1996, respectively, to the mi sales for that segment in 1991. 
(3) Total Obsolescence 
For both functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence,, the appraisal of Mr. 
Kent determined total obsolescence of 21.24% for 1995, and 3 J .65% for 1996. 
In reviewing and analyzing the obsolescence calculations of each of the- appraisers, the 
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Commission is not certain thai either of the appraisals is completely accurate in its calculation of 
obsolescence. 
In the appraisal of Mr. Van Drimmelen, the obsolescence calculations were based upon 
a theory developed and proposed by Dr. Robert G Crawford and Dx Gary C Cornia. While it is an 
interesting theory, there is no evidence in this proceeding that convinces the Commission that the 
application of the theory results in an accurate calculation of the obsolescence applicable to the 
property of Petitioner. This is particularly true because of testimony and evidence presented by 
Respondent indicating as follows: 
Mr, Phil Cook, M A.I., reviewed the appraisal of Mr. Van Drimmeien, including his 
calculation of obsolescence. Mr. Cook stated several reasons he did noi agree with Mr. Van 
Drimmelen's calculation of obsolescence, including: 
1. The unsubstantiated assumption that propellant mixes establish the capacity 
utilization rate for the entire facility. This included the representation that there are other products 
(composites) which are produced at the facility besides propellant mixes, and the impact of the 
production of those composites had not been factored into the obsolescence calculations. 
2. The unsubstantiated assumption of 100 percenr utilization of capacity Mr, Cook 
main;ains it is unreasonable to assume the plants would be ]00 percent utilized from the day of 
construction. He maintains the obsolescence calculations of Mr, Van Drimmeien ignore the 
distinctions between "full production capability/ "preferred level of operation/' and "practical 
capacity." He concludes that it is unreasonable, physically infeasible md imprudent to expect to 
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construct any plant to achieve a 100 percent utilization rate. 
3. The failure to consider industry-wide capacity utilization rates. 
4. The failure to consider economics of scale. The general position is that if there is 
any excess capacity in the facilities, it was constructed at a lower cost, and should be carried at a 
lower cost factor than the portion of the plant that is utilized, 
5. The failure to implement the concept of operating leverage This would be to 
adjust the ratio of fixed and variable expenses to total revenues 
6. The failure to consider whether any obsolescence is temporary or permanent 
After giving a more complete explanation of the above problems of the obsolescence 
calculation of Mr. Van Drimmelen, the conclusion of Mr. Cook was as follows' 
"Conclusion. In short, there arc compelling arguments to suggest the 
appraisers inadequately handled the calculation of obsolescence, 
While the basic concept of actual production versus capacity is well 
established, the application of thai concept is less simple than the 
appraisers have concluded. The overall estimate appears to be grossly 
overstated, partly because of a double-counting relative to the 
application of physical deterioration, but more so for the other factors 
just addressed, As noted in our sample calculations, the assessment 
(obsolescence calculation] could legitimately be argued to be closer 
to 40 percent as opposed to the 64 to 68 percent range concluded by 
the appraisers." 
Mr. Cook also analyzed the land value calculations of Mr. Van Drimmden. Mr, Cook 
acknowledges the difficulty of finding comparable sales in the local market the siz:e of the subject site 
of more than 4,000 acres. Nevertheless, Mr. Cook concluded that the land value calculations of Mr. 
Van Drimmelen were understated, but he did not make his own land value estimates. 
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Therefore, based upon all of the testimony and evidence in this proceeding, including 
but not limited to that referred to above, the Commission finds and concludes that Vm appraisal of 
Mr, Van Drimmelen overstated the obsolescence of the facilities, and understated the value of the 
land, 
Petitioner and its witnesses have also asserted several challenges to the obsolescence 
and land value determinations made by Mr Kent in his appraisal These include The following: 
1, Mr. Kcni failed to estimate any obsolescence for the Bacchus West facility because 
it is the newest and most modern of the three plants. 
2. Mr. Kent limited his incurable functional obsolescence to the buildings in Plant 1 
and NIROP which had outlived their functional utility or have been completely abandoned. The 
position of Petitioner is that this approach is wrong because it does not include buildings that are in 
partial usage or not completely abandoned, nor does it allow any incurable functional obsolescence 
for the buildings at the Bacchus Plant. 
3, Mr. Kent calculated economic obsolescence of 15 percent for 1995 and 26 percent 
for 1996, based upon the changes from 1991 to 1995 or 1996. The position of Petitioner is this 
requires an erroneous assumption ihat there was no economic obsolescence in 1991. 
4. Mr, Kent's determination of land valuation is erroneous because; 
a. an insufficient adjustment was made to adjust for size when compared with 
other sales of much smaller size, 
b. the (and was valued as residential land, whereas its highest and best use, and 
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actual use, is industrial. 
c. the assumption of selling the land in 100 acre or smaller plats (for 4,278.50 
acres) fails to recognize the time and costs to subdivide the land. 
Therefore, based upon all of the testimony and evidence in this proceeding, including 
but not limited to that referred to above, the Commission finds and concludes that the appraisal of 
Mr, Kent understates the obsolescence of the facilities and overstates the value of the land. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that Petitioner has failed to meet 
its burden of proof to establish that the market value of the subject property is lower than that 
determined by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, or to provide a sound evidentiary basis 
for reducing the value determined by the Board of Equalization to the amount proposed by Petitioner. 
Likewise, Respondent has failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that the market value of the 
subject property is higher than that determined by the Board of Equalization, or to provide a sound 
evidentiary basis for raising such value to the amount proposed by Respondent, The Commission 
therefore finds that the market value of the real property of Petitioner m Salt Lake County was 
5152,725,521 for 1995, and $168,003,500 for 1996. It is so ordered. 
DATED this / ^ day of ^£^^€^^JU^ , 1999 
. ' • . A ^ 
/ : ^ { rt.c-t.^ /ta
 e a^J-
G. Biaine Davis 
Administraiive Law Judae 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION; 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision, 
DATED this /& day of !%Zw£frS>i&,.y* ,1999. 
Richard B. Mc^eown ll*of' '"'"'' \ % < Pam Hendriekson 
Chairman \ ;i f RpAl \^\\ Commissioner 
J0 '0 
Palmer DePauiis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order tc file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. §63-46b-13 A Request 
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact If you do not Hie a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) 
days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann, §§59-1 -
601 and 63-4Gb-13 et seq. 
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1 DISSENT; 
The proper valuation of a large, highly specialized industrial property such as the 
subject is highly problematic in most instances, There are rarely, if ever, satisfactory comparable 
sales, The income approach i$ not entirely satisfactory because of the difficulty of identifying the 
income attributable to a specific facility, as opposed to income generated by all of the taxpayer's 
property, wherever located. Moreover even if income figures were available for this particular 
facility, they would presumably represent income generated by the taxpayer's real property, persona! 
property and intangible property Only real property is the subject of this appeal Finally, where, as 
here, the majority of the improvements are old and there have been significant changes in the industry, 
historical cosi figures are problematic. The improvements range from 6 to 81 years old. Ex. P^  
Boudreaux, Sec B. It is difficult to ascertain the appropriate amount of physical depreciation under 
these circumstances, let alone economic and functional obsolescence. Moreover, because of the 
uniqueness of the facility, it is difficult to find a reliable benchmark against which economic 
obsolescence can be measured. 
In ihis case, however, we have the unusual situation of an arm's length sale negotiated 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller a few months prior to the first hen date and 
consummated, without substantial change in terms, a few months after the fust lien date. Although 
1 recognize that a single saie does not make a market, the existence of an arm's length sale provides 
highly probative evidence as to the fair market value of the property in question as of the first lien 
date. 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
LEE GARDNER, in his capacity as Salt Lake 
County Assessor, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondents-Intervenors, 
cr -L 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 & 99-0190 
•,LT 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Commercial Property 
Tax Years: 1997, 1998 and 1999 
Judge: Davis 
Presiding: 
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mr. Maxwell Miller, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Mr. Randy Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
For Respondent: Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn 
& Peters 
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
For Intervenor, Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor: 
Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn 
& Peters 
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
For Intervenor, Granite School District: 
Mr. J. David Pearce, from the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
April 23, 2001 through April 27, 2001. Each party submitted its Proposed Findings of Fact, 
U U L "i' * u 
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Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, and Briefs on or about May 14, 2001. Based upon the 
evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The years in question are 1997, 1998 and 1999. The lien dates are January 1, 
1997, January 1, 1998 and January 1, 1999. 
3. The Salt Lake County Assessor initially valued the land and improvements for 
each of the years at issue as follows: 
Assessment Year Assessment Amount 
1997 $ 256,402,900 
1998 $ 235,850,700 
1999 $ 235,848,900 
4. The subject property is zoned for commercial and industrial purposes and West 
Valley City and Salt Lake County have imposed an over pressure zone which prohibits residential 
development around the site. Further, gullies and canyons divide the property and a railroad right-of-
way exists through the subject property, so the site cannot be fully utilized because of the 
development difficulty posed by the subject's terrain. The property is not vacant or available for 
development for residential use. There was no evidence of the likelihood of a change in the zoning 
from industrial to residential. The buildings and structures are widely dispersed because of the 
highly explosive nature of the manufactured products. 
5. The Bacchus Works includes three plants: Plant One, Bacchus West, and the 
Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP"). 
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6. Plant One includes more than 450 buildings, slightly over 40% of which are 
devoted to primary purposes (i.e. earth protected and bunkered high tech research and development 
structures, administrative, directive and security) and the rest are support facilities (i.e. storage and 
shipping). 
7. Bacchus West includes approximately 34 major buildings and 27 support 
structures. Bacchus West includes specialized features which are uniquely geared toward the 
construction of rocket motors. 
NIROP PROPERTY 
8. Petitioner has alleged that the NIROP property is exempt from property taxes and 
is not subject to the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, etseq. 
9. NIROP is a facility which is owned by the United States Navy, but is used by 
Petitioner to fulfill and perform its government contracts. The uses and features of the structures 
within this facility [NIROP] are similar to those of Plant One. 
10. The NIROP property is and has been used for Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) 
programs, including D5 (Trident), C3 (Trident), C4 (Poseidon), A3 (Polaris), which are all U.S. 
Navy missile systems worked on by Petitioner. 
11. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., has a Facilities Use Contract with the Navy for the use 
of NIROP. Facilities Use Contract; Affidavit of Robert Kaufman. 
12. The contract provides "that the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract 
shall apply to these facilities provided to the contractor by the Government... for the contractor's 
use in performance of contracts or subcontracts, or both, for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) 
~
3
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systems. The contractor agrees to use, maintain, account for, and dispose of such facilities in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract." Contract, Part I, Section B. 
The Facilities Use Contract is attached to the County's NIROP Reply Memorandum. 
13. First priority for the use of NIROP shall be given to work on behalf of the Navy. 
Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3, <f 3. 
14. Alliant must obtain approval before making either capital modifications to or 
usage changes of facilities. Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3, ^  4. 
15. The FAR 52.245-11(e)(1) requires the Contractor (Alliant) to notify the 
Contracting Office... (1) Whenever use of all facilities for government work in any quarterly period 
averages less than 75 percent of the total use of the facilities." 
16. In addition to using NIROP for SSP programs, Alliant uses NIROP for non-FBM 
purposes such as storage, testing and shipping commercial rocket motors. Affidavit of Kim J. 
Abplanalp at 4, f 12; Affidavit of Robert E. Kaufman at 5, f 16. 
17. Alliant operates NIROP within the bounds of the Facilities Use Contract and 
cannot do more or less than that. J. Foote, Tr. April 23, 2001 at 166-67. 
18. NIROP contains 145 major structures and support and storage buildings. 
Affidavit of Ed Kent at 4,^| 10. 
19. There are approximately 100 actively used buildings at NIROP. Tr. at 773. 
20. Robert Reilly concluded that approximately 36 of the buildings at NIROP were 
functionally obsolete and that an additional 10 buildings suffered some functional obsolescence. P. 
Reilly-2, Exh. VIII; Exh. XI; Exh. XIV. This leaves approximately 100 actively used buildings at 
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NIROP. 
21. The entire Bacchus Works facility, including NIROP, is enclosed in fencing, 
warns trespassers to keep out and is not open to the public. No member of the public may gain 
entrance to the Bacchus Works, including NIROP, without the express permission of Alliant. 
Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5 4 17. 
22. In order to gain access to the Bacchus Works facility, including NIROP, one must 
pass through AUiant's designated entrance, register with AUiant's security officers at AUiant's 
administration building, obtain permission from an Alliant employee to gain access, wear an Alliant 
identification badge, and be transported to, from and through the facility by an Alliant employee in 
an Alliant vehicle. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, «j[ 18. 
23. The entrance of NIROP does not require separate permission, registration, 
identification, or accompaniment by a Navy employee. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, ^ 19. 
24. The Navy's Trident II (commonly called the D-5) rocket motor is not primarily 
produced at NIROP. The primary manufacturing process of the Trident rocket motor is at AUiant's 
privately owned facility located at Bacchus West. NIROP property is used in a supporting role in the 
manufacturing process, but all of the actual rocket motor manufacturing occurs on AUiant's privately 
owned property. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, | 20. 
25. Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the Titan (and Trident), has an on-site 
team, located very close to AUiant's program office, and the Lockheed Martin team communicates 
and interacts daily with Alliant employees. J. Foote, Dep. at 37-40. 
26. Lockheed's on-site team for Titan is to provide contract interface, and quality 
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oversight. The team verifies that AUiant is producing consistent with the contract and that 
production lines are under correct controls. J. Foote, Dep. at 40. 
27. Lockheed's on-site interface with AUiant for Titan is more than what is typical of 
prime contractors. J. Foote, Dep. at 40. 
28. Boeing also has on-site representatives doing customer subcontracting duties and 
is there to oversee quality and ensure that the right disciplines are followed. J. Foote, Dep. at 41. 
29. The Navy employees are doing quality inspections and verifications. They are 
monitoring AUiant but are not involved in manufacturing. J. Foote, Tr. April 23, 2001 at 163. 
30. The Navy does not have the actual day-to-day management and direction over the 
production of rocket motors at Bacchus West. Robert Kaufman Dep. at 13. 
31. AUiant uses the NIROP property, in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
its supply contract. The Navy maintains an office at the AUiant facilities, for the purpose of 
providing technical assistance under Navy supply and facilities contracts. Affidavit of Sumsion at 3, 
[^ 5, attached to the County's Reply Memorandum on NIROP. Alliant's employees use, maintain, 
dispose of and account for the NIROP facilities in accordance with the facilities use contracts. 
Affidavit of Sumsion at 3, ^ 6. 
32. The Navy's interaction with AUiant with respect to its supply and facilities 
contracts is similar to the relationship AUiant has with its onsite prime contractors, Lockheed Martin 
and Boeing, which is one of oversight of quality and activities consistent with contract production 
specifications. This relationship is not equivalent to management or control by the Navy over 
Alliant's manufacturing of solid rocket motors, or its use of NIROP in support thereof. 
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3 3. NIROP is used by Alliant in connection with the supply contracts for solid rocket 
motors for the Trident II (D-5). Affidavit of Steve Sumsion at 2, ^ 3. 
34. Alliant is entitled to earn a profit on the Trident supply contracts. J. Foote Tr. 
April 23, 2001 at 170. 
3 5. The Navy does have some employees on the property who are there primarily for 
repair, maintenance, and administrative purposes. 
PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY 
36. Alliant acquired the Bacchus Works facility as part of its purchase of the 
Hercules aerospace business from Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules"). The Hercules/Alliant sale 
occurred pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties dated October 28, 1994. 
The closing date of the sales transaction was March 15, 1995. 
37. At the time of the sale, Alliant and Hercules were public companies, having no 
common directors, officers or employees. Both parties to the sale undertook extensive due diligence. 
The sale price was negotiated by the parties at arm's length. 
38. Hercules and Alliant determined that the purchase price Alliant would pay 
Hercules for its aerospace assets "shall be the net book value as of the closing date plus 66 million 
dollars." By "net book value", the parties to the sales transaction meant "assets transferred minus 
liabilities assumed." 
39. In a prior proceeding Petitioner represented, and the Commission found, that the 
amounts paid for the property of Hercules were as follows: 
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U U L 'i <3 / Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal No. 99-0190 
Cash paid from Alliant to Hercules * $247,547,000 
Advance payment under license agreement $ 14,099,000 
Interest paid on advance payments $ 551,000 
Stock paid from Alliant to Hercules 
(3,862,069 shares @ $29/share) $112,000,000 
Total paid by from Alliant to Hercules .$374,197,000 
Transaction expenses paid to third parties 
(investment bankers, accountants, lawyers) $ 11,250,000 
Total purchase price Alliant paid to Hercules $385.447.000 
40. In addition, Alliant also assumed $230,662,574 of the liabilities of Hercules, 
raising the total consideration for the sale to $616,109,574. 
41. The property purchased from Hercules included real, personal and intangible 
property in Utah and other states. The Utah property was located in Salt Lake, Davis and Tooele 
Counties, with the majority being in Salt Lake County. 
42. Petitioner made allocations of the purchase price between real, personal and 
intangible properties for book and tax purposes. Additional accounting allocations between the 
various geographical locations were also made, but it is not clear that any such allocations were 
based upon fair market value. 
43. Net book value (defined by Petitioner as original cost less depreciation) is not the 
same concept as the cost method of valuation which is usually replacement cost (at the lien date) less 
economic (not accounting) depreciation. Further, the depreciation for the two concepts is calculated 
differently. In addition, assets operating as a unit have an enhanced market value over the separate 
value of each individual asset, because those assets are already installed and earning revenue. 
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Therefore, fair market value is not the same thing as net book value as that term was used by 
Petitioner. 
STIPULATIONS 
44. On or about February 16, 2000, the parties entered into a "Stipulation and Joint 
Motion for Scheduling Order", a copy of which is attached hereto, and the factual representations are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
45. On or about April 17,2001, the parties entered into a "Stipulation" regarding land 
values for the property at issue, a copy of which is also attached hereto, and the factual 
representations are also incorporated herein by reference. 
46. Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the Commission finds the land values, 
excluding any effect of contamination and/or stigma, are as follows: 
Year Value 
1997 $ 35,545,692 
1998 $ 39,322,360 
1999 $ 41,052,358 
47. Further, based upon the stipulations, the Commission finds the reproduction cost 
of the improvements, less physical depreciation, is as follows: 
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As of January 1 • 
FACILITY 1997 1998 1999 
PLANT 1 $ 61,767,570 $ 63,263,144 $ 63,538,813 
NIROP $ 38,082,662 $ 38,676,540 $ 38,669,210 
BACCHUS WEST $ 104,163,666 $ 106,633,254 $ 107,508,194 
SUBTOTAL $204,013,898 $208,572,938 $209,716,217 
Deletions $ - $ - $ 
Additions $ - $ 813,536 $ 1,481,309 
TOTAL $204,013,898 $209,386,474 $211,197,526 
ISSUES 
48. The ultimate issue for the Commission to determine in this proceeding is the fair 
market value of Alliant's taxable real property in Salt Lake County as of January 1,1997,1998 and 
1999 as defined in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(9). 
49. Determinations of value are normally made using three (3) separate approaches to 
value, i.e., the cost approach, the market or comparable sales approach, and the income approach. 
The parties have agreed that the cost approach should be used in this case because of a lack of 
reasonable information to use to make an estimate of value based on either of the other approaches to 
value. The Commission concurs and agrees that the cost approach is the method most likely to 
determine the fair market value of the property of Petitioner. 
50. Because the parties have agreed on the value of the land (except for the effects of 
contamination and stigma), and the reproduction cost less physical depreciation for the 
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improvements, it would normally be a matter of adding those two (2) amounts together to determine 
the total value. However, there are issues which have been raised which Petitioner argues should 
result in reductions in the value, which issues are: 
a. The amount, if any, of decrement in the land values for contamination 
of the soil. 
b. The amount, if any, of decrement in the land values for stigma 
associated with the land because of the contamination, which may make 
the land more difficult to sell. 
c. The amount, if any, of decrement in the value of the improvements, 
caused by functional obsolescence. 
d. The amount, if any, of decrement in the value of the improvements 
caused by external or economic obsolescence. 
e. Whether the value of the NIROP property should be removed from the 
total value of the property because it is owned by the United States 
Navy and (Petitioner alleges) is not subject to tax pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101. 
CONTAMINATION 
51. Petitioner has proposed a deduction from the RCNLD (replacement cost new less 
depreciation) values stipulated to by the parties to adjust for contamination which has occurred on 
the property. Because of the contamination, the property is subject to Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action pursuant to a consent order between Hercules, Inc. (the 
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former owner of the property) and the State of Utah. That consent order requires certain corrective 
action and contamination monitoring. 
52. Petitioner has requested the deduction from RCNLD for contamination be based 
upon its projected monitoring costs, and page 29 of Exhibit 1 Reilly projects those monitoring costs 
to be $500,000 per year. Therefore, Petitioner has requested a reduction in value for monitoring 
costs of $8,000,000 for 1997, $7,500,000 for 1998, and $7,000,000 for 1999. 
53. The actual costs of remediation to the RCRA corrective action for the years 1997 
to 1999 are as follows: 
1997: $314,219 
1998: $550,061 
1999: $806,415 
54. Liabilities for remediation are not contained in the Bacchus Works financial 
statements but are booked at the corporate level and are contained in the annual reports of the year 
2000 form 10-K. 
55.. The remediation and monitoring costs are included in Alliant's costs submitted to 
the United States Government. The costs have been considered an allowable indirect contract cost 
and have been reimbursed by the United States Government. 
56. As part of the sale transaction, Alliant and Hercules, Inc. entered into an 
Environmental Agreement which provides for indemnification to Alliant by Hercules in the event the 
United States Government does not reimburse Alliant for remediation costs. 
57. The Alliant Annual Reports to Shareholders for 1998 states that Alliant has a 
reimbursement receivable for environmental costs reported to be approximately $10.5 million, in 
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which the report states it is expected that a significant portion of the company's environmental costs 
will be reimbursed to the company by the United States Government and those not covered through 
government contracts will be covered by Hercules under the indemnification agreement subject to 
the company notifying Hercules of claims prior to March 2000 and March 2005. 
5 8. The Report to Shareholders for 1996 through 1999 and the year 2000 form 10-K 
contain similar representations regarding indemnification and reimbursement. 
59. J. Phillip Cook, MAI (Cook) who appraised the land as part of his cost approach, 
determined based on the annual reports to shareholders, the environmental agreement, the contracts 
which provide for indemnification and the fact that Alliant has been reimbursed by the United States 
Government for the remediation costs, that there is no net liability to Alliant with respect to 
environmental contamination at the Bacchus facilities. Therefore, Mr. Cook made no deduction 
from the land value or total property value for contamination remediation or monitoring. 
60. Mr. Reilly disagreed with Mr. Cook. The view of Mr. Reilly is that the contracts, 
including Alliant's contracts with the government, and its indemnification agreement with Hercules, 
provide that "Alliant has to exhaust all other potential remedies before it can go back to Hercules and 
then can only effectively get remedies from Hercules through litigation." Testimony of Robert 
Reilly, Tr. at 201. Mr. Reilly's testimony was that Alliant's contracts " . . . fall into different 
categories, there's the fixed fee type of contract, there's the totally cost reimbursed type of contract, 
there's the cost plus contract." Id. at 268-271. Under these contracts, Mr. Reilly states Alliant's 
recovery of its costs incurred for environmental contamination is problematic at best. 
61. Mr. Reilly further testified that Mr. Cook's representations about Alliant's 
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potential reimbursement and/or indemnity for environmental costs are not relevant because the "new 
buyer [the willing buyer under Utah law] would most likely not get the indemnification. The 
indemnification doesn't transfer with the land." Tr. at 200. Mr. Reilly further testified that 
indemnification and reimbursement are not relevant to the valuation of the land, because "if you 
value the property - if you value the site as if vacant and unimproved, then you have to take out 
environmental liabilities and you have to take out stigma." Tr. at 1169. 
62. After reviewing the testimony, the Commission finds there is some evidence of 
contamination, but it is insufficient to quantify the decrement in value that has occurred because of 
such contamination. 
63. The highest and best use of the property is as a rocket manufacturing plant, and 
future purchasers of the property would likely continue to use it as a rocket manufacturing plant. It is 
probable that the federal government will continue to reimburse Alliant for the necessary and 
allowable remediation and monitoring expenses. 
64. The evidence is unclear from the record what obligations the federal government 
would have to continue making those reimbursements for monitoring if Alliant did not continue to 
own the property, particularly if there were not any government contracts for productions on the 
property. 
65. It is not clear from the evidence that the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) corrective action consent order between Hercules, Inc., and the State of Utah runs with 
the land and would be binding on any future owners of the land. 
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66. Because of the reimbursement of all remediation and monitoring costs; the lack 
of evidence to show whether the consent order runs with the land; and the difficulty in quantifying 
any contamination, the Commission concludes Petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there should be a decrement in the land values for contamination 
remediation and/or monitoring. 
STIGMA 
67. Petitioner also proposed an adjustment to the RCNLD values for "stigma". This 
proposed adjustment is to attempt to quantify a reduction in value because of a negative impression 
of the property created by the contamination. This negative impression may make it more difficult to 
sell the property, which would extend the time necessary for any sale to occur. 
68. Mr. Reilly's proposed deduction for stigma is based upon the additional time, an 
additional two to three years, to sell contaminated property. "If you assume that the willing buyer -
willing seller would not receive the proceeds of the sale for an additional two or so years at that net 
ten and a half discount rate, the reduction in the present value of the proceeds is about 2.3, 2.4 
million in 1997 based upon a site value of $23.9 million." The same methodology was used for other 
years. 
69. Mr. Cook's position on stigma is that consideration of eight factors lead him to 
conclude there should be no deduction in Alliant's land values for stigma. These eight factors 
include: unknown remediation costs, future liability, financeability restrictions, replaceability, 
marketing perception and increased marketing time. Mr. Cook further testified these factors played 
no role in reducing Alliant's land value for stigma because "of the fact that the government is very 
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much a part of the reimbursement program, [and because] there is an indemnification with Hercules 
as a back-up." Tr. at 738. 
70. There is evidence that some contamination may exist on this property, but there is 
no evidence that it would affect the purchase price of the property. Petitioner purchased this property 
from Hercules, Inc., only a few years ago, and there is no evidence that any such "stigma" either 
delayed the closing on the property or that the price paid was reduced. Therefore, Petitioner has 
failed to meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that there should be a 
decrement in the land values for "stigma". 
FUNCTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE 
71. With respect to functional obsolescence, the parties agree that "functional 
obsolescence [is] the reduction in value (1) of real estate (and specifically land improvements and 
buildings); and (2) of tangible personal property due to its inability to perform the function (or yield 
the utility) for which it is originally designated." P-Reilly-2 at 7. Functional obsolescence is in 
addition to depreciation, which is a loss in value caused by physical wear and tear. 
72. Any abnormal or excessive functional obsolescence and external obsolescence 
are considered separately and are not included in the Marshall Valuation Service Cost Manual tables. 
Cook Appraisal at 48, Exh. R-3. 
73. For functional obsolescence, Mr. Reilly deducted $18,650,000 for 1997; 
$19,290,000 for 1998; and $19,600,000 for 1999 from the stipulated RCNLD. Exhibit P-Reilly-3, 
Exhibit A (Revised). 
74. The Roger Weir Report of March 10,2000, was prepared by an Alliant employee 
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for purposes of maintaining records of the use of the buildings for submittal to the United States 
Government. P. Cook Tr. April 26, 2001, at 766-67. 
75. The report lists the buildings at Bacchus West, NIROP, and Plant One. P. Reilly-
2 (attachment). 
76. Mr. Weir categorized the buildings into three categories: buildings which are 
generally in use, but utilization may be less than optimum; buildings which have been placed on 
stand-by for possible future use; and buildings which have been abandoned. Cook Appraisal at 49, 
Exh.R-3. 
77. In proposing his deduction from RCNLD for functional obsolescence, Mr. Reilly 
made his own study similar to the Roger Weir Report and deducted the full value of the buildings 
which he determined were "not used or not needed." Tr. at 191. This included the buildings which 
have either been placed on stand-by for possible future use, or have been abandoned. 
78. Mr. Cook used the Roger Weir Report to identify buildings that might suffer from 
economic obsolescence. Mr. Cook's appraisal said, "in the case of either standby or abandoned 
buildings which are still in use beyond a nominal level the reproduction or replacement cost new 
figures have been reviewed. If they are in line with the costs of buildings that support existing use, 
no additional obsolescence is assessed. If the costs are measurably higher than would be expected 
for use to which those improvements are now put, additional obsolescence is assessed based on the 
difference between reported costs new and a reasonable cost for the actual use." 
79. After issuing his original appraisal, Mr. Cook made a physical inspection of the 
property in September 2000, Following that physical inspection, Mr. Cook issued a supplemental 
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report in which he testified the functional obsolescence was $14,745,524 for 1997; $15,150,370 for 
1998; and $15,183,914 for 1999. 
80. One of the buildings Mr. Cook included as having taxable value was the NIROP 
administration building which is Mno longer used", which he said would have "shell value" of $2.4 
million. Tr. at 770. The largest portion of the difference in functional obsolescence between Mr. 
Cook and Mr. Reilly is in this one building.
 f 
81. The expert witnesses for both parties agree there is functional obsolescence in 
numerous buildings located on the property. There was general, though not complete, agreement on 
which buildings were partially or fully functionally obsolete. Mr. Reilly deducted the full value of 
all buildings that were "not used or not needed", whereas Mr. Cook left some "shell value" for some 
of those buildings. 
82. Mr. Reilly provided a complete list and values of the buildings which he 
determined were functionally obsolete because they were "not used or not needed", whereas Mr. 
Cook did not have with him, and did not provide, the list and values of the buildings he determined 
were partially or fully functionally obsolete. Therefore, the Commission could not review, evaluate 
and compare the buildings on Mr. Cook's list to the buildings on Mr. Reilly's list to determine 
whether or not the inclusion of a "shell value" is appropriate. 
83. The Commission concludes that Petitioner met its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the buildings on the list of Mr. Reilly were functionally obsolete, 
and the values thereof should be removed from the total values in the amounts proposed by Mr. 
Reilly. By making this determination, the Commission is not making a finding or determination that 
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all buildings that are "not used or not needed" do not have value. 
ECONOMIC OBSOLESCENCE 
84. Economic obsolescence is generally defined as "a reduction in the value of real 
estate improvements and of tangible personal property due to the impact of economic conditions that 
are external to and not controlled by the physical nature or the structural or mechanical operation of 
the property." Exhibit P-Reilly-3 at 9, and Resp. Exhibit 3 at 53, quoting "The Appraisal of Real 
Estate", page 392 (11th ed.). Further, there are two general methodologies by which economic 
obsolescence is measured. The first method is a "paired data analysis" by which one property 
without any economic obsolescence is compared to another property that suffers from economic 
obsolescence. The second is a "capitalization of rent loss" technique by which economic 
obsolescence is the quantifiable difference in the capitalized rent between the property when there is 
little or no economic obsolescence and another property which suffers from economic obsolescence. 
85. The parties agree that Alliant's Bacchus Works may have suffered some 
economic obsolescence although Respondent has argued that the economic obsolescence, if any, is 
minimal. The primary issue is how to measure and quantify that economic obsolescence, and it is 
the largest issue in this proceeding. 
86. Petitioner has submitted that economic obsolescence should be measured and 
deducted from RCNLD based upon the following reasons: 
a. The strategic solid rocket motor market is declining. Estimated industry 
sales in 1991 were approximately $2.5 billion, which fell to 
approximately $1 billion in 2000, and are estimated to be less in the 
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When the Bacchus Works was originally constructed by Hercules, it was 
built to manufacture large rocket motors such as the space shuttle 
boosters. The plant has not operated at peak production capacity because 
(1) Petitioner was not successful in getting some expected contracts such 
as a second source shuttle contract; (2) the government missile business 
declined; and (3) much of the current business is expendable launch 
vehicle (ELV) business which are smaller products than that for which 
the facility was originally built. 
When Bacchus West was initially constructed, it was intended to produce 
large-scale rocket motors up to ten (10) feet in diameter, such as the 
space shuttle. Tr. 37. 
After the Cold War came to an end in 1989, several missile programs 
were cancelled and the missile business has significantly declined. Tr. 
38. 
The space shuttle launch rates are only approximately one-third of what 
was originally planned when Bacchus West was constructed. Tr. 38. 
The solid propulsion industry was adversely affected when Alliant was 
not selected to continue development of the evolved expendable launch 
vehicle system (EELV), using a solid propellant, and two other 
companies (Boeing and Lockheed-Martin) were selected to continue 
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EELV development using liquid propulsion systems. Tr. 40-42. 
g. Some Russian technology has replaced some of the United States 
Technology. Tr. 42-43. 
h. The bidding on projects has gone from government supported cost-plus 
programs to commercial fixed-price programs. Tr. 44-45. 
87. Based upon these reasons, Mr. Reiliy, on Schedule I of Exhibit 3-Reilly, used 
several economic indicators and compared the information for the years at issue (1997, 1998 and 
1999) with a base period of 1984 through 1990. 
88. Respondent argues there is very little justification for an economic obsolescence 
adjustment because of the following: 
a. Prior to the purchase of the Bacchus Works facility from Hercules, 
Alliant retained Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., which reported that 
"overall, the solid rocket motor [market] is likely to experience a slight 
decline, but will remain viable for the foreseeable future. Although the 
industry is likely to consolidate to some extent, Hercules' market position 
appears to be strong and they will likely be a long term survivor." Booz-
Allen Report at 12-12-13, Exh. R-63, AT005382-83. Based on that 
report and further evaluation, Alliant believed it could increase 
shareholder value with the purchase. Shareholder Report, Exh. R-25 at 
33. 
b. Aires Analytics, another consultant to Alliant at the time of purchase, 
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predicted that "both HAC and Thiokol Corporation ("Thiokol") should 
survive the growing competition and would likely emerge as the future 
U.S. producers of large solid rocket motors." Shareholder Report at 32, 
Exh.R-25 
c. Alliant knew of the potential negative influences existing in the market 
before it decided to purchase Hercules Aerospace. The Aires Report 
stated that "budget constraints will probably prevent the U.S. Government 
from beginning any new launch development programs that could affect, 
within the next 10 years, the market for large solid rocket motors." 
Shareholder Report at 32. Similarly, when Alliant purchased HAC it was 
aware that the "demand for unmanned launches by the . . . Titan IV, 
which uses HAC boosters, will be significantly reduced." Id. 
d. Alliant received its largest solid rocket motor contract in its history when 
it was awarded a $750 Million contract to produce solid rocket motors for 
Boeing's Delta launch vehicle in 1998. Since the acquisition, Alliant also 
increased its share of the Titan solid rocket motor upgrade (SRMU) 
market by winning the entire Titan SRMU business from a competitor, 
Chemical Systems Division. Shareholder Report at 105. 
e. John M. Logsdon, III, Director of the Space Policy Institute, George 
Washington University, and a leading expert in the space field, reports 
that Alliant "has become firmly positioned as the leading supplier for 
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solid rocket motors for expendable launch vehicle." Report at 1, Exh. R-
24. 
f. Alliant aerospace management reported to Alliant's Board of Directors in 
1998 that it had 70% of the ELV solid rocket motor market. Logsdon's 
report shows a steady increase in the numbers of ELV launches since the 
mid 1980's. Jeff Foote, President of Aerospace Propulsion of Alliant, 
stated that Alliant has a contract with Boeing to produce 176 Delta IV 
motors, the latest entry into the EELV market. Foote Dep. at 16-17. 
Affirming this outlook in 1999, Alliant's aerospace management reported 
to its Board of Directors that 1999 "has been an excellent year." Exh. R-
11. 
g. The number of expendable launch vehicle launches has increased from 
1984 to 1999. Those during 1984 to 1990 average 11.5 launches per year 
and are as follows: 
1984 16 
1985 8 
1986 4 
1987 8 
1988 10 
1989 13 
1990 2 i 
Total: 80 
h. The number of launches of expendable launch vehicles for 1996 is 26; 
1997 is 30; 1998 is 26; 1999 is 30. Logsdon Tr. April 25, 2001 at 586. 
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i. Booz-Allen & Hamilton projected 1995 to 1999 total sales for the Trident 
strategic missile to be $325 million. Actual sales for the first five years 
were $336.5 million, which equates to 107.3% of projection. CookTr. 
April 26, 2001 at 805-806, Exh. R-97. 
j . Space sales were projected at $909 million dollars for 1995 to 1999, but 
actual sales were $1,225 billion dollars or 140% of the projection. The 
combined sales projection for 1995 to 1999 was $1,234 billion dollars 
and the actual sales were $1.622 billion dollars, or 131.5% of projection. 
Cook Tr. April 26, 2001 at 806, Exh. R-97. 
k. Petitioner is the leading supplier for solid rocket motors (SRM) for U.S. 
manufactured expendable launch vehicles, supplying SRM's for five of 
the nine ELV's in current use — Titan IV, Delta II, Delta III, Pegasus and 
Taurus. (Other U.S. ELV's in current use are the Atlas II and Atlas III, 
Athena and Titan II.) In addition, Alliant will supply SRM's for some 
models of the Delta IV family of EELV's which are scheduled to enter 
service in 2001. Logsdon Report at 1, Exh. R-24. 
1. Those EELV's which use Alliant solids have accounted for most of the 
U.S. ELV launches in recent years. Projected launches for CY 2001-2002 
include 17 Delta II launches, six Delta III launches, the first launch of 
Delta IV, four Titan IV launches, four Pegasus launches, and one Taurus 
launch (with only six Atlas launches and one Titan II launch scheduled 
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during the same period among the other ELV's.) Logsdon Report at 1, 
Exh. R-24. 
m. The percentage of ELV launches using Alliant solid rocket motors was 
60% in 1997, 72% in 1998, and 70% in 1999. 
n. Alliant provides solid rocket motors for all three launch vehicle markets, 
i.e., heavy, medium and light, 
o. Since Alliant purchased Hercules, a commercial market has emerged for 
both commercial and governmental users for solid rocket motor strap-ons. 
p. For 1996, 1997 and 1998, Delta II launches have exceeded the Aires 
Analytics projection. Delta III and IV are new launch vehicles for which 
Alliant provides some or all of the solid rocket motor, which were not 
anticipated at the time of the acquisition of Hercules, 
q. The decline in the rate of worldwide expendable launch vehicle launches 
is due solely to the decline in the Soviet and Russian space captive 
market. Logsdon Tr. April 25, 2001 at 563. 
r. Although the decline of Communism and the cold war did result in a 
reduction in demand for strategic and tactical missiles, it had very little 
impact on the space market. 
s. The facilities at Bacchus West were built to manufacture solid rocket 
motors for the Trident II, the Titan IV B, the Delta and the Pegasus and 
all of these programs continued through 1999. NASA's budget has not 
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been cut and was essentially flat during the years in question. NASA's 
projects have not been scaled down or functions reduced. Logsdon Tr. 
April 25, 2001 at 568-571. 
89. If the measure of any economic obsolescence is to be the "capitalized rent loss", 
the parties strongly disagree over the "benchmark" from which to measure such loss. Petitioner 
argues the loss should be measured from the time most of the Bacchus West plant was built from 
1984 to 1990, and it should be based upon the present unused capacity of the property 
90. Mr. Reilly, for Petitioner, measures economic obsolescence at Bacchus Works by 
comparing (1) historical Bacchus Works' results of operations vs. current results of operations; (2) 
Bacchus Works' capital appropriation requests vs. actual financial performance; (3) projected 
Bacchus Works' financial performance vs. actual financial performance; (4) required Bacchus Works' 
cost of capital vs. actual return on invested capital; (5) projected Bacchus Works' internal rate of 
return vs. actual rate of return; and (6) industry demand analysis. Exh. P-Reilly-3, p. 78, Schedule 1. 
91. To determine these measures, Mr. Reilly adjusted the financial statements for 
Bacchus Works operations provided by Alliant to (1) exclude the results of the Hercules fiber plant, 
a property that was not purchased by Alliant; (2) exclude accounts payable, as the account payable 
balance was inconsistently accounted for between Bacchus Works and its parent company 
throughout the historical period analyzed; and (3) re-classified certain expenditures as "fixed assets" 
that were previously classified as "other assets". 
92. Based on that analysis, Mr. Reilly concluded the economic obsolescence for the 
years in question was 50% for 1997, 55% for 1998, and 45% for 1999. Exhibit P-Reilly-3 p. 78, 
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Schedule 1. 
93. On the other hand, Respondent argues that any loss should be measured only 
from the time Petitioner purchased the property from Hercules, and should be based only on any 
reductions in value occurring after the date of purchase by Petitioner. The position of Respondent is 
that any economic obsolescence suffered by Petitioner should be based upon its own purchase price 
for the property, and other financial data, and not on the amount paid by Hercules to construct or 
acquire the property approximately fifteen (15) years prior to the lien dates. 
94. Mr. Cook, for Respondent, maintains that a proper benchmark for measuring 
economic obsolescence, which is similar to a paired sales analysis, is the allocation of the purchase 
price of the Bacchus Works from Hercules by Alliant, and comparing that to the values determined 
using the cost approach. Mr. Cook compared his preliminary cost values (reproduction 
cost/replacement cost new less normal depreciation, less extraordinary functional obsolescence, plus 
land and personal property at Bacchus Works and Clearfield) to the allocated sale price of Bacchus 
Works. Based upon that analysis, Mr. Cook concluded there was little or no economic obsolescence 
for the years 1997 to 1999 as is reflected in the following table. 
1997 1998 1999 
Subject Purchase Price Analysis 
Allocated Purchase Price 347,300,000 347,300,000 347,300,000 
Preliminary Cost Values 335,199,904 364,199,583 337,768,315 
Difference (Possible Obsolescence) 0 - 16,899,583 0 
Difference Expressed as a Percent 0.00% 4.64% 0.00% 
Cook Appraisal at 94, Exh. R-3; Cook Supp. at 14, Exh. R-4 
- 2 7 -
, <• c ; o 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal No. 99-0190 
95. Mr. Cook also attempted to measure economic obsolescence by calculating a 
return on property, plant and machinery (PP&M) and estimated the range of economic obsolescence. 
The low end of economic obsolescence based upon a return on PP&M would be no obsolescence for 
1997,1998 or 1999. The high end of economic obsolescence based upon that calculation would be 
$10,844,523 for 1997, $4,806,525 for 1998, and zero for 1999. Mr. Cook's final conclusion of 
economic obsolescence is $5,700,000 for 1997, $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999. Cook 
Supp. at 14, Exhibit R-4. 
96. The primary method Mr. Cook used to determine economic obsolescence was to 
allocate the total purchase price to the Bacchus West facility, and comparing that allocated purchase 
price with his cost values, and the difference is his possible obsolescence. Mr. Cook testified that a 
purchase price analysis would indicate economic obsolescence of approximately $16,900,000 for 
1998, but zero for both 1997 and 1999. 
97. Mr. Cook also made an analysis of earnings before income taxes (EBIT) and 
earnings before income taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITIDA), and arrived at a low end 
and high end of economic obsolescence. The low end was zero for all three years, and the high end 
was $10,844,523 for 1997, $4,806,525 for 1998, and zero for 1999. 
98. Based upon his analysis, Mr. Cook made a final estimate of economic 
obsolescence of $5,700,000 for 1997, $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999. 
99. The Commission determines that although the property may have some economic 
obsolescence, the amounts recommended by Mr. Reilly are excessive and would not result in an 
accurate representation of the fair market value of the property. This determination is made in part 
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for the following reasons: 
a. In Exhibit IV-1, p. 83 to Exhibit 3-Reilly, his "Historical Results of 
Operations vs. Current Results of Operations" analysis, Mr. Reilly bases 
part of his proposed economic obsolescence adjustment on data that is 
relatively meaningless. He began by using historical return on net 
tangible assets (RONTA) that begins in 1984, prior to the construction of 
any of the assets now on the books of the company. Virtually all of the 
income in 1984 was earned on assets from NIROP, and those assets were 
not on the books of either Petitioner or Hercules. In addition, many of the 
assets from Plant 1 were nearly fully depreciated, so the return on assets 
is not meaningful. Therefore, notwithstanding Mr. Reilly's testimony that 
a 170% return on assets "was normal for 1984", (Tr. 457-458) the 
Commission finds it was not a normal return on net tangible assets, and it 
does not provide a basis upon which economic obsolescence should be 
calculated. 
b. All of the calculations used by Mr. Reilly on Exhibit IV-1, p. 83 to 
Exhibit 3-Reilly begin very high for 1984, and then rapidly decline. We 
find the rates of return on which Reilly based his economic obsolescence 
calcluations did not begin to stabilize until 1988. The use of 1984 to 
1987 accordingly distorts his base period calculation If Mr. Reilly's 
method of calculating economic obsolescence is used with 1988 as the 
- 2 9 -
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initial year, it results in no economic obsolescence. 
c. Mr. Reilly's calculations of return on total assets and return on equity are 
both tainted and distorted by a $ 120,000,000 adjustment Mr. Reilly made 
for a litigation settlement amount received from Lockheed-Martin. Mr. 
Reilly acknowledged that effect. (Tr. 329, 331, 335 and 336).
 { 
d. Mr. Reilly demonstrated a decline in the military missile market, but he 
failed to take into consideration the increase in the commercial satellite 
launch business, thereby significantly overstating the amount of economic 
obsolescence. 
100. The Commission likewise has difficulty accepting in full the economic 
obsolescence methodology applied by Mr. Cook for the following reasons: 
a. The Commission is not fully comfortable with the measurement of 
economic obsolescence made by Mr. Cook based upon an allocation of 
»
;
 the purchase price in this case. The purchase price by Alliant from 
Hercules involved property in multiple states and multiple counties in this 
state. Mr. Cook made a good faith effort to allocate a portion of the 
purchase price to the property in Salt Lake County. That process required 
making numerous assumptions, and while most of the assumptions 
appear to be reasonable, they are still somewhat speculative. A change in 
any of those assumptions could make a substantial difference in the 
ultimate conclusion. The Commission finds that the assumptions made in 
. - 3 0 -
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making an estimate of economic obsolescence by Mr. Cook using an 
allocation of the purchase price were not fully supported. The purchase, 
price allocation method is not a true "paired data analysis". Rather, it 
combines elements of a comparable sales approach with a cost approach. 
Although this method may indicate the existence of obsolescence, it does 
not provide a reliable measure of that obsolescence. 
b. The Commission finds that Mr. Cook's "Capitalization Rate Analysis" 
amounts to a comparison of income approach conclusions of value with 
the preliminary cost figures. It is not a true "capitalized rent loss" 
methodology. As is the case with the allocated purchase price 
methodology, this technique appears to compare two approaches; the 
income capitalization approach and the cost approach. Although Mr. 
Cook compares capitalization rates as a measure, capitalizing the income 
at his "target rate" and allocating any difference to his cost figures can 
achieve the exact same results. However, as with his sales allocation 
method, Mr. Cook's "capitalization rate analysis" appears to be a 
reasonable technique for identifying the possible existence of economic 
obsolescence. 
c. With respect to the other financial analyses made by Mr. Cook, the 
Commission finds there is not adequate foundation and support for his 
rates of return, debt rate, gross margin, and other general measures of 
- 3 1 -
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relative performance determinations to conclude that they relate to 
economic obsolescence. These are more indicative of how the going 
concern is performing relative to expectations or other elements of 
Petitioner's business, rather than whether the physical assets suffer from 
economic obsolescence. 
101. The Commission therefore finds that Mr. Cook's appraisal substantiates the 
existence of economic obsolescence in at least the amounts stated in his report. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just administration of property 
taxes to ensure that property is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-210(7). 
2. To prevail, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original 
assessment contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for 
reducing the original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V. Bd. Of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997). Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979). However, in this case neither party presented evidence to 
support the determination of value made by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
Accordingly, each party has the burden of proof to provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary 
basis, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the fair market value of the property. Once 
the parties stipulated to the initial land and facility values, either party desiring to increase or 
decrease those values must provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis by a 
- 3 2 -
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decrease those values must provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis by a 
preponderance of the evidence, for any proposed modifications from those stipulated amounts. 
3. A tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person 
or any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is used 
in connection with a business conducted for profit. This includes property which is owned by the 
United States Government but used in connection with a business conducted for profit. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-4-101. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that the NIROP plant is not exempt and is subject to the privilege tax 
imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et. seq. The NIROP property is used in connection with a 
business conducted for profit, and the lease and contract entitle Petitioner to exclusive possession of 
the premises. 
We have previously addressed Petitioner's NIROP arguments in the context of an earlier case 
that is now on appeal in District Court. We believe that decision is correct and reaffirm it here. 
First, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioner is enjoying the beneficial use of the NIROP 
facilities in connection with a business being conducted for profit. Accordingly, under Section 59-4-
103(l)(a), that beneficial use is subject to the privilege tax, unless one of the exceptions in (l)(b) or 
(c) applies. There is no allegation that either of the exceptions applies. 
Petitioner does argue, however, that it is exempt from the privilege tax under Section 59-4-
103(3)(e). That section provides that no privilege tax is imposed on the use or possession of 
property pursuant to a lease, permit, or easement, unless the lease, permit or easement entitles the 
- 3 3 -
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lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the property. First, it is not clear that the contractual 
arrangement between the Navy and NIROP is a lease, permit or easement. It certainly is not a lease 
or an easement in the classic sense. 
Even if the contract constitutes a permit, however, we do not believe the supervisory 
activities of the Navy can be said to interfere with Alliant's exclusive possession of the premises. 
There is no indication in the record that the Navy's presence here is different than the government 
oversight provided in federal defense procurement projects generally. It is our understanding that 
such procurement contracts were a significant factor in motivating Utah, as well as most other states, 
to adopt the privilege tax in the first place. We believe that this type of contract is exactly a situation 
that the privilege tax was intended to reach. See generally Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 393 
P.2d 391 (1964). The oversight by Lockheed and Boeing was not such as to interfere with Alliant's 
exclusive possession. Lockheed and Boeing were there to facilitate and supervise Alliant's 
fulfillment of its own duties under the contract. Although they had a right to enter the property, 
neither Boeing nor Lockheed had any right to possession of the property that in any way diminished 
Alliant's interest. Accordingly, we believe that Alliant's use of the NIROP property during the years 
in issue is properly subject to tax. 
We also conclude that the stipulations of the parties regarding the land values and 
facilities values are a reasonable fair market value of the property of Petitioner, except for any 
possible considerations for contamination, stigma, functional obsolescence, and economic (or 
external) obsolescence. However, we do conclude there is insufficient evidence to establish there 
should be a decrement in value for either contamination or stigma, but there should be a decrement 
- 3 4 -
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in value for functional obsolescence as set forth herein. 
In addition, we conclude that the Bacchus Works suffers from economic 
obsolescence. Both appraisers reported economic obsolescence in their appraisals. However, neither 
appraiser has given us a completely reliable basis for estimating that obsolescence. As noted above, 
we find that Mr. Reilly's methodology clearly overstates economic obsolescence. Although we do 
not agree with Mr. Cook's specific methodology, we find that his conclusions at least provide a 
floor. All of the evidence indicates there is economic obsolescence in 1997 and 1998 of at least the 
amount determined by Mr. Cook. Therefore, we find economic obsolescence of $5,700,000 for 1997 
and $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999. 
-35-
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The fair market value of the property should therefore by calculated as follows: 
1997 1998 1999 
Land Values (per Stipulation) 
$ 35,545,692 
Contamination 0 
Stigma 0 
Total Land Values $ 35,545,692 
FACILITY 
$ 39,322,360 
0 
0 
$ 39,322,360 
$ 41,052,358 
0 
0 
$ 41,052,358 
PLANT 1 
NIROP 
BACCHUS WEST 
SUBTOTAL 
Deletions 
Additions 
TOTAL FACILITY 
Total Land and Facility 
Functional Obsolescence 
Sub-total 
Economic Obsolescence 
Fair Market Value 
Rounded 
$ 61,767,570 
$ 38,082,662 
$ 104,163,666 
$ 204,013,898 
$ 
$ 
$204,013,898 
$239,559,590 
$ 18,650,000 
$ 220,909,590 
$ 5,700,000 
$215.209.590 
$215.210.000 
$ 63,263.144 
$ 38,676,540 
$ 106.633,254 
$ 208,572,938 
$ 
$ 813,536 
$ 209.386.474 
$ 248,708,834 
$ 19,250,000 
$ 229,458,834 
$ 16,900,000 
$ 212.558.834 
$212.559.000 
$ 63,538,813 
$ 38,669,210 
$ 107,508,194 
$209,716,217 
$ 
$ 1,481,309 
$211,197.526 
$ 252,249,884 
$ 19,600,000 
$ 232,649,884 
$ 0 
$ 232.649.884 
$232.650.000 
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the market value of the 
subject property is $215,210,000 for 1997, $212,559,000 for 1998, and $232,650,000 for 1999. The 
Commission further determines the NIROP property is not exempt and is subject to the taxes 
imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et. seq. It is so ordered. 
DATED this /d day of AM/MAA/ , 2001. 
G. Blaine Davis 
Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this //3 day of filflfcrn/UA / 2001. 
n W L J 2 _ ^ / / /&/^^\^%&&Ar 
Pam Hendrickson R. Bruce Johnson 
Commission Chair Commissioner 
/fljUuA^W fJL^C^ 
Palmer DePaulis Marc B. Johns 
Commissioner Commission-
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request 
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thiity 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
GBD/ssw/99-0190.fof 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Deputy 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW (1259) c^° ^P/r^ 
MAXWELL A. MILLER (2264) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendants, 
and 
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
• id 3 , a Dist. Civil No. 980901298 
(1995-1996 valuation tax years) 
*i*Jc*j<*i:***j;Jc**JcJcJ:JtJf'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'kmk-ki;'ki('kJc'k'k-k-k-k 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, 
3rd Dist. Civil No. 010908307 
(1997-1999 valuation tax years) 
504867.1 V U £ 6 8 1 
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Defendants, 
and 
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. • 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER 4th Dist. Civil No. 990402607 
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE (Independent Action) 
COUNTYASSESSOR; LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER; 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY 
HORIUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in 
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants. 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Interveners 
cn / i o /T i i 
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On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant"), and Defendants 
Salt Lake County, its officers and assessors, entered into a written stipulation in settlement of the 
above-captioned matter. The Salt Lake County Commission approved the Settlement Agreement 
on December 6, 2000, and on December 15, 2000 parties to the Settlement Agreement filed a 
Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving 
Settlement ("Joint Motion") with this Court. 
The parties in the above-captioned matter, including Defendants-Intervenors Lee 
Gardner, Utah State Tax Commission, and Granite School District (collectively "Defendants") 
subsequently filed their respective memoranda stating their positions on the Joint Motion. On 
March 13, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion. 
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" 
("Decision") dated September 20, 2001 with respect to the Joint Motion. 
On June 7, 2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it considered: 
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its Decision 
That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement; 
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; 
3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and consideration of 
Plaintiffs [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and 
--
 4* f> p f»". f* 
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4. The Award of Attorneys'Fees. 
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint 
Motion for Approval of Settlement. 
2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through April 27, 
2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through 
1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was 
$215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively. 
3. On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third 
District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, et al , Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the 
County's assessments of Alliant's real property for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "1997-
1999 Valuation Case"). Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as 
a Tax Court Judge. 
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry 
dated October 9, 2001. 
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5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian, 
sitting as a Tax Court Judge. 
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was AUiant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated 
"Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts. 
7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court. 
No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending 
before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed 
February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick (980901298). This first 
case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves AUiant's statutory and 
constitutional challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates 
under the direction and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve 
Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999 and future years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States 
Constitution. 
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP 
Action to a 'Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et al, cases are appeals that 
either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax Commission 
ou2o77 
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{ 
("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's 
1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case"). 
The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996 
Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring (990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis < 
(00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and Memmott 00070001). Again with agreement from 
all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable 
Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP 
Action. 
10. By Order dated on November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 1997-
i 
1999 Valuation Case to this Court. 
11. On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant 
entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for | 
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000, 
the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected legislative body, adopted and 
approved the Settlement Agreement. 
12. On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary 
Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing 
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax 
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive. 
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are ^ 
all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property 
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tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action, 
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax 
matters have been dismissed. 
14. Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some 
matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes involving 
Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and the Tax 
Commission. Decision at 12. 
15. The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax 
Commission and this Court. Decision at 13. 
16. Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or y 
proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as parties to 
the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as approved and 
executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. Decision at 15. 
17. The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl Hendrickson, 
Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, and 
the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The Settlement Agreement was an 
offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties to the Settlement Agreement. 
Decision at 15. 
18. Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is an 
officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 15. 
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19. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and 
agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. Decision at 15. 
20. In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to Salt Lake 
County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and trouble of 
protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion relative 
to the merits of the respective claims. Decision at 16. 
21. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later 
attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory, constitutional 
and pragmatic arguments. Decision at 16. 
22. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties 
to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 16. 
23. There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the 
agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, 
injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy. Decision at 16. 
24. This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission. 
25. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon 
fair market value. Decision at 17. 
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26. The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severability of the $5 
million dollar settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple 
tax years and multiple jurisdictions. Decision at 17. 
27. The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys," 
who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure an appropriate order 
from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner." Decision at 22. 
28. The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party breaches 
the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or 
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement." Decision at 22. 
29. The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to secure 
approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the Settlement Agreement; 
instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with respect to the approval process. Decision at 23. 
30. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor, advocated the 
defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the agreement on a variety of 
statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court rejects. Decision at 23. 
31. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a party 
to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt Lake County. 
Decision at 23. 
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32. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, breached 
the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather than seeking to 
secure its approval. Decision at 23. 
33. Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not bound 
by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 23. 
34. While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax 
disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or before the 
Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations. Decision at 23. 
35. The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's 
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy 
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or 
NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the 
years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article 
VI of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 
1995-1999, clearly including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover 
future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued 
unlawful assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NIROP claims are expressly covered 
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never 
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement 
NIROP claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases. 
ou2o? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36. The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith and 
anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant. Decision at 24. 
37. The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995 
through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal. Decision at 24. 
38. The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus on 
constitutional difficulties and problematic implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but 
primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor. Decision at 
13. 
39. The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement Agreement does 
not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to 
intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. Decision at 13. Defendant 
Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7, 2000, whereas the Salt Lake 
County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000. 
40. Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the amount of 
$30,000. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now therefore enters its 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Settlement Agreement is enforceable, legal and constitutional. Decision at 
21. 
2. The Court rejects Defendants' constitutional challenges to the Settlement 
Agreement, specifically including Defendants' arguments that the Settlement Agreement is 
unconstitutional because it does not assign an assessed value to the property at issue based upon 
fair market value. Decision at 21. ^ 
3. The Court rejects the Tax Commission's objection to the Settlement Agreement 
that the Tax Commission and/or Granite School District are necessary parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. Granite School District was not a necessary party to the Settlement Agreement and 
its absence as a party to the agreement does not make the Settlement Agreement unenforceable. 
Decision at 24. 4 
4. When the Court issued its Decision, jurisdiction to approve the Settlement 
Agreement was divided between this Court and the Tax Commission. This Court had partial 
jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement in that jurisdiction was then shared between 
this Court and the Tax Commission. Decision at 22. 
5. While jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement was divisible between the 
Tax Commission and the Court, the refund award to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is 
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years. Decision at 22. 
6. The refund amount of $5 million to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is i 
indivisible and non-allocable between the various tax years. Decision at 25. 
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7. The sole reason the Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement 
is that the Court's jurisdiction and the Tax Commission's jurisdiction over the years 1995 
through 1999 at issue under the Settlement Agreement were divisible. Decision at 25. 
8. The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and has authority to 
resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. Decision at 16. 
9. Alliant is entitled to attorneys' fees to be assessed against Defendant Lee Gardner, 
in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, because Mr. Gardner breached the 
Settlement Agreement in not seeking to secure approval of the Settlement Agreement. Decision 
at 24 and 25. 
10. The Court has entertained, considered and rejected Defendants' arguments against 
the Settlement Agreement and its enforcement, which include: 
10.1 At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the 
opportunity to fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property 
uniformly and equally based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-302 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102, as amended; 
10.2 The Settlement Agreement address but does not set or fix values 
based upon fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value 
violates Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 
and Utah Const. Art. XIII, sec. 2. 
10.3 Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its 
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face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive 
because the "conditional language" of the agreement is plain and 
clear; 
4 The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the 
Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The 
Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for 
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with 
differing jurisdictions; 
5 There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the 
$5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years; allocation 
would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and further, if the 
tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare; 
6 The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple 
jurisdictions; 
7 The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the 
Settlement Agreement; 
8 The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement 
Agreement is that the terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust 
and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and equal taxation 
statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally 
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flawed because there is no attempt to achieve fair market value. 
Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be achieved. 
10.9 The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases. 
10.10 The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement 
Agreement. 
10.11 Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to 
reject the Settlement Agreement. 
10.12 The Settlement Agreement cannot be implemented in its current 
form because it fails to reflect fair market value assessments. 
Decision at 17-18. 
11. This Court is not bound by the Tax Commission's decision of rejection of the 
Settlement Agreement. Decision at 13. 
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters its 
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ORDER 
Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend is hereby granted and the Court enforces the Settlement 
Agreement in its entirety. Judgment is hereby entered against Salt Lake County and in favor of 
Alliant for $5 million. The Court awards attorneys' fees to Alliant Techsystems, Inc., against 
Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, in the amount of $30,000. 
DATED this J>£_ day of June 2003. 
-"7 Honorable Lynn W. D 
Tax Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2r_ day of June, 2003,1 caused to be sent, via U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT, to: 
J. Craig Smith 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kelly W.Wright 
P.O. Box 886 
Morgan, UT 84050 
JohnE. S. Robson 
David Pearce 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
2001 South State St., S 3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters 
185 South State St., Ste. 700 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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